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ACCESS TO FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
PATRICIA A. DORE
[F]or us to blindly adhere to an erroneous rule, merely because
it has been declared in a recent earlier decision, tends to en-
shrine and perpetrate the dead error of yesterday ....
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Administrative Procedure Act establishes proce-
dural ground rules which govern the decisionmaking activities of
the executive branch agencies. The statute makes several kinds of
proceedings available to persons who are affected by proposed
agency action. With the exceptions of judicial review and judicial
enforcement, all the proceedings available under the statute are
administrative and take place in an executive forum. Nevertheless,
when a person's right to initiate an administrative proceeding is
challenged, lawyers and courts instinctively treat the question as if
it involved the right to sue on a claim in a judicial forum. The
lawyers argue about whether the person has "standing" and they
turn to the largest body of law on the subject of standing-federal
court decisions concerned with federal constitutional limitations on
the federal judicial power-to support their arguments. Conse-
quently, an incongruous body of law has developed in this state
which makes a person's right to initiate an administrative proceed-
ing in an executive forum turn on his ability to satisfy tests enun-
ciated by the federal courts for judicial standing.2
This Article critically examines this body of law and rejects the
use of any judicial standing test to determine the right of access to
administrative proceedings. In addition, it proposes to banish the
word "standing" from the discussion of the right to initiate any
executive branch proceeding. If indeed "[lianguage is the. . . ma-
1. Therrell v. Reilly, 151 So. 305, 306 (Fla. 1932), quoted in Stephen Bodzo Realty, Inc.
v. Willits International Corp., 428 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1983).
2. One commentator has noted that federal standing law and state administrative law
make strange bed fellows. Kavanaugh, Administrative Standing Under Chapter 403: What
Does the Jerry Case Mean?, 53 FLA. B.J. 729, 730-34 (1979). Two others have suggested that
the marriage brings a desirable uniformity to the law. Dubbin & Dubbin, Administrative
Law: Access to Review of Official Action-Standing Under the Florida Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815, 820-28 (1981).
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trix of perception," the writer hopes to change the way lawyers
and judges perceive executive branch proceedings by changing the
language they use to talk about them. Throughout this Article the
reader will encounter phrases like "access," "access criteria," "the
right of access to a proceeding," and "the right to initiate a pro-
ceeding." The word "standing" appears only for accurate quotation
or when the discussion concerns the right to seek judicial review.
It is hoped that by using language that carries no judicial over-
tones, the discussion about access to administrative proceedings
can be refocused on what the legislature intended when it created
the proceedings. To that end, a new analytical approach is sug-
gested. The statutory access language for each proceeding is ex-
amined and access criteria are proposed which are consistent with
the plain meaning of the language used, evidence of legislative in-
tent available from extrinsic sources, and the function and purpose
of each proceeding. Cases in which courts have used judicial stand-
ing rules to determine access to executive branch proceedings are
analyzed and an alternative analysis based on the access criteria
developed for that proceeding is given.
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF Jerry AND Florida Home Builders
While an inmate in a state prison, Leroy Jerry was found guilty
of unarmed assault and placed in disciplinary confinement. After
serving this penalty,4 Jerry filed a petition with the Division of Ad-
ministrative Hearings (DOAH) challenging the validity of the De-
partment of Offender Rehabilitation's rule under which inmates
are subjected to disciplinary confinement and loss of gain time.
The Department contended that Jerry lacked "standing" to chal-
lenge the rule because he had already been found guilty, had
served his penalty, and, therefore, was not presently affected by
the rule. The hearing officer rejected this contention, ruling that
Jerry had the requisite interest to challenge the rule because he
was an inmate contesting procedures he had been subjected to in
3. E. PAWEL, THE NIGHTMARE OF REASON 22 (1984).
4. It is unclear from the hearing officer's final order whether Jerry's petition was filed
before or after he completed his disciplinary confinement. The final order recites the De-
partment's argument as addressing the rule's effect on Jerry at the time of the final hearing
in the rule challenge proceeding rather than at the time the petition was filed. Jerry v.
Florida Dep't of Offender Rehab., DOAH Case No. 76-1951R, Final Order at 2; compare
Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
5. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-3.08 (1976). "Gain time" is a deduction from the sentence of a
prisoner who commits no violation of Department rules or laws of the State and satisfacto-
rily performs assigned tasks. FLA. STAT. § 944.275 (1985).
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the past and to which he might be subjected in the future. The
First District Court of Appeal reversed the hearing officer's final
order and held that Jerry lacked "standing" to initiate the rule
challenge proceeding.7 The court used the occasion to "attempt to
comprehend in depth the meaning of standing," which it said, "in-
volves a careful study of the pertinent provisions of the new APA,
compared with the 1961 Act as well as a comparison with the Fed-
eral APA and the cases interpreting it."'
Unfortunately, the Jerry court's study of the access provisions in
chapter 120 was cursory; its resort to the Federal APA and federal
case law was misconceived. Still, no court since has questioned the
basic but unarticulated analytic premise of the Jerry court: that
when interpreting unique Florida statutory provisions granting ac-
cess to state administrative proceedings, it is appropriate to rely on
a dissimilar federal statute, on cases interpreting that federal stat-
ute, and on United States Supreme Court cases construing the
constitutional "cases or controversies" limitation on federal court
jurisdiction.' Indeed, in Florida Home Builders Association v. De-
partment of Labor and Employment Security,0 the Florida Su-
preme Court also resorted to federal cases and to the judicial re-
view provision of the Federal APA"I in formulating a standard for
associational access to section 120.56 rule challenge proceedings.
As in Jerry, no attempt was made to explain why a federal consti-
tutional standard for standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts was relevant to resolution of a question of access to ex-
ecutive branch proceedings under Florida law.12  A careful
6. Jerry v. Department of Offender Rehab., DOAH Case No. 76-1951R, Final Order at 2.
7. Department of Offender Rehab. v. Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied
mem., 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978).
8. Id. at 1232.
9. Shortly after Jerry, another panel of the same court observed: "Whatever the law may
be in Federal courts or other jurisdictions, the Florida law on the subject has been clearly
and unambiguously settled by this court's opinion ... in [Jerry] . . . .The opinion is
clearly and lucidly written, numerous authorities are cited and the court's reasoning allows
no room for doubt." Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045,
1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
10. 412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
12. Although the court recognized that the federal cases it relied on were concerned with
the article III "cases or controversies" requirement, it nevertheless justified their use be-
cause it said the same rule had been applied to cases brought under the Federal APA. 412
So. 2d at 353. This is, of course, correct. But it begs the question. 5 U.S.C. § 702 is the
judicial review provision of the Federal APA. It establishes the standard that one injured by
federal administrative action must meet in order to initiate federal court review of that
action. The standing requirement to gain admittance to federal courts imposed by the
1986]
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examination of the federal authorities relied on in Jerry and in
Florida Home Builders reveals the inappropriateness of their use
and demonstrates the need to rethink the administrative access
question from a state law rather than a federal law perspective.
Although for different purposes, the language of the Federal
APA judicial review provision was used in both Jerry and Florida
Home Builders. Both courts also used Supreme Court decisions
concerning the standing requirements of article III for determining
the requisite interest necessary to initiate executive branch pro-
ceedings established by chapter 120. The appropriateness of rely-
ing on these two bodies of federal law is examined separately.
A. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
In Jerry and Florida Home Builders the courts were concerned
with whether the respective petitioners were "substantially af-
fected" within the meaning of section 120.56(1) and, therefore,
could initiate an administrative challenge to question the validity
of a rule before the DOAH. i' The DOAH was created by the legis-
lature to conduct hearings required by chapter 120 and other
laws. 4 Because the DOAH is not one of the courts enumerated in
article V of the Florida Constitution, it may not exercise the judi-
cial power of the state.15 Rather, the DOAH is part of the execu-
tive branch and its adjudicatory power, like that of other executive
branch agencies, is limited constitutionally to that which is consid-
ered "quasi-judicial."16
"cases or controversies" requirement applies to all article III courts, trial and appellate.
Because the requirement is constitutionally based, Congress may not lessen it by statute. In
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488, n.24 (1982), the Court stated: "Neither the [APA], nor any other
congressional enactment, can lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. III."
All of the authorities relied on by the Florida Supreme Court were concerned with the arti-
cle III "cases or controversies" limitation on the federal courts.
13. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (1985) provides that "[a]ny person substantially affected by a
rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground
that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."
14. Id. § 120.65(2).
15. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 provides in relevant part that "[tihe judicial power shall be
vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No
other courts may be established by the state .... "
16. Id. art. V, § 1 specifies that "[c]ommissions established by law, or administrative
officers or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the func-
tions of their offices." See also Point Management, Inc. v. Department of Business Reg., 449
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Bowen v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566, 568
(Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (ruling that inverse condemnation actions may not be adjudicated by
administrative agencies), aff'd mem., 472 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1985); Winter Springs Dev. Corp.
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Nevertheless, when the Jerry and Florida Home Builders courts
sought assistance from the Federal APA in interpreting Florida's
statutory access requirements concerning proceedings conducted
by this executive branch agency, they both converged on the judi-
cial review provision in that federal statute. This may be ex-
plained, in part, by the fact that the Federal APA makes no allow-
ance for the administrative challenge to rules. Under the Federal
APA, the closest analogue is the adjudicatory hearing provision;
however, that section offers no guidance on the access question be-
cause its operation is dependent upon statutes external to the
APA." Consequently, the only provision in the Federal APA bear-
ing on the question of access is section 702. In that section the
standards for judicial review of agency action are prescribed in the
following terms: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."' 8 The Florida Home Builders court found this language
sufficiently similar to the "[a]ny person substantially affected by a
rule" language of section 120.56(1) to justify reliance on all federal
standing cases.' 9 The Jerry court, on the other hand, had sug-
gested that the federal section 702 language was "practically the
same standard" as that found in Florida Statutes section 120.68(1),
which affords judicial review to "[a] party who is adversely affected
by final agency action," but noted the dissimilarity between the
v. Florida Power Corp., 402 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (stating that an adminis-
trative agency is without power to award money damages for breach of contract); Peck Plaza
Condominium v. Division of Fla. Land Sales & Condominiums, 371 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1979) (ruling that an agency may not interpret contracts); Carrollwood State Bank v.
Lewis, 362 So. 2d 110, 113-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (ruling that an agency may not resolve a
constitutional challenge to a statute or rule), cert. denied mern., 372 So. 2d 467 (1979);
Biltmore Constr. Co. v. Department of Gen. Servs., 363 So. 2d 851, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
(ruling that an agency may not order specific performance of a contract which only a court
in the exercise of its equitable powers may decree); Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Leon
County, 344 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (ruling that DOAH hearing officers exercise
quasi-judicial power only when holding proposed rules invalid because violative of Florida
Constitution); Department of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290, 293-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
(ruling that DOAH hearing officers exercise quasi-judicial power when deciding whether an
agency rule is a valid exercise of the power delegated to it); Department of Admin., Div. of
Personnel v. Department of Admin., Div. of Admin. Hearings, 326 So. 2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1976) (ruling that the DOAH is without power to declare a rule invalid on federal
constitutional grounds).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982) provides that "[t]his section applies, according to the provi-
sions thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing."
18. Id. § 702.
19. 412 So. 2d at 353 n.5.
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federal term "adversely affected or aggrieved" and the Florida
term "substantially affected."20
To the extent Jerry was inconsistent with its opinion in Florida
Home Builders, the Florida Supreme Court disapproved it. 21 Pre-
sumably, then, the supreme court's finding of sufficient language
similarity between section 702 and section 120.56(1) displaces the
contrary conclusion reached by the lower court in Jerry. However,
the court in Florida Home Builders expressed no view concerning
the similarity between section 702 and section 120.68(1); therefore,
the Jerry court's dictum on that point remains undisturbed. Con-
sequently, the federal standing requirement for seeking judicial re-
view of federal administrative action has been superimposed upon
or substituted for two quite differently worded provisions in chap-
ter 120. These provisions grant access to two state forums-an ex-
ecutive branch agency and article V courts-as different from each
other in origin and function as they both are from the federal
courts.
The Florida Home Builders court used section 702 as a means to
an end. The end was adoption of the Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission22 federal rule governing the stand-
ing of associations to sue in federal court on behalf of their mem-
bers. The problem, as the court recognized, was that Hunt con-
cerned the "cases or controversies" requirement of the federal
constitution. To justify its use in any event, the court tried con-
structing a bridge to the administrative process by noting that the
same standing requirement was applied to section 702 cases. Sub-
sequently, the language of section 702 was found to approximate
the language of section 120.56(1), thereby justifying looking to
Hunt and other federal judicial standing cases when considering
access to rule challenge proceedings. The court's analysis is flawed
on two accounts: first, section 702 does not establish the necessary
link to the administrative process; second, the language dissimilari-
ties between the federal and state statutes are too palpable to be
dismissed ipse dixit.
That the same standing requirements found in Federal non-APA
cases are applied to cases brought under section 702 does not sup-
port the proposition that those standing requirements are or ought
to be imposed on the administrative process whether federal or
20. 353 So. 2d at 1233.
21. 412 So. 2d at 354.
22. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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state. Section 702 is the judicial review provision of the Federal
APA. It establishes the standard one injured by federal adminis-
trative action must meet to initiate federal court review of that
action. Federal court standing requirements imposed by the "cases
or controversies" clause of article III apply to all article III courts,
trial and appellate. 3 Because the requirements are constitutionally
imposed, Congress could not lower them through section 702.4
Consequently, the Florida Home Builders reference to section 702
did not supply the missing link; rather the court ended up pre-
cisely where it began-with article III of the United States
Constitution.
After quoting section 702, the court resolved the question of lan-
guage similarity between section 702 and section 120.56(1) in a
footnote, stating: "We believe that the standing requirement of
this statute is so similar to the 'substantially affected' requirement
of section 120.56(1) that we are justified in looking to federal case
law for guidance in formulating our rule regarding associational
standing under section 120.56."' 5 On examination, it is difficult to
accept this assertion.
Using the dictionary, the Jerry court found that "'[a]dverse' is
different in meaning from 'substantial,' the former defined as 'act-
ing against or in a contrary direction'; the latter defined as 'con-
sisting of or relating to substance, .. .not imaginary or illusory
• . .considerably large.'"26 However helpful the dictionary's dis-
tinctions between the sections' key words, the more compelling ar-
gument is found within the four corners of chapter 120. The Flor-
ida Legislature did use the phrase "adversely affected" as a
requirement for standing to seek judicial review under section
120.68(1). But "adversely affected" purposefully appears in no
other provision in the chapter. If the legislature intended the same
standards governing standing in the courts to govern access to ex-
ecutive branch proceedings, would it not have continued the same
language? What is gained by saying that a person "substantially
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ (1)-(2).
24. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Several commentators
have taken issue with the constitutional status given to the injury in fact requirement by the
Supreme Court. See L. JAFFE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINisTRATivE ACTION 462-67 (1965);
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE
L.J. 816 (1969); Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals
for Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 863 (1977).
25. 412 So. 2d at 353 n.5.
26. 353 So. 2d at 1233.
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affected" by a rule may challenge it-not in a court, but before an
executive branch agency-if what was meant was that the person
had to be "adversely affected," language with which the legislature
was familiar? It is unfortunate that the Florida Home Builders
court implicated section 702 in its construction of section
120.56(1). Its use did not serve the intended purpose; its applica-
tion encourages resort to a body of federal law which should not be
considered when construing access provisions in chapter 120.
The Jerry court did not use section 702 to determine access to
administrative rule challenge proceedings. However, in dictum that
court noted the similarity between the language of section 702 and
that of section 120.68(1). To date, no court has held that section
702 and its interpretative cases should influence whether one is en-
titled to seek judicial review of final agency action under section
120.68(1).2" Perhaps it is not too late to sound the warning.
Because both sections 702 and 120.68(1) concern standing to
seek judicial review of agency action, reliance on the federal stat-
ute when interpreting the state provision might appear more ap-
propriate here than in the context of executive branch proceedings.
In fact, the Federal APA judicial review criteria are no more rele-
vant to the meaning of section 120.68(1) than they are to the
meaning of section 120.56(1). This is so for several reasons: first,
Florida courts are not constitutionally restricted to hearing only
"cases or controversies" as are the federal courts; second, the fed-
eral and state judicial review provisions operate as part of vastly
different administrative law schemes; third, the meaning of the op-
erative terms in the federal provision are not clear and continue to
be the subject of scholarly criticism and debate.
Article V of the Florida Constitution, unlike article III of the
United States Constitution, contains no "cases or controversies"
limitation on the exercise of state court jurisdiction. Although
Florida courts generally require a person to demonstrate "special
injury" to have standing to sue,"' "special injury" is not constitu-tionally mandated and it may be abrogated by the courts or the
27. In Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Division of Labor, 355 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978), the court denied standing to seek judicial review of an emergency rule to peti-
tioners who failed to show they were adversely affected by it with citation to Jerry. That
citation, without more, cannot be read as an acceptance of the Jerry dictum. The emergency
rule contained an escape clause which permitted the petitioners, at their option, to be re-
lieved of the rule's requirements. Because they could avoid the effect of the emergency rule,
the petitioners were not adversely affected by it.
28. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
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legislature.2 9 This difference between the constitutional boundaries
of federal court jurisdiction and of state court jurisdiction makes
resort to section 702 particularly hazardous. Federal court cases in-
terpreting section 702 will and must do so with an eye focused on
federal constitutional limitations. But these limitations are irrele-
vant to Florida courts and, therefore, so are the federal cases con-
cerned with them.
When chapter 120 was adopted in 1974, one of the stated legisla-
tive purposes was to make uniform provision for judicial review.30
This purpose was achieved by providing that all review petitions
be filed in the appropriate district court of appeal, except when
review by the supreme court is provided by law.3' While the consti-
tutionally grounded prerogative writ jurisdiction of the circuit
courts has generated substantial litigation concerning the circuit
courts' proper function in policing administrative activity, 2 this is-
29. Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
30. FLA. STAT. § 120.72(1)(a) (1985).
31. Id. § 120.68(2). By operation of FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2), Public Service Commis-
sion rules and orders relating to rates and services of electric, gas, and telephone utilities are
reviewable in the supreme court.
32. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b); see, e.g., Junco v. Board of Accountancy, 390 So. 2d 329
(Fla. 1980); Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc. 361 So. 2d 695
(Fla. 1978); Department of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1978); Bowen v.
Florida Dep't of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), aff'd mem., 472 So. 2d 460
(Fla. 1985); Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Ray, 444 So. 2d
1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Atlantic International Inv. Corp., 438 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983), aff'd, 478 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1985); Commission on Ethics v. Sullivan, 430 So. 2d
928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Department of Business Reg. v. Carl & Mike, Inc., 425 So. 2d 190
(Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Key Haven Associated Enters. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund, 400 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 427 So.
2d 153 (Fla. 1982); Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So.
2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983); Smith v.
Willis, 415 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Communities Fin. Corp. v. Florida Dep't of
Envtl. Reg., 416 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); 2829 Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Bever-
ages & Tobacco, 410 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Ortega v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 409 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Department of Professional Reg. v. Fernandez-
Lopez, 407 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Department of Business Reg. v. 27th Ave. Corp.,
402 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Department of Business Reg. v. Provende, Inc., 399 So.
2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Department of Business Reg. v. N.K., Inc., 399 So. 2d 416 (Fla.
3d DCA 1981); Department of Professional Reg. v. Hall, 398 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981);
Deseret Ranches, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs., 392 So. 2d 1016
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Laborers' International Union v. Greater Orlando Aviation Auth., 385
So. 2d 716 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); E.T. Legg & Co. v. Franza, 383 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA
1980); Freeman v. School Bd. of Broward County, 382 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980);
Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Whitfield, 382 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Brown v. State,
375 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Coulter v. Davin, 373 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979);
Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Lewis, 367 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979);
Metropolitan Dade County v. Department of Commerce, 365 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978);
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sue has largely been resolved in favor of review by the district
courts of appeal after the administrative process has been
exhausted.3 3
In contrast, judicial review of federal agency action may be by
way of prerogative writ (nonstatutory review),"' or specific review
authority in the various agencies' organic statutes (statutory re-
view), 5 or section 702 of the Federal APA.36 This elaborate federal
scheme appears cumbersome when compared to the elegant sim-
plicity of Florida's approach. Both elegance and simplicity are
threatened if Florida courts import-even in part-federal law by
using section 702 as an aid to construing section 120.68(1).
Section 702 extends the right to judicial review to "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action" or to a person "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute." This language has been on the books since
the Federal APA's enactment in 1946, but its reach and meaning
remain in issue. Professor Kenneth Davis argues persistently, if
not successfully, that Congress intended anyone injured in fact by
School Bd. of Broward County v. Constant, 363 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Car-
rollwood State Bank v. Lewis, 362 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied mem., 372
So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel. Fla. State Bd. of Nursing v. Santora, 362 So. 2d 116
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Department of Revenue v. Young Am. Builders, 358 So. 2d 1096 (Fla.
1st DCA 1976), aff'd sub. noma. Department of Revenue v. Silver Springs Shores, 376 So. 2d
849 (Fla. 1979); Adams Packing Ass'n v. Florida Dep't of Citrus, 352 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1977); Hill v. School Bd. of Leon County, 351 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert.
denied mem., 359 So. 2d 1215 (1978); Department of Transp. v. Morehouse, 350 So. 2d 529
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied mem., 358 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1978); United Faculty v. Bran-
son, 350 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 348 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977); School Bd. of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977),
cert. denied mem., 358 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1978); State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis,
344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Estero Bay Dev. Corp., 336
So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied mem., 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977); Department
of Revenue v. University Square, Inc., 336 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Department of
Revenue v. Young Am. Builders, 330 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); General Care Corp. v.
Forehand, 329 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
33. See Key Haven Associated Enterprises, 427 So. 2d at 156; Amrep Corp., 358 So. 2d
1343; State ex rel. Willis, 344 So. 2d at 589; Mitchell, 346 So. 2d at 568. But see Bowen, 448
So. 2d 566; Gulf Pines Memorial Park, 361 So. 2d at 698-99.
34. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 23.04-.06, at 307-17 (1958); L. JAFFE,
supra note 24, at 165-94, 213-32, 320-93; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 435-37 (1976);
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 432-38, 456-64 (1974); Scott, Standing in the Supreme
Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 648-54 (1973).
35. K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 23.03, at 300-07; L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 155-59; B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 30-32; Albert, supra note 34, at 429-32; Scott, supra note 34, at
654-58.
36. K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 23.02, at 296-300; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 449-54;
Scott, supra note 34, at 658-59.
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agency action to have standing to seek judicial review.3 7 Professors
Scott and Albert, on the other hand, interpret the "legal wrong"
portion as extending standing to one who has suffered injury to a
right protected by the common law and the "adversely affected or
aggrieved" portion as concerning one whose standing is specifically
conferred by statute.38 Disagreeing with all of them, Professor
Stewart suggests that the "legal wrong" portion refers to both com-
mon law and statutory rights, and that the "adversely affected or
aggrieved" portion "refers to statutory review proceedings which
can encompass both those who suffer legal wrong and 'surrogate'
plaintiffs who do not."'
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,40 the Supreme Court interpreted section 702 as conferring
standing on anyone "injured in fact" by agency action if the inter-
est being asserted was "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated" by the relevant statute.4 ' The "zone of in-
terest" standard was hailed by some as liberalizing standing, 2 but
condemned by most as "opaque" and vague,' 3 "needlessly com-
plex,"" "analytically faulty, . . . cumbersome, inconvenient, and
artificial.' 45 Even the Supreme Court apparently has abandoned
the "zone of interest" inquiry.'6 Yet, despite these warnings, Flor-
ida courts have permitted the "zone of interest" concept to gain a
foothold in Florida administrative law.47
37. K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 22.02, at 211-13; Davis, Standing to Challenge Govern-
mental Action, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 355-56 (1955); Davis, "Judicial Control of Administra-
tive Action": A Review, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 668-69 (1966); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 617-36 (1968); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 465-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Liberalized Law of Stand-
ing]; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 419-22 (3d ed. 1972); 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 24:3, at 214-19 (2d ed. 1983).
38. Albert, supra note 34, at 451 n.105; Scott, supra note 34, at 658.
39. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,
1727 n.285 (1975).
40. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
41. Id. at 152-53.
42. Davis, Liberalized Law of Standing, supra note 37, at 450; Gellhorn, Public Partici-
pation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 367 (1972); Sedler, Standing, Jus-
ticiability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 484-88 (1972).
43. Stewart, supra note 39, at 1731.
44. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 466.
45. Davis, Liberalized Law of Standing, supra note 37, at 457-58.
46. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:17, at 276-78 (2d ed. 1983).
47. See Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 426 So. 2d 1112, 1114
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983); City of Panama City v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund, 418 So. 2d 1132, -1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); All Risk Corp. v. Department of
Labor & Employment Sec., 413 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Agrico Chem. Co. v.
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The federal constitutional and administrative frameworks are
not comparable to Florida's. Florida's judicial review provision is
not yet fraught with the contradiction and controversy that con-
tinue to surround section 702. Under Florida's section 120.68(1)
"[a] party who is adversely affected by final agency action is enti-
tled to judicial review." Two of the provision's three critical terms
are defined: "party"48 and "agency action. '49 If the agency action
involved is an order, finality is statutorily defined; 50 if the agency
action sought to be reviewed is a rule, finality has been judicially
defined. 5' The remaining phrase, "adversely affected," is the only
phrase common to both the federal and the Florida provisions.
Wisely, the Florida courts have begun to develop its meaning by
considering its place in Florida's overall statutory and administra-
tive framework.5 2 This effort should not be sidetracked by casual
references to a common phrase plucked out of federal law and out
of context. Section 702 comes with too much baggage, and the
freight costs are too high.
The Federal APA and the federal cases interpreting it are irrele-
vant to the judicial interpretation of the administrative access pro-
visions and the judicial standing provisions in chapter 120. The
language differences are significant, and the administrative
schemes are not comparable. There is no indication in the history
of chapter 120's development that the Federal APA was used as a
model. The use of section 702 in Florida Home Builders was unfor-
tunate and unnecessary; the passing reference to it in the Jerry
dictum ought to be ignored. Florida courts should not burden
chapter 120 with wholly inappropriate federal baggage.
Department of Envtl. Reg., 406 So. 2d 478, 480-82 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), petition for review
denied, 415 So. 2d 1S59 (Fla. 1982).
48. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11) (1985).
49. Id. § 120.52(2).
50. Id. § 120.52(10). An order is final "when reduced to writing and filed with the person
designated by the agency as clerk." Id. This definition of an order was amended by the
legislature to reflect the ruling of the court in Bank of Port St. Joe v. Department of Bank-
ing & Fin., 362 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
51. Florida Admin. Comm'n v. District Court of Appeal, First Dist., 351 So. 2d 712, 714
& n.4 (Fla. 1977) (holding that final agency action occurs when a rule is filed with the De-
partment of State).
52. E.g., School Bd. of Pinellas County v. Noble, 372 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1979); Daniels v.
Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 401 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), aff'd sub nom.
Roberson v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 444 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1983); Sarasota
County v. Department of Admin., 350 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied mem.,
362 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1978); 4245 Corp., Mother's Lounge v. Division of Beverage, 348 So. 2d
934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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B. Article III "Cases or Controversies" Cases
There is conflict among federal cases whether judicial standing
requirements and administrative access requirements are inter-
changeable. Some early Supreme Court decisions held they were
not, but those cases involved situations in which the petitioner,
having been permitted to intervene in an agency proceeding,
sought to base his right to judicial review of the adverse adminis-
trative decision on this intervenor status. The Court ruled that
participation in an agency proceeding was controlled by statute,
but standing to initiate court review of an agency action could not
be maintained unless one had suffered an injury to a personal legal
right 5s-the article III standing requirement at the time.54
When a federal agency denied intervention in its proceedings
and sought to defend its action by urging that judicial standing
requirements were not met, several courts did apply the judicial
requirements to determine access to the administrative proceed-
ing.55 Courts taking this approach cited as authority a footnote in
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC.56
However, that footnote clearly indicated that the question was not
contested by the parties, and the court did not analyze the issue.
While practical and theoretical differences between the judicial
and the administrative forums were recognized by some courts57
and commentators,58 a comprehensive analysis was not undertaken
until 1978 when Judge Bazelon wrote his concurring opinion in
53. Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 254-57 (1930); Pitts-
burgh & W. Va. Ry. Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479, 486-88 (1930).
54. Stewart, supra note 39, at 1723-24.
55. Martin-Trigona v. Federal Reserve Bd., 509 F.2d 363, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975); National Welfare Rights
Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
56. 359 F.2d at 1000 n.8 (citations omitted):
All parties seem to consider that the same standards are applicable to determining
standing before the Commission and standing to appeal a Commission order to
this court. We have, therefore, used the cases dealing with standing in the two
tribunals interchangeably.
57. Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians
v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207, 1212 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated, 420 U.S. 395 (1975); United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 466 F.2d 573, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 205
F. Supp. 592, 593-94 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 223 (1962) (per curiam), reh'g denied and
opinion clarified, 372 U.S. 246 (1963).
58. K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 22.08, at 239-43; L. JAFFE, supra note 34, at 524; Shapiro,
Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV.
721, 726, 767 (1968); Stewart, supra note 39, at 1748-52.
1986]
980 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:965
Koniag, Inc., Village of Uyak v. Andrus.
Bazelon's analysis began with the observation that, while federal
administrative agencies often exercise adjudicatory power, agencies
are not article III courts. Their members do not enjoy life tenure
and guaranteed compensation. 0 Thus, the judicial "cases or con-
troversies" limitation is not binding on them. "Congress, in its dis-
cretion, can require that any person be admitted to administrative
proceedings, whether or not that person has alleged 'injury in fact'
or has satisfied the other constitutional standing requirements rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court."61 Also dismissing as inapplicable
the so-called prudential rules 62  of standing, Bazelon wrote:
"[P]rudential limitations reflect a concern about the limited au-
thority and competence of the judiciary in setting general policy.
As such, prudential limitations are no more applicable to adminis-
trative agencies than Article III limitations.""3 According to him,
standards for determining access to administrative proceedings
should be gleaned from the language of the statute. When the stat-
utory language does not supply specific criteria, Judge Bazelon
suggested that a functional analysis be used.6 4 But "[t]he impor-
tant point is that administrative standing should be tailored to the
functions of the agency, not to arcane doctrine from another area
of the law."'65
59. 580 F.2d 601, 611-17 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J., concurring), cert. denied mem.,
439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, mandates that "[tihe Judges, both of the supreme and infer-
ior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office."
61. 580 F.2d at 612.
62. The prudential standing limitations mentioned by Judge Bazelon are
that the plaintiff assert an interest "'arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated' by the statutory framework within which his claim arises,"
that the plaintiff assert more than "a 'generalized grievance' shared in substan-
tially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens," and that the plaintiff assert
his own rights and interests, rather than those of third parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. Bazelon's functional analysis takes into account the following five factors:
(1) The nature of the interest asserted by the potential participant.
(2) The relevance of this interest to the goals and purposes of the agency.
(3) The qualifications of the potential participant to represent this interest.
(4) Whether other persons could be expected to represent adequately this interest.
(5) Whether special considerations indicate that an award of standing would not
be in the public interest.
Id. at 616.
65. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion,
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The Florida Home Builders court and the Jerry court justified
their reliance on federal cases concerned with the "cases or contro-
versies" limitation on federal court jurisdiction when formulating
standards for access to the administrative rule challenge proceed-
ing provided in section 120.56. The Florida Home Builders court
reached for and cited Warth v. Seldine6 and Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission 7 through misperception. 8
The Jerry court was led to Sierra Club v. Morton,69 United States
v. SCRAP,"° Roe v. Wade,71 and O'Shea v. Littleton72 by Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary.3 Among the definitions the court
found for the section 120.56(1) word "substantial" was the phrase
"not imaginary or illusory. 7 4 Apparently, it was the word "illu-
sory" that triggered the plunge into the -federal case law because,
as the Jerry court explained, "decisions involving standing in the
federal courts often turn upon issues pertaining to whether a per-
son seeking relief has shown that his interests are substantial and
not illusory. '7 5
Both Florida courts treated standing to invoke federal court ju-
risdiction and access to a state executive branch proceeding as es-
sentially fungible. Neither court addressed the nature of the par-
ticular proceeding or the nature of the forum to which access was
sought. If article III judicial standing limitations are inappropriate
for determining access to federal administrative proceedings, how
can they have any relevance for determining access to state admin-
istrative proceedings? None of the policy considerations underlying
article III requirements and the federal prudential rules of stand-
ing makes sense in the context of state executive branch
proceedings.
has also rejected use of judicial standing limitations when determining access to administra-
tive agencies. Ingalls Shipbuilding v. White, 681 F.2d 275, 285 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on
other grounds, Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399, 407 (5th
Cir. 1984); American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 673 F.2d 82, 85 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); ECEE, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 339,
349-50 (5th Cir. 1981); Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360,
391 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied mem., 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
66. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
67. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
68. Florida Home Builders, 412 So. 2d at 353.
69. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
70. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
73. Jerry, 353 So. 2d at 1233 n.8.
74. Id. at 1233.
75. Id.
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The Florida Constitution limits administrative agencies to the
exercise of "quasi-judicial power. '7 6 This restriction is not merely
unlike article III's limitation; it is the antithesis of that limitation.
Federal courts may only exercise judicial power, and only at the
behest of a plaintiff who has a "personal stake" in the outcome. 7
Florida administrative agencies may not exercise judicial power at
all.
The prudential standing rules were formulated to "limit the role
of courts in resolving public disputes"7 8 and to define "the proper
judicial role relative to the other major governmental institutions
in the society. '7 9 But application of restrictive judicial standing re-
quirements to administrative proceedings of any kind does not
limit the role of courts in resolving public disputes; if anything, it
limits executive branch agencies in the performance of the respon-
sibilities clearly imposed on them by the legislature. Imposition of
judicial standing requirements in the administrative context does
not define the proper role of courts relative to other branches of
government. It does define the role and limit the function of the
executive branch in terms of the judicial model. The policy consid-
erations that inform federal standing rules are turned upside down
when those rules are misapplied to state executive branch proceed-
ings. Applied out of context, the rules do not restrict the role of
the judiciary, they expand it, and simultaneously frustrate the in-
tended growth and development of other major governmental
institutions.
III. A BETTER APPROACH
Judge Bazelon's prescription for determining access to federal
administrative proceedings cannot be totally followed in Florida
because of the vast differences between the federal and the Florida
administrative procedure statutes and the differences between the
federal and Florida administrative structures. There are, however,
two aspects of his approach to the problem that can be borrowed
and put to good use in Florida. The first is his premise; the second
is his functional analysis.
Bazelon's premise is that the best approach to administrative ac-
76. See supra note 16.
77. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
78. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500.
79. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), quoted in Koniag, Inc., Village of Uyak v. Andrus, 580 F.2d at
612 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
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cess questions is to reject arcane, judicially conceived constitu-
tional and prudential standing rules and to accept legislatively
designed statutory access rules. This approach is sound whether
the access question arises in a federal or a state administrative set-
ting. The Florida Legislature, no less than the Congress, could, in
its discretion, require that all persons be admitted to administra-
tive proceedings. Persons need not allege "injury in fact" or satisfy
the other constitutional or prudential standing requirements recog-
nized as necessary to gain admittance to the courts. Of course, the
converse is also true. The Florida Legislature, in its discretion,
could require all persons to allege and to prove "injury in fact" to
gain admittance to some or all administrative proceedings. The
choice lies with the legislature not with the courts.
When a person's right to initiate or to participate in the admin-
istrative proceedings authorized by chapter 120 is questioned, the
analysis should not be driven by the assumption that the legisla-
ture chose to impose judicial standing requirements. Rather, the
analysis should focus on the access standard the legislature pro-
vided for that particular proceeding. Even casual perusal of the ad-
ministrative proceedings available under chapter 120 shows that
each proceeding has its own statutory access language. Although
the language in some is similar to the language in others, none is
identical and none is formulated in terms commonly associated
with judicial standing requirements. The diversity of language sig-
nals the inappropriateness of imposing a single access standard for
the seven different administrative proceedings. The absence of
"special injury" or "injury in fact" language suggests that the legis-
lature exercised its discretion by deciding to allow persons meeting
the various access standards to initiate or participate in the pro-
ceedings. Proper respect for legislative authority requires rejection
of the assumption that the legislature chose to impose judicial
standing rules to determine access to all seven chapter 120
proceedings.
Occasionally, the Florida Legislature expresses its will on the ac-
cess question with great clarity and specificity. For example, in
chapter 380 the legislature identified the participants in the devel-
opment of regional impact process as including only the owner, the
developer, the appropriate regional planning agency, and the state
planning agency.80 Florida courts have had little difficulty applying
80. FLA. STAT. § 380.07(2) (1985).
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chapter 380's access standard because it is so precise. 81 But noth-
ing approaching chapter 380's precision is found in any of chapter
120's access provisions. Sometimes the legislature uses a nonspe-
cific term like "affected person" but then defines the term in pre-
cise language. For example, in chapter 163 the legislature provided
an opportunity for an "affected person" to challenge administra-
tively a decision by the state land planning agency that a local gov-
ernment comprehensive plan is in compliance with state require-
ments. "Affected person" for these purposes is defined to mean
the affected local government, persons owning property or resid-
ing or owning or operating a business within the boundaries of
the local government whose plan is the subject of the review, and
adjoining local governments who can demonstrate that adoption
of the plan as proposed would produce substantial impacts on the
increased need for publicly funded infrastructure, or substantially
impact on areas designated for protection or special treatment
within their jurisdiction. 82
In chapter 120, the legislature used similar terms to indicate who is
entitled to participate in various proceedings, but left the terms
undefined-"any affected person,". "any substantially affected per-
son "any person regulated by an agency or having a substantial
interest in an agency rule," "a person timely asserts that his sub-
stantial interests will be affected ... and affirmatively demon-
strates . ..that the proceeding does not provide adequate oppor-
tunity to protect those interests," "any person substantially
affected by a rule," and "the substantial interests of a party are
determined by an agency. '83 When viewed in isolation, these non-
specific terms seem to provide little insight into legislative intent.
But even nonspecific statutory language may yield useful criteria
for determining access if the words are given their common mean-
ing and if the language relating to access is examined carefully and
in context. However, relying on plain meaning and context alone to
coax meaningful criteria from vague legislative expressions can be
risky business. That risk can be minimized by considering certain
81. See infra note 385.
82. Ch. 85-55, § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws 207, 221 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3)(a)
(1985)).
83. To be sure, there is an elaborate, if not specific, definition of the word "party " in
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11) (1985). But the word "party" is used in connection with access to
only one of the seven administrative proceedings available. Consequently, the definition's
usefulness is limited.
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extrinsic sources and by introducing the second aspect of Bazelon's
approach-a functional analysis-into the search for useful
standards.
The purpose of judicial construction of statutes is to ascertain
legislative intent. To the extent legislative intent is discoverable
from extrinsic sources, it should be used to support or, if necessary,
to modify any access standards drawn by attributing plain mean-
ing to vague statutory language. The most valuable extrinsic aids
are those reflecting legislative intent during the enactment pro-
cess-"committee reports, statements of sponsors and other legis-
lators, transcripts of committee hearings and floor debates, and
house journals. '8 4 Because the House bill revising chapter 120 was
largely a product of the Florida Law Revision Council, the Coun-
cil's records are also important extrinsic sources.8 5 But as other
commentators have observed, "[iln Florida, anyone interested in
statutory history must be both diligent and fortunate." ' That
warning has special significance for anyone researching the history
of chapter 120. Little evidence survives from which legislative in-
tent can be gleaned, even though revision of the 1961 Administra-
tive Procedure Act was a legislative priority during the 1974 Regu-
lar Session, and the Florida Law Revision Council, at the request
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, undertook a far
reaching revision project.
The Law Revision Council records are probably the most com-
plete. The Council contracted with Arthur England to be the re-
porter on its revision project. England prepared, and the Council
debated, five drafts of the proposed revision. The drafts, complete
84. Rhodes, White & Goldman, The Search For Intent: Aids To Statutory Construction
in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 383, 383 (1978).
85. The Florida Law Revision Council was composed of twelve members, two members
of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate, two members of the House of Rep-
resentatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, and eight persons, who were either
members of the Florida Bar or law faculty members from an accredited college of law in the
state, appointed by the Governor. FLA. STAT. § 13.91 (1973). The functions of the Council
were to examine the law of the state and to make recommendations "to modify or eliminate
antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law of the state into harmony with
modern conditions." Id. § 13.96(1)-(2). In 1977, the Council's name was changed to the Flor-
ida Legislative Law Revision Council. Ch. 77-37, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 48, 48 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 13.90 (1977)). The appointment process was also changed so that the Senate Presi-
dent appointed four members, at least two of whom were from the Senate; the Speaker of
the House appointed four members, at least two of whom were from the House; and the
Board of Governors of the Florida Bar appointed four members, who were either members
of the Bar or law faculty from an accredited college of law in the state. Id., § 1977 Fla. Laws
at 49 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 13.91 (1977)).
86. Rhodes, White & Goldman, supra note 84, at 402.
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with reporter's comments, are available.8 7 The House Committee
on Governmental Operations and its Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Procedure conducted public hearings on the various Sub-
committee and Law Revision Council drafts. Tape recordings of
some of these public hearings still exist.88 The Senate President
directed the Senate Committee on Rules and Calendar to address
the more narrow topic of reforming administrative rulemaking.8 9
None of the meetings or public hearings conducted by the Senate
Rules Committee were tape recorded. Tape recordings of the floor
debate in both the House and the Senate exist, 0 but the confer-
ence committee neither tape recorded its meetings nor issued a
conference committee statement 'explaining the resolution of dif-
ferences between the House and Senate versions of the revision.,
None of the existing tape recordings have been transcribed. Thus,
with the exception of the Law Revision Council's records, most of
the historical materials are relatively inaccessible. Nevertheless, a
complete review of the available historical materials does yield
some insight into legislative intent on the question of access stan-
dards for several administrative proceedings, and, therefore, should
be considered valuable aids in the construction of ambiguous stat-
utory terms.2
87. The work papers of the Council's Reporter, including preliminary materials, the five
drafts of the statute and their commentary, are available at the library of the Florida Su-
preme Court, in the archives of the Law Revision Council on file with the Florida Legisla-
ture's Division of Legislative Library Services, and at the Florida State University College of
Law Library.
88. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 11, 1974)
(available at Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Legis. Library Servs., Tallahassee,
Fla.); Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Admin. Procedure, tape recording of
proceedings (Jan. 16, 1974 & Apr. 4, 1974) (available at Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm.,
Div. of Legis. Library Servs.).
89. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 14, 1974) (on file with Secretary) (state-
ment of Sen. Barron).
90. Fla. H.R., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 17, 1974) (on file with Clerk); Fla. S.,
tape recording of proceedings (May 14, 1974) (on file with Secretary).
91.
[Rieports of conference committees generally take the form of brief letters of
transmittal to the officers of the two houses, recommending specific amendments
to reconcile the differing versions of the legislation. Little is revealed about ex-
plicit legislative intent, although much can be inferred by the adoption of one
alternative instead of another.
Rhodes, White & Goldman, supra note 84, at 395.
92. Florida courts have been willing to consider the Reporter's Comments to determine
legislative intent. See Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Employment
Sec., 412 So. 2d 351, 353 n.2 (Fla. 1982); Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla.
1980); Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. Webb, 367 So. 2d 201, 203 n.4 (Fla. 1978); In re
Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 1976); City of Plant City v.
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The comments of Representative Hector, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Administrative Procedure, and the reporter's com-
ments on the various draft statutes presented to the Law Revision
Council, reflect that in the course of revising chapter 120 the ad-
ministrative procedure statutes of other states and the Revised
Model Act were considered."3 These comments suggest the possi-
bility of another extrinsic source to be considered in the effort to
ascertain the meaning of vague statutory language. If it can be de-
termined that the legislature borrowed language from another
state statute which had been construed to have a certain meaning,
then that construction ought to be considered evidence of legisla-
tive intent in Florida.
Perhaps the most useful aid in determining the meaning of
vague statutory language is the function or the purpose the partic-
ular proceeding was designed to achieve. In the federal context,
rights to participate in agency proceedings are conferred by Con-
gress in the various agencies' organic statutes. Thus, Bazelon's
functional analysis stressed the importance of tailoring administra-
tive access to the particular function of the agency in question. 4
Under the Florida scheme, however, rights to initiate and to par-
ticipate in administrative proceedings are conferred by chapter
120, a general statute applicable to all governmental agencies as
defined.95 Therefore, because the same administrative proceedings
may be invoked to check the action of all agencies, the particular
functions of the individual agencies are not especially relevant to
Mayo, 337 So. 2d 966, 970 n.3 (Fla. 1976); Lewis v. Judges of the Dist. Court of Appeal, First
Dist., 322 So. 2d 16, 19 (Fla. 1975); State v. General Dev. Corp., 448 So. 2d 1074, 1084 n.28
(Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Guerra v. Department of Labor & Employment Sec., 427 So. 2d 1098,
1101 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Bigler v. Department of Banking & Fin., 368 So. 2d 449, 451
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979), aff'd mem., 394 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1981); School Bd. of Broward County
v. Constant, 363 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); McDonald v. Department of Banking
& Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 582 n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Postal Colony Co. v. Askew, 348 So. 2d
338, 341 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), afJ'd, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978); School Bd. of Leon
County v. Mitchell, 346 So. 2d 562, 566 n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied mem., 358 So.
2d 132 (Fla. 1978); State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 592 n.12 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977).
93. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 11, 1974)
(available at Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Legis. Library Servs., Tallahassee,
Fla.). Rep. Hector, in explaining the development of the bill, told the House Committee on
Governmental Operations that the APA's of Missouri, Texas, Oregon, and Massachusetts
were considered by the Subcommittee on Administrative Procedure. See REVISED MODEL
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1961, § 6, at 400, 14 U.L.A. 371, 400 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as 1961 MODEL ACT].
94. Koniag, Inc., Village of Uyak v. Andrus, 580 F.2d at 615-17 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
95. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (1985).
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the access question. Rather, in the context of Florida's chapter 120,
the important point is that access standards should be tailored to
further the function of each administrative proceeding. Each of the
seven administrative proceedings created by chapter 120 has a dis-
tinct purpose; each is conceptually different from the others; each
is designed to achieve a particular end. The access rule for each
proceeding, therefore, should be crafted with a view toward facili-
tating the purpose of each proceeding established by the
legislature.
In the sections that follow, this approach is used to examine
each of the administrative proceedings available under chapter
120. A tentative access standard for each proceeding is drawn by
attributing plain meaning to the language used by the legislature.
That tentative standard is either validated or modified in light of
evidence of legislative intent disclosed by extrinsic sources. The
standard then is refined by analyzing the function and purpose of
the proceeding and determining the extent to which the standard
facilitates them. Finally, in each section the cases which have ruled
on persons' rights to initiate or to participate in the proceeding
under study are critically examined and an alternative analysis
based on the access standard developed for that proceeding is
presented.
IV. ACCESS TO RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS
Rulemaking under chapter 120 is a complex process. This com-
plexity results from the different approaches taken by the House
of Representatives and the Senate during the revision of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.9 6 The House, through its Committee
on Governmental Operations and Subcommittee on Administrative
Procedure, worked closely with the Law Revision Council on a
comprehensive revision of agency rulemaking, adjudication proce-
dures, and judicial review standards.9 7 As a result, the bill debated
in the House was substantially the same as the final draft ap-
proved by the Law Revision Council. 8 The Senate bill, on the
other hand, was almost exclusively concerned with agency
rulemaking. 9 The conference committee report ultimately ap-
96. Levinson, A Comparison of Florida Administrative Practice Under the Old and the
New Administrative Procedure Acts, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 72, 74 (1975).
97. Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975
Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 621-22 (1975).
98. Id. at 622.
99. Id.
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proved by both chambers retained the rulemaking provisions de-
veloped by the Law Revision Council and the House-the initia-
tive, the information gathering hearing, and the drawout-and
added to them the administrative validity challenge independently
developed by the Senate.100 Consequently, there are four distinct
proceedings that may occur during agency rulemaking that offer
opportunities for participation in the process to persons having the
requisite interest. Because each of the four proceedings has its own
access requirements, each provision must be examined separately
to determine the nature of the interest a person must have to in-
voke each process.
A. The Initiative Provision
"Any person regulated by an agency or having a substantial in-
terest in an agency rule may petition an agency to adopt, amend,
or repeal a rule or to provide the minimum public information re-
quired by s. 120.53. " 101 The statutory language recognizes two clas-
ses of persons vested with the right to petition an agency for the
adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule. Persons regulated by an
agency are included in the first class. Persons with a substantial
interest in an existing or proposed agency rule constitute the
second.
The first class can be defined narrowly to include only those in-
dividuals and businesses licensed by the state. This construction
would include members of the professions and occupations regu-
lated by various boards under the Department of Professional Reg-
ulation's supervision: accountants, barbers, cosmetologists, engi-
neers, health care professionals, harbor pilots, real estate agents,
and so on, and the highly regulated businesses: alcoholic beverages,
banking, insurance, securities, and utilities. Through an initiative
100. Id. at 635.
101. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (1985) (emphasis added). The minimum public information
required by § 120.53 includes a description of the agency's organization, the general course
and method of its operations, the ways through which the public may obtain information
from the agency and communicate information to the agency, the nature and requirements
of all formal and informal procedures used by the agency in its dealings with the public, a
list of all forms and instructions used by the agency in dealing with the public, the rules of
procedure appropriate for the presentation of arguments on issues of law or policy and for
the presentation of evidence on factual disputes, the rules for the scheduling of meetings,
hearings, and workshops, and the availability of agenda. In addition, each agency must
make available for public inspection and copying all rules formulated, adopted, or used by
the agency, all agency orders, and a current subject-matter index to all rules and orders
adopted or issued since January 1, 1975. Id. § 120.53(1)-(2).
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petition submitted to the appropriate agency, any licensed individ-
ual or business certainly has the right to try to change the rules
governing his profession, occupation, or business. But to limit this
class to licensed individuals and businesses is unduly restrictive
and is not supported by the language of the provision.
Although the term "license" is defined in chapter 120,102 it was
not used in connection with the initiative provision. Instead, the
legislature chose the term "regulated," which has broader reach
and connotation. To regulate is to control. Therefore, the first class
must be understood to include any person whose conduct is con-
trolled by an agency, that is, any person whose conduct is subject
to agency approval or whose conduct must be structured to comply
with agency requirements. Under this construction, licensed indi-
viduals and businesses remain in the class, but many more are
added. For example, agency employees, parolees, state hospital pa-
tients, prison inmates, license applicants, public employee unions,
and students are considered persons regulated by an agency.
The second category, any person having a "substantial interest"
in an agency rule, is more problematic. The "substantial interest"
requirement used here and in connection with several other chap-
ter 120 proceedings is a critical but undefined term. Unlike other
sections requiring that substantial interests be "affected, '10 3 or
"determined, '" 104 or adequately protected,' 05 the initiative provision
simply provides that a person have a "substantial interest" in an
agency rule. Further, the initiative provision's "substantial inter-
est" requirement is not the sole legislative standard concerning ac-
cess. It appears in the disjunctive with the phrase "any person reg-
ulated by an agency." The breadth of that phrase's coverage, the
use of the disjunctive, and the absence of language requiring per-
sonal impact suggest an intent, in the context of the initiative pro-
vision, to confer the right to petition on persons who would not
necessarily be personally affected by a rule, amendment, or repeal
proposed by the petition.106
102. Id. § 120.52(8).
103. Compare id. § 120.54(4) with id. § 120.56(1).
104. See id. § 120.57.
105. See id. § 120.54(17).
106. In Florida Institutional Legal Servs., Inc. v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n,
391 So. 2d 247, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), the court characterized the initiative provision's
access language as "rather liberal . . . in contrast to somewhat more restrictive standards
written elsewhere in the APA." Without specifying whether prisoners were persons regu-
lated by the Parole and Probation Commission or were persons with a substantial interest in
Commission rules, the court ruled that prisoners were entitled to use the initiative mecha-
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1. History of the Initiative Provision
This legislative access standard is ambiguous and the history of
its development offers no insight into legislative intent. Through
all five Law Revision Council drafts, "any person" could petition
for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule or to require com-
pliance with the public information provision. 10 7 The limiting lan-
guage, "regulated by an agency or having a substantial interest,"
was later supplied by the legislature. On this point, the Senate and
the House basically agreed from the beginning.1 08 The language
adopted was that drafted by the Senate Committee on Rules and
Calendar.109 Unfortunately, no available record exists explaining
why the legislature rejected the more permissive Law Revision
Council formulation.
2. Initiative Provisions in Other States
Administrative procedure statutes of other states are very simi-
lar to each other. But there is little similarity to the Florida provi-
nism to require Commission compliance with the § 120.53 mandate that each agency adopt
certain rules of practice, procedure and organization. Id. Access to the initiative process also
was granted to Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. (FILS) as a "person ...having a
substantial interest" in the Commission's rules. The court recognized that as "a legal service
corporation which by contract with the Commission provides indigent inmates representa-
tion and other legal services in parole matters," FILS had a "substantial interest" in Com-
mission rules relating to practice, procedure, and organization. Id.
107. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 0120.4(4) (Florida Law Revision Council, Re-
porter's Draft No. 1, with commentary, Oct. 26, 1973) in 3 PRELIMINARY MATERIALS DEALING
WITH THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 8 (available at the Florida Supreme
Court Library and the Florida State University College of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as
Reporter's Draft No. 1]; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AT § 0120.4(3) (Florida Law Revision
Council, Reporter's Draft No. 2, with commentary, Nov. 30, 1973) in 4 PRELIMINARY MATER-
IALS DEALING WITH THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 11 (available at the Florida
Supreme Court Library and the Florida State University College of Law Library) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Reporter's Draft No. 21; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 0120.4(3) (Florida
Law Revision Council Reporter's Draft No.3, with commentary, Jan. 5, 1974) in 5 PRELIMI-
NARY MATERIALS DEALING WITH THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 11 (available
at the Florida Supreme Court Library and the Florida State University College of Law Li-
brary) [hereinafter cited as Reporter's Draft No. 3]; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §
0120.4(3) (Florida Law Revision Council, Reporter's Final Draft, Mar. 1, 1974) in 6 PRELIMI-
NARY MATERIALS DEALING WITH THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5 (available at
the Florida Supreme Court Library and the Florida State University College of Law Li-
brary) [hereinafter cited as Reporter's Final Draft].
108. Fla. HB 2672 (1974), Fla. CS for HB 2672, 2434 and 2583 (1974), and Fla. SB 892
(1974), all used the same phrasing: "[a]ny person regulated by an agency or any person
representing a class of persons having a substantial interest in an agency rule."
109. Compare Fla. CS for SB 892, sec. 4 (1974) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
120.041(3)(1973)).
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sion. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have initia-
tive provisions in their administrative procedure acts. A majority
of them11° has essentially adopted the language of the 1961 Re-
vised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (RMA) which
provides: "An interested person may petition an agency requesting
the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. Each agency
shall prescribe by rule the form for petitions and the procedure for
their submission, consideration, and disposition . . . .," Follow-
ing the same basic approach, the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act (MSAPA) and North Carolina extend the opportu-
nity to "any person,"'1 12 whereas the Alabama statute leaves the
question entirely for agency determination by rule.113 Several state
statutes make no provision for agencies to provide by rule for the
filing and disposition of initiative petitions. Of these, six permit
"interested persons" to petition;1 4 another six permit "any per-
son" to petition;1 15 Alaska and California extend the right to an
"interested person" except when another statute restricts access to
a designated group. 1 6 The Wisconsin approach (which, although
highly commended, has been followed only by Tennessee)1 1 7 ex-
tends the right to petition, unless otherwise restricted, to any "mu-
nicipality, corporation or any 5 or more persons having an interest
in a rule."' 18 Although its statute does not contain an initiative
110. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-174 (West Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1506(b)
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-9 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-6 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-
5206 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 1008(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §
17A.7 (West 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:953(C) (West Supp. 1985); MD. STATE GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 10-123 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 4 (West 1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-315 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-910 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.100(1)
(1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4(f) (West Supp. 1984-1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 305
(West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.390 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-6 (1977); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-8 (1978); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.060 (Supp. 1985); WYO. STAT. § 16-3-106 (1982).
111. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 93, § 6, at 400.
112. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981, § 3-117, 14 U.L.A. 113-14
(Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited a 1981 MODEL ACT]; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150 A-16 (1983).
113. ALA. CODE § 41-22-8 (1982).
114. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(7) (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.09 (West Supp. 1985);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:6 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-7 (1978); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-23-126 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-13 (1980).
115. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-703(c) (1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10114 (1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8055(1) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24-238 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
536.041 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 806 (Supp. 1984).
116. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.220 (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11347 (West 1980).
117. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 204-05 (1965).
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-201(a) (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.015(1) (West
1982).
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provision, North Dakota permits "any person substantially inter-
ested in the effect of a rule""1 " already adopted to petition the
agency for reconsideration, amendment, or repeal. Nevertheless,
Florida alone requires that, in order to petition for the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of any agency rule, a person must either be
regulated by that agency or have a substantial interest in the rule.
Yet, the essential similarity between the language of the North Da-
kota reconsideration provision and the Florida initiative provision
would invite reference to North Dakota case law for aid in defining
the meaning of the phrase "substantially interested." Unfortu-
nately, the North Dakota courts apparently have not yet had occa-
sion to construe the provision.
3. Functional Analysis
The Florida initiative provision was designed to provide a
"mechanism for periodic review of agency policies and procedures,
with a requirement that the reasons for old rules be re-articulated
if continued. ' 120 The initiative concept has been described aptly by
Professor Bonfield as a means of implementing the "ideal of par-
ticipatory democracy." ' In his view, it establishes a procedure
which
allows the public to prod an agency to action in a way that seeks
to ensure that those satisfied with the status quo are forced to
reexamine their positions in light of new views and changed con-
ditions. In doing so, .... [it] clearly benefits those subject to an
agency's authority. The provision also benefits the agency and the
public-at-large because it ensures wiser and sounder government
by directing the agency's attention to situations in which the issu-
ance, amendment, or repeal of rules may be desirable. 22
The purposes underlying the initiative process argue in favor of
broad access rules. Persons whose conduct is subject to agency di-
rection or control certainly are in a position to proffer new ideas,
different approaches, and better alternatives based on their experi-
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-04 (Supp. 1983).
120. Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State of
Florida, March 9, 1974, at 16, reprinted in 3 A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, FLORIDA ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL 16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reporter's Comments].
121. Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Ap-
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ence under existing rules. Surely there are also persons who,
though not directly and personally involved in a particular regula-
tory scheme, are thoughtful observers. Whether qualified by educa-
tion, experience, position, or concern, these persons, too, are in a
position to suggest a reexamination of current policy and to tender
alternatives. 123 Neither a regulated person nor a substantially in-
terested person will necessarily prevail on the merits because that
decision is a matter of agency discretion. The essential point is
that the policy foundations supporting the initiative provision are
served when both have the right to require an agency to reexamine
its position.
The structure of Florida's initiative provision is such that no
agency need be concerned about a flood of "unfounded and 'pestif-
erous' petitions" if access is widely available. 124 The provision re-
quires the petition to "specify the proposed rule and action re-
quested.' 2 5 A petition proposing the repeal of an existing rule on
the theory that no rule on the subject is necessary would be fairly
easily drawn. But a petition proposing the repeal of an existing
rule and offering an alternative rule, or a petition proposing an
amendment to an existing rule, or one proposing a wholly new rule
on a subject, requires the petitioner to draft the language that will
accomplish the desired end. By requiring that an idea not merely
be proposed but be developed in writing, the provision subjects ini-
tiative petitioners to a discipline likely to discourage frivolous use
even though access to the process is easily available. Any person
who undertakes to do an agency's work for it by drafting a pro-
posed rule is necessarily a person having a substantial interest in
that rule.
Nor will broad access rules cause an agency to lose control over
123. The so-called "Gordon Rule," FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6A-10.30 (1982), requiring state
university and community college students to meet certain communication and computation
skills requirements as prerequisites for graduation, resulted from an initiative petition sub-
mitted to the State Board of Education by State Sen. Gordon. Gordon established his sub-
stantial interest in the rule he proposed by showing his interest in education: He was a
member of the Dade County School Board from 1960 to 1968; as a state senator, he had
served on the Senate Comm. on Educ. for six years, during two of which he was the vice-
chairman; he had sponsored numerous bills affecting higher education in Florida; he had
been a strong advocate of quality improvements in higher education; he served on the Joint
Legislative and Executive Committee on Post-Secondary Education in Florida as well as
several national panels concerned with education; and he had received formal recognition
from various groups associated with the education community in Florida. In re Petition for
Rulemaking 1-2, Board of Education Docket No. E-905-81.
124. F. COOPER, supra note 117, at 204 (discussing Wisconsin's initiative method).
125. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (1985).
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its agenda or the direction or development of its policy. The initia-
tive provision does require an agency response to a petition no
later than thirty calendar days after its submission. The agency
may respond by giving notice of rulemaking proceedings in accor-
dance with chapter 120 if it determines that the proposed rule is
worth pursuing. Or the agency may deny the petition so long as it
gives the petitioner a written statement explaining the reasons for
the denial. 128 Agency denial of an initiative petition is subject to
judicial review but, with one exception, the scope of review is ex-
tremely narrow. Ordinarily it must be shown that an agency
abused its discretion in denying the petition.1 27 The exception oc-
curs when the initiative petition sought the adoption of a rule the
agency was required by statute to adopt.128 In that situation, it
would be wholly inappropriate for an agency to deny the initiative
petition. But if it did, a reviewing court would reverse and direct
the agency to proceed with rulemaking proceedings.
In the initiative context, any person whose conduct is controlled
by an agency or any person who is required to tailor his conduct to
comply with agency directives, or any person who demonstrates a
substantial interest in a rule through education, experience, posi-
tion, or concern has a right to petition an agency for the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of a rule. Whether the petitioner prevails on
the merits is entirely within the sound discretion of the agency.
Initiative petitions, if they are to be denied, should be denied on
their merits with an explanation of the reasons supporting the
agency decision. Except in extraordinary circumstances, these peti-
tions should not be denied on grounds of insufficient interest on
the petitioner's part.
B. The Information Gathering Hearing
Rulemaking proceedings, whether in response to an initiative pe-
tition or on an agency's own motion, are begun by the agency giv-
ing public notice in compliance with section 120.54(1). If the pro-
posed rule is not one relating exclusively to organization, practice,
or procedure, "the agency shall, on the request of any affected per-
son. . ., give affected persons an opportunity to present evidence
126. Id.
127. Citizens of Florida v. Mayo, 357 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1978); Freeman v. Department
of Health & Rehab. Servs., 436 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
128. See, e.g., Florida Institutional Legal Servs., Inc. v. Florida Parole & Probation
Comm'n, 391 So. 2d 247, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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and argument on all issues under consideration appropriate to in-
form it of their contentions."12 9
This provision recognizes two categories of persons. Certain de-
fined persons may request an opportunity to inform the agency of
their positions regarding the proposed rule. There is another per-
haps overlapping category of persons to whom this informing op-
portunity must be extended once it has been appropriately re-
quested. While it would not be unusual to require that a person
who initiates a proceeding have a greater interest in the proposed
rule than persons who are allowed to participate in the proceeding
once the machinery is in motion, the language in the Florida provi-
sion does not make that distinction. Both groups, requesters and
participants, must in some way be "affected" by the rule under
consideration. It is clear from the language that the effect on these
persons need not necessarily be adverse. However, some interest of
the persons in both categories must be acted on or changed by the
proposed rule for "affected person" status to be afforded.
1. History of the Information Gathering Hearing
The history of this provision is somewhat more instructive of the
legislative intent than is the history of the initiative provision. The
first two Law Revision Council drafts provided an opportunity for
a public hearing at the request of "any interested person"; the
public hearing was to be one appropriate to allow "interested per-
sons" to inform the agency. 30 Beginning with the third draft and
continuing through the final draft, the Law Revision Council set
forth a different formulation: the opportunity for public hearing
was to be at the request of "any person" and "interested persons"
were to be given an opportunity to inform the agency. 31 It was
during the House Administrative Procedure Subcommittee's re-
view of the Law Revision Council's third draft and the House bill
(which reflected the Council's second draft on this point) that dis-
satisfaction with both formulations was expressed. The Subcom-
129. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (1985) (emphasis addded).
130. Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.4(3), at 8; Reporter's Draft No. 2,
supra note 107, § 0120.4(2), at 10.
131. Reporter's Draft No. 3, supra note 107, § 0120.4(2), at 10; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT § 0120.4(2) (Florida Law Revision Council, Reporter's Draft No. 4, with commen-
tary, Feb. 4, 1974) in 6 PRELIMINARY MATERIALS DEALING WITH THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 11 (available at the Florida Supreme Court Library and the Florida State
University College of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Reporter's Draft No. 4]; Reporter's
Final Draft, supra note 107, § 0.120.4(2), at 5.
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mittee informally agreed to amend the House bill to bring it into
compliance with draft three from the Law Revision Council. This
dialogue then took place:
DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS GENERAL COUNSEL: You're not relating it
to any affected or interested person? For instance, speaking as
general counsel for the Department of Citrus now, and it adopts a
rule pertaining to processors of citrus fruit. You mean by that
that a sweet corn grower in South Florida can come in and re-
quest a public hearing on the rule and be granted a public
hearing?
REPRESENTATIVE HECTOR: Well, what should we add to take care
of that problem?
DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS GENERAL COUNSEL: Well, in your proposal
[HB 2672], you say interested person and I'm not sure that that's
the right word. It might be any affected person.
WADE HOPPING: The word affected, you'll find the definition in
the other statutes. You'll find it at least used in [chapter] 403,
and you'll find it used in [chapter] 380. And maybe that's a good
observation.""2
ROBERT RHODES: It narrows your standing.
WADE HOPPING: It narrows standing, but it allows anybody who
can show standing to get in and it's not that tough.133
The Subcommittee then amended the House bill to provide that
any "affected person" could request an opportunity to inform the
agency. Without further discussion and apparently in the interest
of consistency,'3 4 the qualification of persons permitted to partici-
132. Examination of FLA. STAT., ch. 380 (1973), discloses no use of "affected." The word
is used in FLA. STAT. §§ 403.051(1), 051(5), 412(2)(c) (1973), but is not defined and as of the
date of Mr. Hopping's statement had not been construed in any case.
133. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Admin. Procedure, tape recording
of proceedings (Apr. 4, 1974) (available at Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Legis.
Library Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.). Rep. Hector was the Chairman of the Subcommittee.
Wade Hopping was the Chairman of the Law Revision Council and Robert Rhodes was the
Bureau Chief of the Fla. Div. of State Planning, Bureau of Land & Water Mgt.
134. Id.
REP. HECTOR: "How about the word 'interested' on line 29?" [Referring to the
persons who could participate in the public hearing.]
WADE HOPPING: "Well, we need to keep the words alike. We could use the 'af-
fected' there too, do we not?" [sic].
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pate in the proceedings was changed from "interested" to
"affected. 13 5
The Senate bill, as introduced, used the same language as the
committee substitute for the House bill.136 The bill that passed the
Senate, however, made no provision for requesting an information
gathering hearing on a proposed rule.137 The conference committee
report approved by both chambers contained the language ac-
cepted by the House Subcommittee. 138
The record of the House Subcommittee debate on the question
is far from exhaustive, but it does support the construction ten-
dered earlier. An advertent decision was made, at least with re-
spect to the requester, that an opportunity to inform an agency
about one's position on a proposed rule be extended only to a per-
son who in some way is to be affected by that rule. For example, a
sweet corn grower in South Florida may be interested in and con-
cerned about rules regulating citrus processors, but the choice that
was made demands more than interest or concern. Unless the rule
directed at citrus processors will have some impact on the sweet
corn grower, the grower is not an "affected person" for purposes of
requesting or participating in any public hearing held on the rule.
2. Information Gathering Hearings in Other States
Substantially all state administrative procedure acts make provi-
sion for interested persons to submit their views to agencies prior
to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule. A majority of
states13 has adopted language modeled on the 1961 RMA, which
REP. HECTOR: "I think so."
135. Fla. CS for HB 2672, 2434, 2583, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT.
120.54(2) (1974)).
136. Fla. SB 892, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. 120.54(2)).
137. Fla. CS for SB 892, sec. 1 (1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. 120.54(2) (Supp.
1974)).
138. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1328 (Reg. Sess. 1974); FLA. S. JOUR. 907 (Reg. Sess. 1974).
139. ALA. CODE § 41-22(5)(a)(2) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.210(a) (1984); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1002(D) (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-703(a)(2) (1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
11346.8(a) (West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-168(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1506(a) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-4(a)(2) (Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 91-3(a)(2) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 67-5203(a)(3) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127, § 1005.01(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A-4(1)(b) (West
Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:953A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 30A, § 3 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.10 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-302(4) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.061 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:3-
c(I) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-32-02 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 303(A)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985); OIL
REV. STAT. § 183.335(3) (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-3(a)(2) (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-
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provides that prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any
rule, the agency shall "afford all interested persons reasonable op-
portunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writ-
ing." 140 The 1981 MSAPA"'1 and several states"4 2 extend an oppor-
tunity to all persons to submit, in writing, argument, data, and
views on proposed rules.
Some state statutes require a public hearing to be held before
any rule may be adopted.1 4 3 Still others impose a public hearing
only if required by another statute.144 California requires a public
hearing if one is requested by an interested person. ' 5 A large
number of states'4" essentially follows the approach of the 1961
RMA regarding public hearings on proposed rules. The RMA pro-
vides that "[iun case of substantive rules, opportunity for oral hear-
ing must be granted if requested by 25 persons, by a governmental
subdivision or agency, or by an association having not less than 25
members.' 4 7 Some state statutes make a public hearing available
110(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp.
1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-5(1)(b) (1978); VA CODE § 9-6.14:7.1(B) (Supp. 1984); WASH.
REv. ANN. CODE § 34.04.025(1)(b) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.022(1) (West 1982);
Wvo. STAT. § 16-3-103(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
140. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 93, § 3(a)(2), at 387 (emphasis added).
141. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 112, § 3-104(a), at 98.
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10116 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8053(3)(C)
(Supp. 1984-1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-43-17 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.021(2)(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1984); N.Y. A.P.A. § 202(1)(a) McKinney (Supp. 1984-1985).
143. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4-103(4) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-4 (Burns
1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-421(b) (1984); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A.270 (Michie 1985)
(with provision for canceling the hearing if no written request to appear is received from any
person desiring to be heard); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 24.241(1) (West Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 14.14(1) (West Supp. 1985); Ne. REv. STAT. § 84-907 (1981); NEv. REv. STAT. §
233B.061 (1983) (limited to substantive rules with proviso that if no one appears who will be
directly affected by the proposed rule, the agency may proceed to act upon any written
comments received); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-4(A)(3) (1978) (with provision that if agency
determines oral proceedings would be unnecessary or impracticable, it may require written
submissions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(a) (1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(C) (Page
Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-4(4) (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-204(a)
(Supp. 1984).
144. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10117 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8052(1) (1979)
(with provision for hearing if requested by five interested persons); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 30A, § 2 (West 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.021(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
145. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346.8(a) (West Supp. 1985).
146. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-4(a)(2) (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-5203(a)(3) (Supp.
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:953A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-
302(4) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 303(a)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
42-35-3(a)(2) (1977); TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-46-5(1)(b) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.025(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985);
Wvo. STAT. § 16-3-103(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
147. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 93, § 3(a)(2), at 387.
1000 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:965
for all rules, not just substantive rules, at the request of a specific
number of persons, a governmental subdivision or agency, or an
association having no fewer than a specified number of members." 8
Several state statutes permit either the Governor or a legislative
committee to request a public hearing. 49 New Jersey permits only
a committee of the legislature or a governmental subdivision or
agency to request a public hearing on a proposed rule, but agencies
may use informal conferences to solicit the views of interested per-
sons. 150 Montana and Wisconsin require a specified number of per-
sons to request a public hearing and also require that those per-
sons be affected by the proposed rule.1 51 Ohio requires a public
hearing prior to the adoption of any rule, but only persons affected
by the rule may participate. 52 No state other than Florida permits
a single "affected person" to require the convening of a public
hearing on a proposed rule at which "affected persons" may sub-
mit their views to the agency.
3. Functional Analysis
An access standard that requires demonstration of some effect,
while more limited than one that requires only a showing of inter-
est or concern,5 3 is not incompatible with the purposes of the in-
formation gathering proceeding. The purposes served in this set-
ting are similar to those served by the initiative process. The
information gathering proceeding is designed to enable the agency
to become informed about its proposed rule and to implement the
148. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-168(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §
1005.01(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4(l)(b) (West Supp. 1985);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:3-c(I) (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.335(3) (1981); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-23-110(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 840(a) (Supp.
1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.02(1)(e) (West 1982).
149. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005.01(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §
17A-4(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:953A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-302(4) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.025(1)(b) (West Supp.
1985); see also 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 112, § 3-104(b), at 98.
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
151. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-302(4) (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.02(1)(e) (West 1982)
(applies to substantive rules only).
152. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(C) (Page Supp. 1984).
153. Commenting on the Iowa statute's use of the word "interested" in connection with
the opportunity it grants to submit written comments to agencies, Professor Bonfield said:
"The term 'interested person' means quite literally anyone who cares enough to do so. There
is no concept or requirement of standing. All citizens have an 'interest' in the making of
sound law and, therefore, any person who wants to is given a right to comment in writing."
Bonfield, supra note 121, at 852.
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"ideal of participatory democracy." '154 Both purposes are served by
providing a formal mechanism for the presentation of views re-
garding proposed agency policy by persons who will be affected by
that policy. The Law Revision Council viewed the opportunity of
"interested persons" to be heard on proposed substantive rules as
a matter of "fundamental fairness." 15" But it cannot be said to be
fundamentally unfair to require a person who puts the public hear-
ing machinery in motion to show some impact on his interests
caused by the proposed rule.
Requiring those who attend and wish to participate at the hear-
ing to provide a showing of impact is more troublesome. Any per-
son who cares enough about what government is doing, and who
has something to offer which might be useful to the deci-
sionmakers, ought to be heard. Untoward results which undermine
the policy foundations of both the initiative and the information
gathering hearing provisions could occur if only "affected persons"
were allowed to participate in the public hearing. For example, it is
conceivable that an initiative petitioner, who demonstrated sub-
stantial interest in a rule that he proposed but which would not
affect him personally, would be unable to participate at the infor-
mation gathering hearing held on his proposed rule. Happily, this
problem seems more theoretical than real. There are no reported
cases involving the question. It appears that common sense and
good public relations instincts, if not the law, have inclined agen-
cies in Florida to hear from those who wish to be heard.
The information gathering hearing provision is designed to ac-
commodate agency interests in efficiency. An opportunity for a
hearing need only be made available when the proposed rules are
substantive. Rules relating exclusively to organization, practice,
and procedure are viewed as matters of internal agency concern
not requiring outside participation in their development. 15 An
agency is not required to make available an opportunity for com-
ment unless one is requested by an "affected person." Thus, an
agency is spared the time, expense, and delay of soliciting views on
uncontroversial proposals. 157 Unless a public hearing at which oral
presentation can be made is demanded, the opportunity to com-
154. Id. at 892; see Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, appeal dismissed, 370 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1979).
155. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 15.
156. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1985).
157. See Dore, Rulemaking Innovations Under the New Administrative Procedure Act,
3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 97, 98 (1975).
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municate views can be limited to written submissions.' 5 The stat-
ute does require that a record of the proceedings be kept159 and
that any pertinent information received at a public hearing or sub-
mitted to the agency in writing be made a part of that record.1 60
The statute also requires that "affected persons" be given an ade-
quate opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues
under consideration to inform the agency of their contentions."'
The statute does not specify who must conduct the proceeding.
Thus, except in cases involving particularly sensitive rules, an
agency staff member rather than the agency head conducts the
proceeding. Beyond these minimum statutory guidelines, the struc-
ture of the information gathering hearing is left to the agency.
The information gathering hearing has been likened to a fact
gathering legislative hearing. 62 It is not intended to be adversarial.
Agencies have been reminded by the courts that they have an "af-
firmative duty to inform [themselves] to the fullest extent possible
of the interest[s] and problems of those who seek to present evi-
dence and argument. . . . [They have] no right, as a litigant in an
adversary proceeding might have, to protect [themselves] from evi-
dence or argument that may be unfavorable."' 63 Although a record
must be kept of all evidence and argument, oral and written, sub-
mitted to the agency for its consideration, a proposed rule need not
be supported by competent and substantial evidence in that rec-
ord. 6" A party to an information gathering hearing who is ad-
versely affected by the agency's decision to adopt a proposed rule
may seek judicial review of that final agency action.6 5 The consti-
tutionality of the statute authorizing the rule, 66 the constitutional-
ity of the rule, 67 the fairness of the rulemaking proceedings them-
158. Id. The provision was amended in 1978 to authorize the Department of Corrections
to limit prisoner opportunity to comment on proposed rules to written submissions. Ch. 78-
28, § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 28, 29 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1985)).
159. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(6) (1985).
160. Id. § 120.54(3).
161. Id.
162. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 24 (citations omitted); see Dore, supra note 157, at 98.
163. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 24.
164. General Tel. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 1984);
Polk v. School Bd. of Polk County, 373 So. 2d 960, 962 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
165. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1985); see City of Key West v. Askew,. 324 So. 2d 655, 658
(Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
166. See Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977),
aft'd, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
167. See Rice v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 386 So. 2d 844, 848-50 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1980).
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selves, 168 and the adequacy of the rule's economic impact
statement'69 all may be raised on judicial review of the rule by an
adversely affected party to the information gathering hearing. But
the wisdom of the agency's policy choice, so long as it is within its
statutory authority and not arbitrary or capricious, is not an ap-
propriate matter for court review.17 0
The nature of this process and its practical operation in the
overall scheme established by chapter 120 support the legislature's
decision that a person who would require the agency to hold a pub-
lic information gathering hearing at which it must receive all perti-
nent evidence and argument concerning the proposed rule in order
to become better informed, must be a person whose interests are in
some fashion affected by the proposed rule. The legislative deci-
sion that only "affected persons" may participate in the public in-
formation gathering hearing once it has been initiated is less
clearly supported. A process intended to foster communication be-
tween the government and the people would better achieve that
goal if any interested or concerned person were given the opportu-
nity to participate in the dialogue. The legislature's decision to re-
strict the opportunity to "affected persons" was not reached after
thoughtful debate, but in response to an offhand remark that the
words need to be kept alike.' 7 ' The legislature ought to revisit the
information gathering hearing provision and amend it to extend
the right of participation to any interested person. The right to
trigger a hearing ought to remain only with an "affected person."
Consistency of language here is not valuable.
C. The Drawout Provision
Ordinarily, agency rulemaking is governed by section 120.54. As
discussed above, this means that a person affected by the proposed
rule can compel the convening of a legislative type information
gathering hearing at which all affected persons may make their
views about the rule under consideration known to the agency.
168. See Balino, 362 So. 2d at 26.
169. See Florida-Texas Freight, Inc., v. Hawkins, 379 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979); Cortese v.
School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 425 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), petition for
review denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983); Polk v. School Bd. of Polk County, 373 So. 2d 960
(Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
170. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(9), (12)(a) (1985); see Citizens of Fla. v. Mayo, 357 So. 2d 731,
733 (Fla. 1978); Cortese, 425 So. 2d 554; Plantation Residents' Ass'n, Inc. v. School Bd. of
Broward County, 424 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 436
So. 2d 100 (1983).
171. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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However, section 120.54(17), the so-called drawout provision, pro-
vides a means for a person to trigger an adjudicatory proceeding
pursuant to section 120.57. Drawout from a section 120.54(3) infor-
mation gathering proceeding into a section 120.57 adjudicatory
proceeding is available to a person who "timely asserts that his
substantial interests will be affected in the proceeding and affirm-
atively demonstrates to the agency that the [120.54(3)] proceeding
does not provide adequate opportunity to protect those inter-
ests. ' ' 17 1 If the agency agrees that the information gathering hear-
ing procedures will not provide adequate protection, the agency
must suspend that proceeding and convene a separate proceeding
under the provisions of section 120.57. Similarly situated persons
may intervene. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory proceeding,
the information gathering hearing is resumed.
The right to request a drawout is not available to all "affected
persons" participating in an information gathering hearing. The
statutory requirement that "his substantial interests will be af-
fected" requires showing more than mere effect. The use of the
personal pronoun suggests legislative intent that the drawout peti-
tioner's own interests must be at stake. The use of the adjective
"substantial" suggests that the interests affected must be impor-
tant or significant personal interests. The use of the noun "inter-
ests" rather than "rights," "privileges," or "immunities" suggests
that the drawout petitioner's "substantial interests" do not have to
rise to the level of legally recognized and protected rights, privi-
leges, or immunities. Rather, any important or significant concern
personal to the petitioner is sufficient. The final requirement, that
these substantial interests "will be affected in the proceeding," is
curious. After all, the proceeding referred to is an information
gathering hearing at which "affected persons" talk and agency rep-
resentatives listen; the hearing is nonadversarial; no one's interests
are adjudicated. The required showing of effect actually goes to the
product of the proceeding rather than to the proceeding itself.173
That is, if the agency adopts as a rule the proposal under consider-
ation at the information gathering hearing, some important or sig-
nificant interest of the drawout petitioner will be affected.
1. History of the Drawout Provision
The history of the drawout provision shows that it evolved as
172. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1985) (emphasis added).
173. Levinson, supra note 96, at 77.
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part of the adjudicatory hearing provision. There was no access re-
quirement as such in any of the preliminary Law Revision Council
drafts. The first three drafts called for adjudicatory procedures to
be instituted "whenever proposed agency action involves a dis-
puted issue of material fact, of policy, or of the interpretation of a
provision having the effect of law, or whenever a statute other than
this act requires a hearing. ' 174 In the fourth draft, adjudicatory
procedures were to apply "in all contested cases" which involved
disputed material facts, policy, or interpretations of provisions
having the effect of law. 175 The turn away from "proposed agency
action" involving disputed issues of fact or policy to "contested
cases" involving such disputes would seem to have precluded the
provision's application to agency rulemaking. The reporter's com-
ment continued to maintain, however, that the provision was ap-
plicable whether the matter was "adjudicatory in nature, or a rule-
making proceeding. '1 76
The requirement that one's "substantial interests will be af-
fected in the proceeding" first appeared in the Law Revision Coun-
cil's final draft.17 7 The bill debated and approved by the House
contained the "substantial interest" requirement as formulated in
the Law Revision Council's final draft.178 The bill passed by the
Senate did not address administrative adjudication, and conse-
quently it did not provide for the drawout.17 e The conference com-
mittee report passed by both houses contained the House language
on the drawout.5 0 There is no record available of the Law Revision
Council or the House committee discussions concerning the deci-
sion to make the drawout opportunity available to a person who
asserts that "his substantial interests will be affected" in the infor-
mation gathering proceeding. However, Professor Harold Levinson,
174. Reporter's Draft No. 2., supra note 107, § 0120.6, at 16; Reporter's Draft No. 3,
supra note 107, § 0120.6, at 16; see Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.6, at 14
(stating that "[wIhenever the action of an agency involves a disputed issue of material fact,
of policy, or of the interpretation of a provision having the effect of law, the provisions of
this section shall apply").
175. Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 0120.6, at 16.
176. Id. at 17 (Reporter's Comment).
177. Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 107, § 0120.6, at 16.
178. Fla. CS for HB 2672, 2434, 2583, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57).
179. Fla. CS for SB 892 (1974). Fla. SB 892, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57),
as introduced, did contain the same drawout language as in the approved House bill.
180. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1330 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57);
FLA. S. JouR. 909 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same). The drawout provision was subsequently relo-
cated to § 120.54(15) in 1976; see Ch. 76-131, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 216, 221 (current version
at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1985)).
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who chaired the administrative law committee which was primarily
responsible for the development of the Law Revision Council's pro-
posal, subsequently explained that the phrase "substantial inter-
ests" was chosen deliberately by the Council to expand the "right
to a hearing-whether formal or informal-beyond that which was
recognized under prior law.' i8
1
2. Drawout Provisions in Other States
The drawout provision is one of the major innovations brought
about with the 1974 revision of chapter 120. Neither the 1961
RMA nor the 1981 MSAPA contains a similar provision. No other
state administrative procedure statute has a drawout provision.
The Florida statute is unique in this regard.
3. Functional Analysis
Florida's drawout provision represents a rejection of "unthinking
adherence to 'rule-making' and 'adjudication' procedures, as if the
two were wholly distinct and distinguishable.' 182 By expressly rec-
ognizing that "agency proceedings frequently affect individual
rights and create general policy at the same time, so that they par-
take of adjudication and rule-making at the same time,"'' the pro-
vision encourages welcome flexibility in the administrative process.
Procedural rights no longer depend on a rigid adherence to an
anachronistic bright line distinction between adjudication and
rulemaking.184 Rather, the provision is designed to increase admin-
istrative fairness "by focusing attention on the rights affected
rather than the labels given a particular process.' 85 Thus, the pur-
pose of the drawout provision is to enable a person whose "sub-
stantial interests will be affected in the proceeding" to insist on the
procedural safeguards necessary to protect those interests whether
or not those procedural protections are usually associated with the
information gathering hearing held in connection with rulemaking.
The access requirement drawn from the plain meaning of the
provision's language above fully comports with the sparse available
evidence of the drafters' intent, as well as with the policy consider-
181. Levinson, supra note 96, at 77.
182. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 6.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 6-7; see also Kennedy, A National Perspective of Administrative Law and
the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 65, 69 (1975).
185. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 6.
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ations underlying the drawout provision. Any affected participant
in an information gathering hearing who claims his important or
significant concerns will be affected if the agency adopts the pro-
posed rule under consideration satisfies the statutory prerequisite
necessary to proceed to the next step in accomplishing the desired
drawout.
Having established the requisite effect on important or signifi-
cant personal concerns, the drawout petitioner must next "affirma-
tively demonstrate to the agency that the proceeding does not pro-
vide adequate opportunity to protect those interests."'1 86 It is only
if the petitioner successfully carries this burden of persuasion that
the information gathering hearing must be suspended and a sepa-
rate adjudicatory proceeding convened. It is incumbent on the pe-
titioner to request the specific procedural protections he thinks are
necessary to protect his substantial interests. For example, the pe-
titioner may assert a need to examine or cross-examine certain
named witnesses under oath, or to subpoena named reluctant wit-
nesses. Whatever the nature of the asserted need, it must be ac-
companied by a specific proffer of the facts to be adduced through
each witness, and an explanation of why the evidence sought to be
elicited through examination or cross-examination of these wit-
nesses is necessary to protect his substantial interests. 187
The agency for its part must exercise the discretion vested in it
by section 120.54(17).188 It must determine which, if any, of the
requested procedures are necessary to protect the petitioner's sub-
stantial interests. The agency may then either extend the neces-
sary procedural protections to the petitioner in the information
gathering hearing, or if that response is inconvenient or inappro-
priate, suspend the proceeding and convene an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding. The reported cases concerning the availability of the
drawout disclose a fundamental misperception about the provision
on the part of petitioners.' They assert an entitlement to a sec-
tion 120.57 proceeding, but the provision does not entitle a peti-
tioner to a section 120.57 adjudicatory proceeding. The petitioner
is only entitled to those procedural protections that he can affirma-
186. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1985).
187. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 26.
188. Corn v. Department of Legal Affairs, 368 So. 2d 591, 592-93 (Fla. 1979); see Bert
Rogers Schools of Real Estate v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 339 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA
1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1977).
189. See Cortese v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 425 So. 2d 554, 555-56; Bert
Rogers Schools of Real Estate, 339 So. 2d at 227-28.
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tively demonstrate are necessary to protect his substantial inter-
ests. Only if he succeeds in this and then only if the agency decides
not to make the necessary procedures available at the information
gathering hearing is the petitioner entitled to a section 120.57
proceeding.
As a practical matter, an agency will be more inclined to trans-
form the information gathering hearing to accommodate specifi-
cally requested and adequately supported procedural protections
than it will be to grant a request for an adjudicatory hearing. As
discussed above, the information gathering hearing is subject to
few statutory requirements. No statutory prohibitions preclude an
agency from providing procedural protections necessary to safe-
guard someone's substantial interests. By responding to a petition
in this fashion, the agency maintains the relative informality of the
rulemaking process, retains control over the development of its
policy, and saves time. At the same time, a petitioner is accorded
the procedural protections that are adequate to protect his sub-
stantial interests.
On the other hand, the agency may respond, of course, by sus-
pending the information gathering proceeding and convening a
proceeding under section 120.57. If there are disputed issues of
material fact between the agency and the drawout petitioner, the
separate proceeding will be a formal one conducted pursuant to
section 120.57(1). If there are no disputed material facts, the sepa-
rate proceeding may be an informal one conducted under section
120.57(2).190 In either event, substantial delay in the adoption of
the rule will result.
An agency that agrees to convene the separate proceeding obvi-
ously has accepted the consequential delay in the rule adoption
process. But if time is an important consideration to an agency, the
delay inherent in granting a drawout petition works as an incentive
to the agency to deny the petition. Thus, a drawout petitioner is
more likely to obtain agency procedural concessions, if they are
specific and supported, in the information gathering hearing than
he is to persuade an agency to convene the separate proceeding.
The drawout provision properly understood, then, does not por-
tend costly interruptions and inordinate delays for agency
rulemaking if the access rule suggested is used. The process will
190. For a rather unorthodox view of the relationship between the information gathering
hearing and the adjudicatory proceeding brought about through a successful drawout peti-
tion, see Waas, The Limits Upon the Administrative Procedure Act's Drawout Remedy, 52
FLA. B.J. 815, 815-18 (1978).
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work as it was intended to work if any affected person participat-
ing in an information gathering hearing whose important or signifi-
cant concerns will be affected if the agency adopts the rule under
consideration is given the opportunity to request with specificity
those procedures he thinks are necessary to protect his interests.
Whether he is entitled to those procedures will depend on the mer-
its of his assertions and the persuasiveness of the reasons proffered
in their support. The power to decide whether requested proce-
dural protections are to be extended at the information gathering
hearing or whether a separate adjudicatory proceeding is to be con-
vened is vested in agency discretion. Drawout petitions should not
be denied for lack of sufficient interest if the petitioner satisfies
the minimal statutory access requirements. If the drawout petition
is to be denied, it should be on the merits. That is, a petition
which fails to request specific procedural protections or which fails
to support the asserted needs with specific proffers that demon-
strate the necessity of those procedures to protect the petitioner's
substantial interests ought to be denied for substantive
inadequacy.
D. The Administrative Challenge to the Validity of Proposed
Rules
When an agency publishes notice of its intention to adopt any
rule, procedural or substantive, the validity of the proposed rule
may be challenged before a DOAH hearing officer. Section
120.54(4) authorizes "[a]ny substantially affected person [to] seek
an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed
rule on the ground that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority." '' The validity challenge' petition
must be in writing and must be filed with the DOAH within 14
days after publication of notice to adopt the proposed rule.192 The
petition "must state with particularity the provisions of the rule
or economic impact statement alleged to be invalid and must do so
with sufficient explanation of the facts or grounds for the alleged
invalidity and facts sufficient to show that the person challenging
the proposed rule would be substantially affected by it." 193 If the
191. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1985) (emphasis added).
192. The 14-day period was held jurisdictional in Department of Health & Rehab. Servs.
v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
193. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(b) (1985) (emphasis added). The unemphasized language was
added to the subsection in 1984. Ch. 84-203, § 2, 1984 Fla. Laws 611, 612.
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DOAH director is satisfied that the petition meets these require-
ments, she assigns a hearing officer to conduct a hearing within
thirty days of the assignment."" The hearing is conducted in ac-
cordance with the adjudicatory procedures of section 120.57. How-
ever, in an administrative validity challenge proceeding, the hear-
ing officer's decision is final agency action, not the recommended
order that usually results when hearing officers conduct proceed-
ings pursuant to section 120.57(1)."15 An agency may not adopt a
proposed rule by filing it while a validity challenge is pending. If
the hearing officer declares a proposed rule invalid, an agency can-
not adopt it unless the hearing officer's decision is reversed by a
reviewing court.'96 The statute specifically states that failure to
challenge a proposed rule under this provision shall not constitute
a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.' 97
As noted, the validity of any proposed rule may be challenged
administratively by "any substantially affected person." The fur-
ther requirement that the validity challenge petition must allege
facts sufficient to show that the challenger "would be substantially
affected" by the proposed rule is useful in formulating the appro-
priate access standard for this proceeding. The statutory language
emphasizes the effect the proposed rule would have on the person
seeking to challenge its validity. The provision does not require,
for example, that a person allege that his substantial interests
would be affected by the proposed rule in order to challenge it.
Rather, the proceeding can be initiated by any person who would
be affected in an important or significant way if the proposed rule
were adopted by the agency. In other words, any person who al-
leges with specificity that his course of conduct would be acted on
or changed in any important or significant fashion if the proposed
rule were to become effective would be a "substantially affected
person" for purposes of initiating an administrative validity chal-
lenge to that proposed rule.
1. History of the Validity Challenge to Proposed Rules
The history of the administrative validity challenge provision of-
fers little insight into legislative intent. The provision was not in-
cluded in any of the Law Revision Council's drafts. It was not in-
194. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(c) (1985).
195. Id. § 120.54(4)(d); compare id. § 120.57(1)(b)(9).
196. Id. § 120.54(4)(c).
197. Id. § 120.54(4)(d).
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cluded in the House bill as introduced or as debated and approved.
It was not included in the Senate bill as introduced. The validity
challenge provision appeared for the first time in the Senate com-
mittee substitute bill sponsored by the Senate Committee on Rules
and Calendar. This bill, as passed by the Senate, substituted the
validity challenge provision for the information gathering hearing
provision in the House bill.
Under the Senate scheme, agencies would file copies of all rules
they proposed to adopt with the DOAH. No proceeding of any
kind could be requested for proposed rules relating exclusively to
organization, practice, or procedure. For proposed substantive
rules, the following provision was made:
[On written request of any substantially affected person received
within fourteen calendar days after the date of publication of no-
tice the division director shall assign a hearing officer, with due
regard for any technical expertise required, to hold a hearing on
the issues under consideration .... The hearing officer may de-
clare the proposed rule wholly or partly invalid. 98
Thus, in this initial version of the validity challenge provision, no
grounds for challenging the validity of proposed rules were speci-
fied and no requirement that the petition must allege facts suffi-
cient to show that the challenger "would be substantially affected"
by the proposed rule was imposed.
The conference committee report retained both the information
gathering hearing provision from the House bill and the validity
challenge provision from the Senate bill. The conference commit-
tee report also specified the grounds upon which a validity chal-
lenge could be based' 9e and inserted the requirement that the peti-
tion must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the challenger
"would be substantially affected" by the proposed rule.2 00 Al-
though there is no available record of the conference committee
discussion on these points, it is likely that both features were
198. Fla. CS for SB 892, sec. 4 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.041(2)).
199. As enacted in 1974, validity challenges under the statute could be based on either of
two grounds: (1) the proposed rule was an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative
power, or (2) the proposed rule was an exercise of invalidly delegated legislative power. Ch.
74-310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 952, 956 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (Supp. 1974)). The
second ground was deleted in 1976. Ch. 76-131, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 216, 219 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 120.54(3) (Supp. 1976)).
200. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 1328 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. §
120.54(3)); FLA. S. JouR. 907 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same).
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added to conform the language of the provisions for challenge to
proposed rules and the language of the challenge to adopted rules
in section 120.56. Indeed, during the floor debate on the Senate
bill, Senator Barron, who as chairman of the Committee on Rules
and Calendar was the principal architect of both validity challenge
provisions, seemed to indicate that both provisions were available
only to challenge agency rulemaking that exceeded delegated stat-
utory authority."'1
In his explanation to the Senate of the operation of the validity
challenge to proposed rules proceeding, Barron touched briefly on
the interest necessary to initiate the challenge. He said:
[W]here a member of the public is aggrieved by a proposed rule
within the twenty-one [sic] days that they have to become ag-
grieved, they may immediately go to the hearing officer and say,
we contend that this proposed rule is outside of the authority of
the agency that made it, and thereby avoid it ever becoming a
rule.202
Barron's use of the word "aggrieved" in substitution for the phrase
"substantially affected" is not particularly telling. To be aggrieved
is to be injured, offended, or wronged in some way. The word "ag-
grieved" does not necessarily connote a significant or important in-
jury, offense, or wrong, whereas the phrase "substantially affected"
clearly does carry such a connotation. Barron's passing reference
was the only comment made during the floor debate in either
house bearing on the question of the interest a person must have
to initiate a validity challenge to a proposed rule. As a conse-
quence, the legislative history adds nothing to the meaning of the
language used in the provision.
2. Validity Challenges to Proposed Rules in Other States
A statutory provision authorizing "any substantially affected
person" to challenge the validity of a proposed rule before an inde-
pendent administrative hearing officer who has the power to de-
clare the proposed rule invalid after full hearing appears to be
unique to Florida. Neither the 1961 RMA nor the 1981 MSAPA
contains a similar provision. No other state administrative proce-
dure statute contains a validity challenge provision comparable to
201. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 14, 1974) (on file with Secretary).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Florida provision. Some states do require external review of
proposed rules by the attorney general, 0 3 or by the Governor,24 or
by a legislative overview committee.0 5 The 1981 MSAPA contains
a provision permitting the Governor to "summarily terminate any
pending rule-making proceeding. '"20 None of these statutes is
helpful in formulating an appropriate access standard for the Flor-
ida validity challenge provision, however, because none of these ex-
ternal review procedures is triggered by a private person as is the
Florida provision.
203. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1002.01 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8)(b) (1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-169 (West Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-5 (Burns 1982);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4(4)(a) (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-420(b) (1984); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8056(1)(A) (Supp. 1984-1985); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-107
(1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.245(1) (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.26 (West
Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-905.01 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-02 (Supp. 1983);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-6.5 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-211 (Supp. 1984); VA.
CODE § 9-6.14:9.1 (Supp. 1984). In Alaska, proposed rules are reviewed by the Department
of Law. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.060 (1984). California requires the Office of Administrative
Law to review proposed rules, with provision for gubernatorial override. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
11349.3, .5 (West Supp. 1985). In North Carolina the attorney general's acceptance of rules
for filing constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the administrative procedure
act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-59(b) (1983). Wyoming requires the attorney general to give
advice and assistance to all agencies in preparing, revising, codifing, and editing of new and
existing rules. WYo. STAT. § 16-3-104(d) (Supp. 1985).
204. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-3(c) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-5 (Burns 1982);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4(4)(a) (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908 (1981); VA. CODE
§ 9-6.14:9.1 (Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. § 16-3-103(d) (Supp. 1985). In Louisiana, the Governor
may veto a legislative objection to a proposed rule. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:968(G) (West
Supp. 1985). In Vermont, proposed rules are reviewed by an interagency committee on ad-
ministrative rules appointed by the Governor. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 820 (Supp. 1984).
205. ALA. CODE § 41-22-23 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103 (8)(d) (1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-170 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-
4(e), (f) (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-5203(2) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§
1005.01(b), 1007.06(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.8 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13A.020, .030 (Michie 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49:968 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.245 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-402 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:3-e (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:14B-4.1 to .3 (West Supp. 1985) (held unconstitutional in General Assembly of N.J. v.
Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(I) (Page Supp. 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 183.710 to .725 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120 to -125 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-1.2 (1980); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a,
(Vernon Supp. 1985) (opined unconstitutional in Tex. Atty. Gen. Op., MW-460 (March 23,
1982)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-5.5 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 817(c), 842 (Supp.
1984); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:9.2 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.220 (West Supp.
1985); W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-11 (Supp. 1985) (held unconstitutional in State ex rel. Barker v.
Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.018 (West 1982); see also
Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and
Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982).
206. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 112, § 3-202(b), at 115.
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3. Functional Analysis
An access standard that allows any person to initiate a validity
challenge to a proposed rule if he alleges with specificity that adop-
tion of the rule would change his course of conduct in any impor-
tant or significant way is entirely compatible with the purposes un-
derlying the provision. The provision was intended to create an
opportunity for a citizen initiated check on rulemaking that ex-
ceeded delegated statutory authority. 20 7 It was designed to provide
an inexpensive and effective way for persons who would be sub-
stantially affected by a proposed rule to prevent that rule from
ever going into effect if an independent hearing officer found that
the proposed rule-went beyond the agency's statutory authority.08
Like the initiative and information gathering hearing provisions
discussed above, the validity challenge to proposed rules provision
207. In addition to the citizen initiated check on agency rulemaking authority provided
for in FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1985), there is also a legislative check. Id. § 11.60 creates the
Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC), composed of six persons, three mem-
bers of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker, and three members of the
Senate appointed by the President. The JAPC is charged with the responsibility of review-
ing proposed rules as a "legislative check on legislatively created authority." Id. §
120.545(1). If the JAPC objects to a proposed agency rule and the agency refuses to modify
or to withdraw it, the Committee's objection is filed with the Department of State and pub-
lished in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A permanent historical note to the rule when
it is published in the Florida Administrative Code must include a reference to the Joint
Committee's objection and to the issue of Florida Administrative Weekly in which the full
text of the objection appeared. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(8) (1985). The JAPC also has standing
under certain conditions to seek judicial review of the validity of any proposed rule to which
it objected and which the adopting agency refused to modify or withdraw. Id. § 11.60(2)(j).
208. Sen. Barron made the following remarks to the Senate when he explained the Sen-
ate bill during debate:
Under the present law, which is not working, if you are aggrieved by an admin-
istrative rule, you can either go back to the agency that made it, or you can go to
the court. If you go back to the agency that made it, we felt that you wouldn't
have a very good opportunity to get a fair hearing. . . . Now, under the Senate
bill that you have before you, you see that when a rule is made and the public is
aggrieved, either at the time it is made or at some subsequent time, that you may
go directly to the independent hearing officer, and his decision is final unless ap-
pealed to the District Court of Appeals [sic] in Tallahassee.
Now, we feel that the bill well addresses itself to the problem that I think
bothers most Floridians. We found that administrative agencies were making
three to five rules a day. Oftentimes without notice, certainly without the public
being aware, and yet as far as the public was concerned, it was the law. And it was
affecting the lives of all the people of Florida . . . . I think if we pass this bill,
that we'll provide that all rules will go to a committee of the legislature before
they're adopted, and also provide a cheaper manner for the public to be heard
before an independent hearing officer, we will have made a step in the right
direction.
Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 14, 1974) (on file with the Secretary).
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also implements the "ideal of participatory democracy."2 9 Persons
who feel in a substantial way the effect of the policy proposed by
an agency are not required to wait until that policy has been for-
malized into a rule having the force of law before they challenge
the agency's authority to act in the first place; nor are they re-
quired to depend on the action of public officials to rescue them
from the effects of unauthorized agency rulemaking. The ability to
challenge rulemaking believed to be unauthorized, while the
rulemaking process is still in progress, is placed in the hands of the
very people who will be affected by the agency action in some im-
portant or significant way.
Commentators have long recognized the desirability of some
type of external review of agency rulemaking to protect the public
from unauthorized agency action. 10 But the most commonly used
approaches-review by the attorney general or review by a legisla-
tive committee-have been found wanting. For example, when pro-
posed rules must be reviewed by the attorney general, that review
is ex parte and without the benefit of argument in opposition to
the rule's validity.21 ' The review may be little more than a formal-
ity because "[c]ounsel for the agency who drafted the rule is likely
to be himself an assistant attorney general; and in practice the re-
quirement is likely to amount to little more than one assistant at-
torney general obtaining the assent of another to the filing of the
work-product of the first."2 '' On the other hand, if the review is
more than perfunctory, there is a danger that the rule will be re-
jected "on grounds of impropriety rather than illegality."' 3
When the only external review of proposed rules is by a legisla-
tive overview committee there may be both constitutional and po-
litical complications. Interestingly, state constitutional problems
with legislative participation in agency rulemaking surfaced in the
state courts even before the United States Supreme Court held the
legislative veto violative of the Federal Constitution in Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Service v. Chadha2" Courts in Kentucky,
New Hamphire, and West Virginia found statutes which required
legislative committee approval before a proposed agency rule could
become effective violative of the principle of separation of pow-
209. Bonfield, supra note 121, at 892.
210. F. COOPER, supra note 117, at 220; Bonfield, supra note 121, at 896-97.
211. F. COOPER, supra note 117, at 220.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 221.
214. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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ers.21 5 The attorneys general of Tennessee and Texas issued formal
opinions to the same effect.21 Even if the legislative committee is
advisory only, and thus most probably constitutional,1 7 there may
be undesirable political complications resulting from even this lim-
ited participation. Partisan battles fought over the policy of the
statute may be renewed and may influence legislators' judgments
on the legality of an agency rule implementing that legislative pol-
icy.218 Some agencies may have their rules subjected to stricter
standards than other agencies "merely because the legislators in-
volved may have a greater distrust of some agencies than of others,
or a greater interest in the work of some agencies than of
others. 21 9
The Florida response to the problem of checking the exercise of
unauthorized agency rulemaking is apparently unique and avoids
the major objections raised against external review by the attorney
general or by a legislative committee. The decision on the validity
of a challenged proposed rule is made by an independent hearing
officer after full hearing at which the challenger and the affected
agency are adverse parties.220 Thus, the issue can be fully aired
before a hearing officer who is not beholdened to either party.221
The statute specifies the sole ground for invalidating a proposed
rule: that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative au-
thority.2 22 That statutory standard is not foolproof. It does not
guarantee that proposed rules will not be invalidated because of
impropriety rather than illegality. Reasonable hearing officers and
judges may disagree on the authority delegated to an agency by the
legislature in individual cases. 22 3 However, a system designed to
215. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984); Opinion of the
Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va.
1981).
216. Tenn. Atty. Gen. Op. 82-115 (March 11, 1982); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. MW-460
(March 23, 1982).
217. Levinson, supra note 205, at 98-99.
218. Bonfield, supra note 121, at 897.
219. Id. at 898.
220. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(d) (1985).
221. Although hearing officers often come to the DOAH after spending several years as
attorneys with state agencies, it has been the Division's policy not to assign hearing officers
to cases involving his or her former agency for a period of at least five years. Remarks of
Chris Bentley, former DOAH director, First Annual Administrative Law Conference, Talla-
hassee, Fla., (Feb. 18-19, 1983).
222. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a) (1985).
223. For a thoughtful elaboration of this point, see Department of Ins. v. Insurance
Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908, 914-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (R. Smith J., dissenting), petition
for review denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984).
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check agency excesses by decision of a politically insulated hearing
officer, only after an opportunity is given to both sides fully to ven-
tilate the issues, is a system likely to generate correct results, or at
least nonpolitically motivated results. That may be the best that
can be hoped for.
The validity challenge to proposed rules provision is essentially
an intrabranch dispute resolution mechanism. That is, whenever a
qualified member of the public believes an executive branch
agency has exceeded its statutory authority, that person may have
the matter resolved by a specially created and insulated executive
branch agency: the DOAH. The legislature could have vested this
authority in the attorney general, or in the Governor, or in the
Governor and the Cabinet, either sua sponte or on motion of a per-
son substantially affected. That decision could have been made fi-
nal and not subject to judicial review. The legislature could have
chosen to vest this authority in the circuit courts or in the district
courts of appeal. Or the legislature could have decided that the
only check on agency rulemaking would be the Joint Administra-
tive Procedures Committee's review of proposed rules. What the
legislature chose to do instead was to create, within the executive
branch, a pool of independent hearing officers and to invest in
them the authority to determine, subject to judicial review,
whether other executive branch agencies' rules were within the au-
thority delegated by the legislature.
Had the legislature chosen to vest this authority in the courts,
and had it chosen to remain silent on the nature of the injury nec-
essary to invoke the courts' jurisdiction, it would have been en-
tirely proper for the courts to require a would be plaintiff to satisfy
judicially developed standing requirements before the merits of the
matter were addressed. Because the legislature instead chose to
vest this authority in a specialized executive branch agency, judi-
cially developed standing requirements have no relevance. If a
DOAH hearing officer determines that a challenger is indeed a per-
son who would be affected in an important or significant way were
the proposed rule to become effective, that access decision ought to
stand, even though persons granted such access might not be able
to satisfy standing requirements to institute a law suit. The legisla-
ture did not intend access requirements to initiate a validity chal-
lenge to proposed rules and standing requirements to institute suit
to be synonymous; if it had it could have said so. Only when a
hearing officer denies access by applying a standard more demand-
ing than the statutory provision requires should a reviewing court
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intervene. Even then the question for the court is not whether the
person seeking access to the administrative proceeding would have
standing in a court. The question is whether the person seeking to
initiate a validity challenge to a proposed rule has alleged sufficient
facts to show that if the proposed rule were to become effective he
would be affected in an important or significant way.
4. Analysis of Cases Concerning Access to Validity Challenge
to Proposed Rule Proceedings
There are three cases involving access to challenge the validity of
proposed rules which deserve discussion. In Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P.,22' the reviewing court re-
versed the hearing officer's ruling that the challenger had the req-
uisite interest to maintain the action. In Florida Medical Associa-
tion v. Department of Professional Regulation,2 5 the reviewing
court reversed the hearing officer's determination that certain chal-
lengers did not have the necessary interest to challenge a proposed
rule. In Montgomery v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,226 the reviewing court reversed the hearing officer's ruling
that the challengers did not have the necessary interest to chal-
lenge a proposed rule but affirmed the dismissal of the challenge
on mootness grounds. In all three cases the court analyzed the
questions in terms of federal judicial requirements.
When federal Medicaid funds for elective nontherapeutic abor-
tions were discontinued, the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services adopted emergency rules and published notice of its
intent to adopt permanent rules to discontinue the disbursement
of state Medicaid funds for elective nontherapeutic abortions. Al-
ice P. and Susan A., individually and as representatives of a
class,2 ' filed a challenge to the validity of the proposed permanent
rules alleging that they constituted an impoundment of legisla-
tively appropriated funds and that the economic impact statement
was erroneous or incorrect. Neither woman was pregnant at the
224. 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
225. 426 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
226. 468 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
227. The court ruled that a proceeding challenging the validity of a proposed rule was
not a proper one for a class action because a single successful challenge can prevent the
proposed rule from becoming "operational as to any other person similarly situated." 367
So. 2d at 1050. Actually, a single successful challenge can prevent a proposed rule from
becoming operational at all. A proposed rule held invalid by a hearing officer cannot be
adopted by an agency. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(c) (1985).
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time the challenge was filed. ' s The Department's motion to dis-
miss for lack of "standing" was denied; in his final order, the hear-
ing officer ruled "'that all women of childbearing age who are
Medicaid recipients are substantially affected by the proposed rule
and have adequate standing to challenge it pursuant to Chapter
120, F.S.' ",229
The Department appealed and the court reversed saying that
"[c]learly under the rationale of the Jerry case the hearing officer's
holding . .. is much too broad to countenance our approval. 2 30
The court rejected the argument that a less demanding standard
ought to operate for challenging proposed rules than for challeng-
ing rules already in effect. In the court's view, "[tlhere is no differ-
ence between the immediacy and reality necessary to confer stand-
ing whether the proceeding is to challenge an existing rule or a
proposed rule. 2 31 In either event the rule announced in Jerry
must be satisfied. Because Susan A. was not pregnant at the time
she filed the petition challenging the proposed rule, she did not
meet the Jerry standard. 32 However, the court found that the
Jerry standard was satisfied by two other later appearing women
and a doctor. The women testified that they were Medicaid recipi-
ents, that they were pregnant, that they wished to terminate their
pregnancies, and that they were unable to do so without financial
assistance from Medicaid. Dr. Samuel Barr, the director of an
abortion clinic, testified that he had been a Medicaid provider for
five years, that approximately thirteen percent of the abortions
performed at his clinic during the preceding four and one-half
years had been funded by Medicaid, and that since the Medicaid
funding had been discontinued there was a significant decrease in
the number of Medicaid eligible women seeking the clinic's
services.33
But none of the three petitioners meeting the Jerry test filed the
petition challenging the proposed rule. Each of them sought to
228. Alice P. was dismissed as a party by the hearing officer and that decision was not
challenged in the district court of appeal. 367 So. 2d at 1052.
229. 367 So. 2d at 1051.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1052.
232. Id. The court also observed that because Susan A. was not pregnant, she did not
meet the standard of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), because Roe was pregnant at the
time the law suit was filed. 367 So. 2d at 1052 at n.1. There is at least the suggestion that
the Jerry standard and the Roe v. Wade standard are different. They are in fact precisely
the same.
233. 367 So. 2d at 1052.
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enter the proceeding well after the time the proceeding was re-
quired to be initiated.34 Because the women who did file the peti-
tion were not pregnant at the time of filing, the court ruled there
was no valid proceeding to which the three substantially affected
persons could become parties or intervenors. Therefore, the court
ruled that the motion to dismiss the petition should have been
granted by the hearing officer.235
It is evident from the court's unquestioning acceptance of the
Jerry decision 236 and its painstaking recitation of the interests of
the three petitioners found to have satisfied the access threshold
that the proposed rule only could be challenged administratively
by someone who could also maintain a lawsuit in federal court
against the rule once it became effective. To require either prova-
ble pregnancy or actual economic loss at the time the petition is
filed imposes a far too stringent and inappropriate standard for
access to an administrative proceeding designed to operate as a
preenforcement check on executive branch rulemaking. There
must be some "difference between the immediacy and reality nec-
essary" to challenge a proposed rule and an existing rule because
under usual circumstances a proposed rule does not and cannot
change the status quo until it becomes an effective rule. The cir-
cumstances in Alice P. were not usual because the Department had
adopted an emergency rule which did immediately, although only
for a ninety day period, what the proposed rule was intended to do
permanently. Because of the emergency rule, the two pregnant
women desiring abortions at the time they entered the proceeding
could establish an immediate and real impact on their interests;
because of the emergency rule, Dr. Barr could testify to the actual
and real decrease in his income. Without the emergency rule and
until the proposed rule became effective, even the women and the
doctor would have been unable to establish the "immediacy and
reality" apparently required by the court. If the court meant what
it said, the access barrier to proposed rule validity challenge pro-
ceedings would be impossible to scale unless an emergency rule
234. Petitions challenging the validity of proposed rules must be filed within 14 days
after publication of notice of intention to adopt the proposed rule. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(b)
(1985). The court held the 14 day rule was jurisdictional. 367 So. 2d at 1053. The petition in
this case was timely filed on October 28, 1977. Id. at 1048. One pregnant woman and Dr.
Barr sought access to the proceeding on November 18, 1977; the other pregnant woman
sought to intervene on November 23, 1977. Id. at 1053.
235. 367 So. 2d at 1053.
236. See supra note 9.
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were in effect at the time the challenge was filed. An access barrier
that high would render the proceeding largely useless and cannot
be squared with the section's language.
To challenge the validity of a proposed rule a person is only re-
quired to show that he would be affected in an important or signif-
icant way if the proposed rule were to become effective. Surely a
doctor who testified that he was a Medicaid provider, that he per-
formed elective nontherapeutic abortions, and that a part of his
income was derived from Medicaid reimbursement for this service
would establish that he would be affected in an important
way-the loss of income-if the proposed rule discontinuing Medi-
caid funding for elective nontherapeutic abortions were to become
effective. Similarly, the hearing officer's determination that any
Medicaid recipient of childbearing age would be substantially af-
fected by the proposed rule withstands analysis under this
standard.
Before the rule change was proposed, all Medicaid recipients of
childbearing age had an inchoate claim to funds appropriated by
the legislature to pay for whatever medical needs arose during the
fiscal year, including elective nontherapeutic abortions. Only two
months into the fiscal year, the Department decided on its own,
without legislative directive or federal coercion, to propose a rule
that would withhold appropriated funds for a medical procedure
available only to women of childbearing age. Were the proposed
rule to become effective, it would extinguish their inchoate claim
to appropriated funds to pay for a medical procedure for which
reimbursement had been approved by the legislature. As a conse-
quence, every woman in the affected group would lose an economic
entitlement she might need to claim at some point during the fiscal
year.
The fact that there is some uncertainty as to actual need ought
not preclude ability to challenge the legality of the proposed
agency action, anymore than the uncertainty of the real extent of
Dr. Barr's economic loss would preclude his challenge.2 7 Indeed,
the very uncertainty of their situation suggests other ways in which
all women in the affected group would be substantially affected if
the proposed rule went into effect. Medicaid eligible women of
237. Even in a § 120.56 challenge to the validity of an existing rule, when arguably it
makes sense to require a showing of the immediacy of the rule's effect, at least one court has
not permitted an element of uncertainty to defeat access. See Cox v. South Fla. Water
Management Dist., 450 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), petition for review denied
mer., 459 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1984); see also infra pp. 1043-45.
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childbearing age would suffer a loss of freedom they otherwise had
to control the use of their bodies. They alone, among all women in
that age group, would be denied the security of knowing that an
unwanted pregnancy did not have to be carried to term. The
threatened loss of an economic entitlement and the physical and
emotional security that go with it are adequate to meet the validity
challenge access standard. The hearing officer's access determina-
tion should not have been repudiated by the court and the court
should not have imposed the Jerry standard on this proceeding.
One round of the seemingly endless fight238 between opthalmolo-
gists and optometrists over the right of optometrists to prescribe
drugs in their practice was fought in a validity challenge proceed-
ing. At the end of the round, the dispute remained unresolved but
the federal "zone of interest" standing test had become part of
Florida administrative law. The Board of Optometry proposed a
rule setting standards for prescribing certain drugs by optometrists
and providing criteria for determining the competence of optome-
trists to prescribe drugs. The proposed rule was administratively
challenged by an ophthalmologist, the Florida Medical Association,
the Florida Society of Ophthalmology, a pharmacist, and an opto-
metric patient. The ophthalmologist alleged that the proposed rule
unlawfully interfered with his right to practice medicine and with
his professional duty to protect the public from harmful medical
practices. The medical associations alleged they represented Flor-
ida physicians and ophthalmologists, all of whom would suffer eco-
nomic injury if the proposed rule went into effect. The pharmacist
alleged that the proposed rule would present him with a Hobson's
choice-follow the Board of Pharmacy's direction not to fill pre-
scriptions written by optometrists and lose customers, or keep the
customers and subject himself to discipline by the Board. The op-
tometric patient alleged that the proposed rule would force him to
choose between never seeing an optometrist again or risking injury
238. Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Firestone, 465 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev'd
sub. nom. Florida Society of Ophthalmology v. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 11 Fla. L.W. 177
(Fla. Apr. 17, 1986; Board of Optometry v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 463 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985); Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 426 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983); Department of Professional Reg. v. Hall, 398 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981); Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg. 399 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981); Miami-Dade Optical Dispensary, Inc. v. Florida State Bd. of Optometry, 349 So.
2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied mem., 366 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1978); Florida Ass'n of
Dispensing Opticians v. Florida State Bd. of Optometry, 239 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970);
Florida Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Florida State Bd. of Optometry, 227 So. 2d 736
(Fla. 3d DCA 1969), aff'd in part, quashed in part, 238 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1970).
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through the optometrist's illegal use of drugs.2"9
The hearing officer ruled that none of the petitioners had the
requisite interest to challenge the proposed rule and dismissed the
petition. The pharmacist and the optometric patient were excluded
because they failed to show any "injury in fact. 24 0 The ophthal-
mologist and the medical associations were excluded because, al-
though they did establish "injury in fact," they failed to show that
the "'zone of interest' they asserted was within the 'zone of inter-
ests' protected by the statute being implemented by the rule. '21
On appeal, the court agreed with the hearing officer that the phar-
macist and the optometric patient failed to establish the requisite
interest to challenge the proposed rule. But the court ruled that
the allegations advanced in the petition were sufficient to satisfy
the "zone of interest" test as to the ophthalmologist and the medi-
cal organizations and reversed the dismissal of their petition.2 2
The court recognized that the "zone of interest" was a federal
standing test,243 that even in that context its continuing vitality
was questionable,4 that it had been rejected by another state's
supreme court in a case involving similar facts, 45 and that it had
been much maligned by some commentators. 46 Nevertheless, the
239. Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 426 So. 2d at 1113 n.3.
240. Id. at 1114 n.4.
241. Id. at 1114.
242. The court rejected the contention that the asserted injury must be within the zone
of interest protected by the statute being implemented by the rule. The court ruled that the
effect of other statutes must be considered to determine whether the agency exceeded its
statutory authority in proposing the rule. The court reasoned that
[bioth Chapters 463 [the Physicians' Practice Act] and 458 [the Optometrists'
Practice Act] are concerned with the protection of the public by insuring that
persons engaged in the various health care professions are qualified to do so.
These and other statutes pertaining to the health care field . ..also serve the
purpose of delineating, to a great extent, the relative rights and privileges of
health care professionals. It necessarily follows that an agency's determination of
what forms of treatment are permissible or prohibited within each health care
profession is within the "zone of interest" protected by the statutes.
Id. at 1117 (footnote omitted).
243. Id. at 1115-16.
244. Id. at 1116.
245. Id. at n.9; see Rhode Island Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124 (R.I.
1974). The court characterized the Rhode Island case as being "remarkably similar in all
respects to the [case] before us." 426 So. 2d at 1116 n.9. A striking but unappreciated differ-
ence between the cases was the forum to which access was being sought. The Rhode Island
Ophthalmological Society asserted an economic injury as a basis for standing in court to
challenge legislation permitting optometrists to prescribe drugs. The case before the Florida
court, of course, involved an administrative, not a judicial, challenge.
246. 426 So. 2d at 1116 n.9. The court even quoted Professor Kenneth Davis' acerbic
comment about the "zone of interest" test, namely, "Is the 'zone' test the law? The best
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court ignored all the red flags and sanctioned the use of the "zone
of interest" test for determining access to the validity challenge
proceeding.
The two-part "injury in fact"-"zone of interest" test was fash-
ioned by the United States Supreme Court to liberalize standing
requirements for federal court review of federal administrative ac-
tion under the Federal APA.4 7 Whatever value it may still have as
an interpretative aid for that statute, there is no justification for
using the "zone of interest" test to interpret state statutory lan-
guage that only requires a person to show that he would be sub-
stantially affected by a proposed rule. The expressions "adversely
affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of a relevant statute
might have different consequences. Nothing in the language or in
the legislative history of this section remotely suggests that federal
notions of "injury in fact" or "zone of interest" should operate to
determine whether a person would be substantially affected by a
proposed rule. These federal notions are ill suited to monitor ac-
cess to validity challenge proceedings, or for that matter any other
state administrative proceeding, and they should be abandoned.248
Had the court analyzed the allegations made on behalf of each
petitioner to see whether there would be a substantial effect on
him if the proposed rule became effective, it might have reached a
slightly different conclusion. Under the suggested analysis, the op-
tometric patient, the pharmacist, and the two medical associations
would have been denied access to challenge the validity of the pro-
posed rule; the ophthalmologist would have been granted access.
The allegations made on behalf of the optometric patient did not
establish that he would be substantially affected. If the proposed
rule became effective, he could continue to use the services of his
optometrist without risk of injury from the illegal use of drugs sim-
ply by refusing the treatment and requesting a referral to an oph-
thalmologist.249 The patient's course of conduct, therefore, would
not be affected in any important or significant way if the proposed
rule became effective.
answer is: Sometimes it is, but most of the time it is not, and a criterion for determining
when it is the law is completely absent." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 347 (1982
Supp.).
247. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
248. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
249. The hearing officer reached the same conclusion although he characterized it not as
a failure to show substantial effect but as a failure to show "injury in fact." 426 So. 2d at
1114 n.4. The court found the hearing officer's reasoning persuasive. Id. at 1118.
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The pharmacist's allegations were similarly deficient. His admis-
sion that he was bound to follow the Board of Pharmacy's prohibi-
tion against filling prescriptions written by optometrists made his
threatened economic loss allegation very tenuous. His refusal to fill
optometrists' prescriptions would not result in the loss of custom-
ers to other pharmacists because they, too, presumably were bound
by the prohibition.25 0
The suggested analysis would have precluded access to the Flor-
ida Medical Association and to the Florida Society of Ophthalmol-
ogy. The allegations on their behalf were tailored to fit the federal
associational standing rule approved by the Florida Supreme Court
in the Florida Home Builders case. The district court of appeal
had little choice but to accept them as proper petitioners. This
federal judicial standing rule, like the others of similar ilk, has no
place in determining access to administrative proceedings under
chapter 120. It must be rejected because it provides access to pro-
fessional associations not countenanced by the language of the
statute. A validity challenge petitioner is required to "state with
particularity. . . facts sufficient to show that the person challeng-
ing the proposed rule would be substantially affected by it." That
language requires a showing of personal effect. The medical as-
sociations sought access as representatives of their members' inter-
ests, not to vindicate any interest personal to them as associations.
Because they failed to demonstrate how they would be affected in
an important or significant way by the proposed rule if it became
effective, they should not have been permitted to challenge its
validity.
The allegations in the ophthalmologist's petition established
that he would be substantially affected. Without the rule, only
ophthalmologists among eye care professionals could use and pre-
scribe drugs in their practice. With the rule, optometrists who sat-
isfied the rule's competency criteria also could use and prescribe
drugs in their practice. Optometric patients requiring drug therapy
would no longer have to be referred to an ophthalmologist because
the drugs could now be prescribed by the optometrist. As a result,
the ophthalmologist could expect to be injured economically
250. The hearing officer viewed the pharmacist's allegations as showing only "doubt or
uncertainty concerning the eventual impact of a rule" which could not satisfy the "injury in
fact" standard he employed. Id. at 1114 n.4. Citing Jerry, the court said the pharmacist had
"not demonstrated an injury except in the abstract or speculative sense, which is not suffi-
cient." Id. at 1118. The court agreed with the hearing officer that the appropriate remedy
for the pharmacist to pursue was a declaratory statement from the Board of Pharmacy. Id.
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through the loss of patient referrals from optometrists.26' It was
this prospective economic loss that really was at the heart of the
ophthalmologist's claim that the proposed rule unlawfully inter-
fered with his right to practice medicine. The proposed rule would
have diminished the value of the exclusive property right medical
doctors in general and ophthalmologists in particular had to prac-
tice medicine, including the exclusive right to prescribe drugs.26 2
The ophthalmologist's allegations of economic loss adequately es-
tablished that he was a person who would be affected in an impor-
tant or significant way if the proposed rule became effective and
he, therefore, was properly granted access to challenge the validity
of it.265
251. There was no suggestion in the court's opinion that the Alice P. "immediacy and
reality" standard was met or that it was even appropriate to require a proposed rule validity
challenger to prove real and actual out-of-pocket loss at the time the petition is filed.
252. The court struggled with the worthiness of this economic interest primarily because
some earlier cases denied persons asserting injury to a competitive interest the right to initi-
ate adjudicatory proceedings under section 120.57. See infra notes 462-93 and accompany-
ing text. Ultimately, the court distinguished those cases because they did not involve alleged
illegality on the agencies' parts. Thus, at least for validity challenge purposes, threatened
economic injury may be sufficient to satisfy the "substantially affected" requirement.
253. On remand to the DOAH, the Board of Optometry and the Florida Optometric
Association continued to resist the right of the medical associations and the ophthalmolo-
gists to challenge the validity of the proposed rule. Their theory was that the court's opinion
in Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 426 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983) provided only that the challengers could proceed if they established the injury alleged
and the rule's illegality by competent and substantial evidence. Initial Joint Brief of Appel-
lants at 42-46, Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 426 So. 2d 1112
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The hearing officer's final order simply states as a conclusion of law
that the challengers have standing with citation to the Florida Medical Ass'n case. Florida
Medical Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 7 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 339, 354 (1985). On
review, the court summarily rejected appellants' position, stating that its earlier decision
held that the medical associations and the ophthalmologists had "standing" to pursue the
validity challenge. Board of Optometry v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 463 So. 2d 1213, 1216 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985). Unfortunately, the way the court described the appellants' argument and
the way the court responded to it suggest that a person's right to initiate a validity challenge
is somehow tied to that person's ultimate success on the merits. The court said that the
appellants' reading of the Florida Medical Ass'n case was that it granted "only conditional
standing which hinged on the correctness of their challenge." 463 So. 2d at 1216. The court
responded to that characterization of the argument by saying: "In any event, if appellees'
standing did hinge on the correctness of their position, then by our opinion today the cor-
rectness of their position is established and we approve the hearing officer's conclusion that
appellees had standing." Id. Because the court's opinion ruled that the hearing officer cor-
rectly determined the proposed rule was invalid, the "correctness of their position" language
can be read as suggesting a circular access standard. A person would be substantially af-
fected by a proposed rule if his allegations that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority were accepted; a person would not be substantially affected
by a proposed rule if his allegations were not accepted. It would be curious logic indeed that
suggests the answer to the threshold question-does this person have the right to challenge
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In the 1984 General Appropriations Act, the legislature appro-
priated money to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services to fund a workfare program in two counties.2 54 On July 27,
1984, the Department published notice of its intent to adopt a rule
establishing the conditions under which food stamp recipients
would be required to participate in the workfare program. By its
terms, the proposed rule purported to apply statewide.2 5 5 On Au-
gust 10, 1984, two residents of Orange County, who were food
stamp recipients and heads of households, filed a petition challeng-
ing the validity of the proposed workfare rule.2 6 At the time the
petition was filed, it was not known whether Orange County would
be one of the two counties participating in the program. Indeed,
because the Department set a September 1, 1984 deadline for
counties to express their interest in the program, it was not known
at the time the Department published the notice of intent to adopt
the proposed rule or at the time when a validity challenge petition
had to be filed to be timely, which, if any, counties would volunteer
for the pilot program.2 57 Nevertheless, the hearing officer con-
cluded that the challengers did not have "standing" to challenge
the validity of the proposed rule and dismissed the petition.2 5
On review, the court said the challengers had to satisfy the Jerry
standard by showing "an injury which is both real and immediate,
not conjectural or hypothetical."2 59 When the validity challenge
was filed it appeared that the Department was proposing a rule
that would apply statewide to food stamp recipients. Therefore, at
the time of filing, the injury alleged by these challengers was real,
not hypothetical, and the petition should not have been dismissed
for lack of "standing. '"260 Instead of remanding the matter to the
this proposed rule?-is found in the answer to the ultimate question - is this proposed rule
invalid? An access standard that says if you win, you had the right to challenge; if you lose,
you didn't, is meaningless, of course, and the court could not have intended to suggest
otherwise.
254. Ch. 84-220, 1984 Fla. Laws 724, 845 (line item 764).
255. The summary of the economic impact of the rule published in the Florida Adminis-
trative Weekly did indicate the cost of implementing the program in two counties. 10 Fla.
Admin. W. 2323 (July 27, 1984).




259. Id. at 1016. See infra notes 308-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Jerry "immediacy and reality" standard.
260. 468 So. 2d at 1016. The court relied on Professional Firefighters of Fla., Inc. v.
Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 396 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) as authority for
its holding. That case, like Jerry, involved the right to challenge rules already adopted pur-
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hearing officer for further proceedings, however, the court decided
that was unnecessary because the case was now moot. Even though
the proposed rule appeared to be applicable statewide, the court
refused "to close [its] eyes to the fact that in actual effect, only a
pilot program has been implemented by legislative appropriation
of start-up funds, and that food stamp recipients in Orange
County . . .will not be subject to the pilot program."2'6 Because it
was now clear the proposed rule would not apply to these challeng-
ers, the court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of mootness.
The opinion is peppered with references to federal law authori-
ties and commentary and to the role mootness plays in the judicial
arena.2 62 For example, the court said:
A case becomes moot, for purposes of appeal, where, by a change
of circumstances prior to the appellate decision, an intervening
event makes it impossible for the court to grant a party any effec-
tual relief. Mootness can be raised by the appellate court on its
own motion. The rule discouraging review of moot cases is de-
rived from the requirement of the United States Constitution, Ar-
ticle III, under which the existence of judicial power depends
upon the existence of a case or controversy. It is the function of a
judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions on moot
questions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue.23
What is not apparent is what all this has to do with the case. It
seems the court lost sight of what was before it. Given the proce-
dural posture of the case, the only question requiring judicial reso-
lution was whether the hearing officer erred when he granted the
motion to dismiss the petition for lack of "standing." That was not
a moot issue and the court ruled it was error to dismiss on that
ground. The question of the proposed rule's validity was never
reached by the hearing officer. Consequently, the court was not be-
ing asked to render a judgment on the merits by persons who, be-
suant to FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1983). See infra notes 312-18 and accompanying text.
261. 468 So. 2d at 1016.
262. Id. at 1016-17; see United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Monaghan, Constitu-
tional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973).
263. 468 So. 2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted).
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cause of an intervening event, would not be subject to the pro-
posed rule were it to become effective.
The court's mootness discussion makes no sense at all unless the
court was really saying that it was imposing this judicial rule of
self-restraint on the executive branch DOAH. If that is the case,
then the court should have at least made an effort to explain why a
rule derived from the Federal Constitution to limit the authority of
federal courts and a similar rule developed at commom law to re-
strict state courts should be used to restrict a legislatively created
state executive agency.
The matter should have been remanded to the hearing officer for
him to decide in the first instance whether a person must satisfy
the 120.54(4) access standard not only at the time of filing the pe-
tition but throughout that administrative proceeding and whether
the peculiar circumstances of this case justified an exception to any
general rule of continuing effect. It was the Department after all
that was playing the shell game here. The Department chose to
propose a rule of purported statewide application even though it
knew it had funds and legislative authorization for only a two-
county program. The Department chose to begin the rule adoption
process before the two participating counties were identified. In
these circumstances, the Department should not benefit from its
sleight of hand. Either the proposed rule was what it purported to
be and thus was subject to challenge by any state resident who was
a food stamp recipient and head of a household, or it was not what
it pretended to be, in which case, the notice was inadequate and
the proposed rule should have been withdrawn and notice pub-
lished again when the correct information regarding the two partic-
ipating counties was known.
When the statutory language, the underlying purposes, and the
executive forum in which validity challenges to proposed rules are
brought are considered, access to this proceeding ought to be
granted to any person who alleges with sufficient particularity that
his course of conduct will be acted on or changed in some impor-
tant or significant way if the proposed rule becomes effective.
Some degree of uncertainty as to the effect of the proposed rule
must be tolerated if the proceeding is to be available as a preen-
forcement check on agency rulemaking.
DOAH hearing officers should not dismiss validity challenge pe-
titions if the challenger satisfies the minimum statutory standard
of being a person "substantially affected" if the proposed rule were
adopted. Reviewing courts for their part should not second guess a
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hearing officer's determination that the statutory access standards
have been met unless there is no proof in the record of important
or significant potential effect on the challenger. On the other hand,
reviewing courts should intervene to protect the integrity of the
process when a hearing officer uses access standards more stringent
than the statute contemplates and denies access to a person who
would be affected in an important or significant way were the rule
to become effective. The statutory standard for access to this exec-
utive proceeding, in either event, should not be infused with judi-
cially formulated requirements for standing to invoke the judicial
process.
V. ACCESS TO OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In addition to the four opportunities to participate in the
rulemaking process, chapter 120 creates three other administrative
proceedings that are available to persons dealing with agencies in
nonrulemaking circumstances. There is an opportunity to chal-
lenge administratively the validity of adopted rules. There is an
opportunity to obtain a declaratory statement from an agency re-
garding the applicability of agency enforced law to a particular set
of facts. There is an opportunity to have a formal or informal adju-
dicatory hearing before an agency determines the substantial inter-
ests of a party. Each of these proceedings has its own access re-
quirements. Consequently, each statutory provision must be
examined separately to determine the nature of the interest a per-
son must possess in order to invoke each process.
A. Administrative Challenges to the Validity of Adopted Rules
Even after an agency adopts a rule, its validity may be adminis-
tratively challenged before a DOAH hearing officer. Section
120.56(1) authorizes "[any person substantially affected by a rule
[to] seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the
rule on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority." The validity challenge petition must be in
writing and must "state with particularity facts sufficient to show
the person seeking relief is substantially affected by the rule and
facts sufficient to show the invalidity of the rule. 26 4 If the DOAH
director is satisfied that the petition meets these two requirements,
she assigns a hearing officer to conduct a hearing on the petition
264. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2) (1985) (emphasis added).
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within thirty days of the assignment,25 unless the rule being chal-
lenged is an emergency rule, in which case the hearing must be
conducted within fourteen days of the assignment. 66 The hearing
is conducted in accordance with the adjudicatory procedures of
section 120.57. As in the case of a validity challenge to a proposed
rule, the hearing officer's order is final agency action.2 6 The hear-
ing officer may declare a rule invalid in whole or in part. A rule
declared invalid by a hearing officer becomes void thirty days after
the decision is rendered or at a later time if specified in the deci-
sion. An agency whose rule has been declared invalid must give
notice of the decision in the Florida Administrative Weekly.268
Failure to challenge a rule under this provision does not constitute
a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.269
The statutory language concerning access to initiate a validity
challenge to an adopted rule is virtually identical to that concern-
ing access to initiate a challenge to the validity of a proposed rule
discussed above. The minor language differences between the two
provisions appear to be grammatical accommodations reflecting
the difference in effect between a proposed rule and one already
adopted.2 70 To initiate a validity challenge to an adopted rule a
person must be "substantially affected" by the rule and allege facts
sufficient to show that substantial effect. The access standard sug-
gested by this statutory language is, therefore, essentially the stan-
dard derived from the language of the challenge to the validity of
proposed rules provision namely, any person whose course of con-
duct has been acted on or changed in any important or significant
way by the rule is a "person substantially affected" by the rule and
may initiate a challenge to its validity.
1. History of Validity Challenges to Adopted Rules
The legislative history of the validity challenge to adopted rules
is quite similar to the history of the validity challenge to proposed
rules provision. Like it, the validity challenge to adopted rules was
not included in any of the Law Revision Council drafts; it was not
included in the House bill as introduced or as passed; it was not
265. Id.
266. Id. § 120.56(4).
267. Id. § 120.56(5).
268. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(3) (1985).
269. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(5) (1985).
270. This is the conclusion reached by the court in Department of Health & Rehab.
Servs. v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d at 1052.
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included in the Senate bill as introduced. The provision first ap-
peared in the committee substitute sponsored by the Senate Com-
mittee on Rules and Calendar.
As introduced, the House bill provided for a declaratory judg-
ment action to be brought in the circuit courts to test the validity
or applicability of a rule by a plaintiff who alleged that "the rule,
or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threat-
ens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the
plaintiff.2 71 This House bill also included a provision authorizing
agency declaratory rulings on the applicability of statutory provi-
sions, agency rules, or agency orders. 27 ' The provision for declara-
tory judgment actions was deleted in the House committee substi-
tute bill, but the agency declaratory rulings provision was
retained. 27 3
The Senate bill as introduced did not provide for declaratory
judgment actions, but did authorize agency declaratory rulings.'
The Senate Rules and Calendar Committee substitute bill did not
provide for agency declaratory rulings. In its place, the committee
substitute bill provided for the administrative validity challenge to
adopted rules at the behest of "[a]ny person substantially affected
by a rule. '278 The conference committee report retained the House
provision for agency declaratory rulings27e and the Senate provi-
sion for validity challenges to adopted rules.2 7
Several conclusions can be drawn from this history. First, al-
though the 1961 Florida Administrative Procedure Act contained a
provision permitting declaratory judgment actions in the circuit
courts to test the validity of agency rules,278 there appears to have
been little support among those involved in the development of the
1974 Act for continuing that practice. The Law Revision Council
intended to eliminate declaratory judgment actions in the circuit
courts27 1 by providing for judicial review of final agency action,
whether rule or order, in the district courts of appeal or, when re-
271. Fla. HB 2672, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.6) (emphasis added).
272. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.7).
273. Fla. CS for HB 2672, 2434 and 2583, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.56).
274. Fla. SB 892, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.56).
275. Fla. CS for SB 892, sec. 7 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.29).
276. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1329 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. §
120.56(1)); FLA. S. JOUR. 909 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same).
277. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1329 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. §
120.56(2)); FLA. S. JOUR. 909 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same).
278. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1973).
279. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 26.
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quired by law, in the supreme court.2 s8 Neither the Senate bill as
introduced nor the committee substitute that passed the Senate
provided for declaratory judgment actions. Only the House bill as
introduced contained a declaratory judgment provision; it was
based on the RMA.28' The declaratory judgment provision did not
survive the committee process, however, because no declaratory
judgment provision was contained in the House committee substi-
tute bill debated and passed by the House.
Second, the administrative challenge to the validity of adopted
rules was not offered as an alternative to circuit court declaratory
judgment actions. Rather, it was an alternative to the agency de-
claratory rulings provision in both the House committee substitute
bill and the Senate bill as introduced.2 8 Third, because the admin-
istrative validity challenge to adopted rules provision was not an
alternative to circuit court declaratory judgment actions, any at-
tempted comparison between the standing requirement in the 1961
Act and the language used to identify the interest required to initi-
ate the administrative challenge to the validity of adopted rules
under the 1974 Act is unwarranted.2 "8 The legislative history does
not support any comparison between standards because the two
processes were not compared to each other by the legislature.
Senator Barron substituted the word "aggrieved" for the phrase
"substantially affected" in his explanation of the validity challenge
to adopted rules to the Senate,28 4 just as he did in discussing the
280. Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 107, § 0120.17(2).
281. See supra text accompanying note 271.
282. This conclusion is supported by Sen. Barron's remarks during the Senate debate.
He said:
Under the House bill, however, as it came over, if you were aggrieved by a rule,
you had the option to go back to the agency that made the rule. If you were dis-
satisfied there, you would go to the independent hearing officer. All he could do
would be to advise the agency. Now, under the Senate bill that you have before
you [CS for SB 892], you see that when a rule is made and the public is aggrieved,
either at the time it is made or some subsequent time, that you may go directly to
the independent hearing officer . ...
Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 14, 1974) (on file with Secretary).
283. In Department of Offender Rehab. v. Jerry, 353 So. 2d at 1232, the court compared
the language of FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1973), permitting any "affected person" to bring a de-
claratory judgment action to test the validity of a rule, with the language of id. §§ 120.54(4),
.56 (1977), permitting any "substantially affected" person to initiate administrative validity
challenge proceedings to proposed and adopted rules. The court concluded that "[t]he legis-
lature in enacting Sections 120.54(4)(a) and 120.56, employed more restrictive language,
'substantially affected,' than it did in enacting Section 120.30."
284. See supra note 282.
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validity challenge to proposed rules28 5 The word "aggrieved" does
not emphasize the effect of the agency rule on the person seeking
to challenge it in the way the statutory phrase "substantially af-
fected" does. Barron's use of "aggrieved" probably was not meant
to be descriptive of the injury necessary to invoke the validity
challenge proceeding. It is likely that he used the word "aggrieved"
to indicate generally to the Senate that a challenger would have to
be affected in some way, without belaboring the floor debate with
the details of that effect.
The legislative history of this provision does support the view
that standing requirements under the 1961 Act's declaratory judg-
ment section are not an appropriate guide for determining access
standards for this wholly new administrative proceeding in the
1974 Act. Beyond that, however, the legislative history offers little
insight into what the appropriate access standard should be.
2. Validity Challenges to Adopted Rules in Other States
Missouri and Florida appear to be the only states which author-
ize administrative challenges to the validity of adopted rules. The
Missouri administrative procedure statute permits an administra-
tive determination of the validity or applicability of any "rule, reg-
ulation, resolution, announced policy, applied policy, or any similar
official or unofficial interpretation or implementation of state
agency authority, other than in a contested case or in a law en-
forcement proceeding."' 86 A complaint may be filed with the ad-
ministrative hearing commission2 87 by "any interested person, or
duly constituted entity who is affected by such interpretation or
implementation in a manner or to a degree distinct and different
from other members of the general public. '28 8
The Missouri provision is not helpful in formulating an appro-
priate access standard for the Florida validity challenge to adopted
rules provision because the Missouri triggering language is very
different from Florida's "any person substantially affected by a
rule" language. The Missouri provision is essentially a codification
285. See supra text accompanying note 202.
286. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.050(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
287. The Administrative Hearing Commission may consist of no more than three com-
missioners who are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Id. § 621.015. Each commissioner has authority to exercise all powers granted to the admin-
istrative hearing commission without the concurrence of any other commissioner, except for
rulemaking powers in which case all commissioners must concur. Id. § 621.035.
288. Id. § 536.050(2).
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of the common law "special injury" standard. While "special in-
jury" generally is required to institute a law suit in Florida, the
Florida legislature, unlike the Missouri legislature, did not choose
to make the showing of "special injury" necessary to challenge ad-
ministratively the validity of adopted rules.
Most state administrative procedure acts make some provision
for challenging the validity of agency rules in the courts through
an action for declaratory judgment. A majority of these state acts
is patterned on the RMA provision which authorizes any person
whose legal rights or privileges are impaired or interfered with by
an agency rule to seek declaratory relief in the courts.2 89 The Ari-
zona statute permits an "affected person" to bring a declaratory
judgment action;2 0 the Maine statute extends the right to any "ag-
grieved person";29 ' Alaska, California, and Hawaii extend the right
to any "interested person "1;292 Arkansas permits any person who
suffers injury to his person, property, or business to seek declara-
tory relief;293 and the Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
York, and Wisconsin statutes do not specify the nature of the in-
terest a person must have in order to seek declaratory relief.29" The
MSAPA, the District of Columbia, and sixteen states make no pro-
vision for declaratory judgment actions to test the validity of
agency rules. 25
289. 1961 MODEL AcT, supra note 93, § 7, at 400; ALA. CODE § 41-22-10 (1982); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-175 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-10(a) (1982); IDAHO CODE
§ 67-5207 (1980); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-125(b) (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
24.264 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.44 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-506(1)
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84.911(1) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.110(1) (1981) (with provi-
sion for an agency to institute a declaratory judgment action to establish the validity of any
rule); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:7 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-8(A) (1978) (with provi-
sion for any representative association to file the action if one or more of its members could
qualify as a plaintiff); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 306 (West Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-35-7(1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 1-26-14 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-224(a) (Supp. 1984); TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-9 (1978); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 807 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.070(1) (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE §
29A-4-2(a) (Supp. 1984). The same language appeared in Fla. HB 2672, sec. 1 (1974)(pro-
posed FLA. STAT. § 120.6). See supra text accompanying note 271.
290. AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1007(A) (1985).
291. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8058(1) (Supp. 1984-1985).
292. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.300 (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11350(a) (West Supp. 1985);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-7 (1976).
293. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-705 (1976).
294. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:963 (West Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 7
(West 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.050(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.Y. A.P.A. § 205 (McKin-
ney 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.05 (West Supp. 1984-85).
295. The sixteen states are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
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3. Functional Analysis
Much of what was said in the preceding section about the com-
patibility of the access standard proffered with the purposes un-
derlying the validity challenge to proposed rules provision also ap-
plies here. The administrative challenge to the validity of adopted
rules was also intended to create an opportunity for a citizen initi-
ated check on agency rulemaking that exceeded delegated statu-
tory authority.29 It, too, was designed to provide an inexpensive
yet effective way for a person to obtain relief if an independent
hearing officer found that the rule went beyond the agency's statu-
tory authority. These purposes are served by an access standard
that permits any person whose course of conduct is acted on or
changed in any significant or important way by an adopted rule to
initiate a challenge to the rule's validity.
The administrative challenge to adopted rules, like the validity
challenge to proposed rules, is an intrabranch dispute resolution
mechanism. Questions concerning whether any executive branch
agency exceeded its statutory authority when it adopted a rule are
resolved by another executive branch agency-the DOAH. The leg-
islature could have followed the approach suggested by the Law
Revision Council and made the validity of rules exclusively a mat-
ter for judicial determination on review of final agency action. The
legislature could have chosen to follow the House approach and
made the question of a rule's validity one for the agency's initial
determination subject to judicial review. Or the legislature could
have decided to vest sole authority to monitor validity of rules in
the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. As was the case
with the possible alternatives for checking agency authority to is-
sue proposed rules, these options were rejected in favor of vesting
authority in the executive branch DOAH to determine whether a
rule was within an agency's delegated authority.
tucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Wyoming.
296. See supra note 208. In addition to its mandate to review all proposed rules, the
Joint Administrative Procedures Committee may review adopted rules as well. FLA. STAT. §
120.545(1) (1985). If the Joint Committee objects to an existing rule and the agency refuses
to amend or to repeal the rule, the Joint Committee's objection is filed with the Department
of State and published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A permanent history note to
the rule when published in the Florida Administrative Code must include a reference to the
Joint Committee's objection and to the issue of the Weekly in which the full text of the
objection appeared. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(8) (1985). The Joint Committee also has standing
under certain conditions to seek judicial review of the validity of any existing rule to which
it objected and which the agency refused to amend or repeal. Id. § 11.60(2)(j).
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Because the legislature chose to vest the authority to determine
a rule's validity in a specialized executive branch agency, rather
than in the courts, and because it chose not to require "special
injury" to initiate the proceeding, judicial standing requirements
are not appropriate for determining access to this proceeding. The
respective responsibilities of the DOAH hearing officers and the re-
viewing courts in this context are the same as they are in the con-
text of the validity challenge to proposed rules discussed above.2 0
7
A DOAH hearing officer's determination that a person is affected
in an important or significant way by a rule should not be dis-
turbed by a reviewing court unless it is unsupported by the record.
If a DOAH hearing officer uses an access standard more demand-
ing than the statutory language requires and improperly denies ac-
cess, a reviewing court should reverse and remand if the record
supports the challenger's position that he is affected by the rule in
an important or significant way. In either case, the appropriate ac-
cess standard for determining ability to initiate this executive
branch proceeding should not be confused with judicially devel-
oped rules for standing to institute a law suit.
4. Analysis of Cases Concerning Access to Validity Challenge
to Adopted Rule Proceedings
The cases concerning access to the validity challenge proceeding
have tended to implicate judicial concepts of standing and ripe-
ness. Three issues have surfaced which relate to the appropriate
access standard for this proceeding. First, the right of associations
to challenge rules which do not affect them but which do substan-
tially affect their members. Second, the extent to which the cer-
tainty of the rule's effect on the challenger must be established.
And third, whether a legally protected right must be infringed for
a challenger to show substantial effect.
Initially, associations were not permitted to challenge the valid-
ity of adopted rules solely as representatives of their members' in-
terests. Unless at least one member was also a party to the pro-
ceeding, petitions filed by associations were dismissed for failure to
show that a "party [had] sustained or [was] in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the challenged
rule. '29 8 The Florida Supreme Court disapproved this approach in
297. See supra pp. 1017-18.
298. Florida Dep't of Education v. Florida Education Ass'n United, 378 So. 2d 893, 894
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979), vacated in Florida Homebuilders Ass'n v. Department of Labor &
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its Florida Home Builders decision saying the "restriction on the
standing of associations is an excessively narrow construction of
section 120.56(1) and results in restricted public access to the ad-
ministrative processes established in the Florida Administrative
Procedure Act. ' 29  The court noted that greater public access to
executive branch agencies was a principal goal of the revisers of
chapter 120300 and concluded from this that
the refusal to allow this builders' association, or any similarly sit-
uated association, the opportunity to represent the interests of its
injured members in a rule challenge proceeding defeats this pur-
pose by significantly limiting the public's ability to contest the
validity of agency rules. While it is true that the "substantially
affected" members of the builders' association could individually
seek determinations of rule invalidity, the cost of instituting and
maintaining a rule challenge proceeding may be prohibitive for
small builders. Such a restriction would also needlessly tax the
ability of the Division of Administrative Hearings to dispose of
multiple challenges based upon identical or similar allegations of
unlawful agency action.301
Satisfied that this rather brief review of the history and purpose of
chapter 120 supported its view, the court went on to devise a stan-
dard permitting associations to challenge the validity of rules act-
ing solely as representatives of their members' interests. 2
At first glance, the pourt's decision seems correct. Greater public
Employment, 412 So. 2d 351, 354 (1982); Department of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Flor-
ida Home Builders Ass'n, 392 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), rev'd sub nom. Florida
Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Employment, 412 So. 2d 351, 352 (1982).
Both courts quoted the language of the Jerry opinion.
299. 412 So. 2d at 352.
300. The court cited these remarks from the Reporter's Comments: "'The principle pur-
pose for the adoption of a wholly-revised administrative procedure act for Florida is to rem-
edy massive definitional, procedural and substantive deficiencies in existing law ... (v) by
broadening public access to the precedents and activities of agencies .... .' Id. at 353 n.2.
The validity challenge proceeding, however, was not included in the Law Revision Council's
proposal to which the Reporter's Comments were addressed.
301. Id. at 353.
-302. The standard, derived from Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), permits an association to initiate a validity challenge if it demon-
strates that
a substantial number of its members, although not necessarily a majority, are
"substantially affected" by the challenged rule. Further, the subject matter of the
rule must be within the association's general scope of interest and activity, and
the relief requested must be of the type appropriate for a trade association to
receive on behalf of its members.
412 So. 2d at 353-54.
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access to the workings of the executive branch agencies was indeed
a major goal of the revisers of chapter 120. The federal associa-
tional standing rule urged on the court by the Home Builders was
more in keeping with that general goal than was the special injury
rule urged by the agency.303 But neither standing rule, federal or
state, was appropriate and, while the court is to be applauded for
considering history and purpose when faced with an access ques-
tion, it would have been better served if it had focused on the lan-
guage of the validity challenge section rather than on the general
history and purpose of the statute as a whole.
The access language used in section 120.56 does not support the
court's decision to permit associations to challenge the validity of
rules which do not affect them. Section 120.56(1) authorizes "[a]ny
person substantially affected by a rule" to initiate a validity chal-
lenge. The suggestion is that the challenger must be affected per-
sonally by the rule. Ambiguity about the personal effect require-
ment is removed by the section 120.56(2) directive that the
petition "shall state with particularity facts sufficient to show the
person seeking relief is substantially affected by the rule." A
trade or professional association, acting solely as a representative
of its members' interests, cannot satisfy that directive. The court's
associational standing rule, however ameliorative its intent, ignores
unambiguous statutory language requiring demonstrable personal
effect and thus permits validity challenges to be brought by per-
sons not intended by the legislature to have access to this
proceeding.
Nor do the court's concerns about the financial burden that
would be imposed on individual association members and the
strain that would be put on DOAH resources if associations were
not permitted to challenge rules on their members' behalf justify
the violence done to the plain meaning of the section's language.
The court assumes that without the associational standing rule the
burden of challenging the validity of the rule would fall upon a so-
called small builder at a cost that may be prohibitive. Even if those
assumptions are correct, the court fails to explain why persons who
happen to be members of trade or professional associations war-
rant consideration not extended to unorganized individuals who
must shoulder the same burden and costs to challenge invalid
agency rules. If the costs of maintaining a rule challenge are too
high, they are too high for everyone, not just members of trade or
303. Florida Homebuilders Ass'n, 352 So. 2d at 352.
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professional associations. In any event, if the cost of waging valid-
ity challenges to adopted rules is indeed a problem, it would seem
to be one which the legislature is more institutionally competent to
address than are the courts.
The court's concern about the inefficient use of DOAH resources
is equally unavailing. While the court legitimately should be con-
cerned about the impact judge-fashioned rules have on the efficient
use of judicial resources, it acts improperly when it supervises re-
source allocation at the DOAH. The legislature by statute and the
DOAH by practice have addressed the problem of multiplicity.
Section 120.56(5) provides an opportunity for other persons sub-
stantially affected by a rule to join a validity challenge as parties
or intervenors.30 If separate petitions challenging the validity of
the same rule are filed, the DOAH director assigns all the petitions
to the same hearing officer who in turn consolidates them for hear-
ing and decision.305 Presumably, in the appropriate case the valid-
ity of an adopted rule could be challenged by a person substan-
tially affected by it as a representative of all other similarly
affected persons.30 In sum, the court's associational standing rule
is not supported by the language of the section nor by the court's
rationale.
The case that introduced federal judicial ripeness notions to the
validity challenge proceeding access standard was Jerry. Relying
exclusively on federal case law, the court denied access to challenge
the validity of a procedural rule to a prison inmate because he
failed to establish that, at the time of the challenge, he was suffer-
ing any present adverse effect of the rule. His status as a prison
inmate who had been subjected to the rule in the past and who
might be subjected to it again at any time was accepted by the
hearing officer as sufficient demonstration of substantial affect.10 7
The court disagreed and concluded that
Jerry's prospects of future injury rest on the likelihood that he
304. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(5) (1985) has been construed to permit intervention either on
behalf of a petitioner or a respondent. Florida Elec. Power Coordinating Group, Inc. v.
County of Manatee, 417 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
305. Telephone conversation with Sharyn Smith, Director, Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings
(Aug. 15, 1984); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 221-6.11 (Feb. 1985 Supp.).
306. But see Department of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla.
1st DCA 1979) (holding that a § 120.54(4) validity challenge proceeding is not appropriate
for a class action); Medley Investors, Ltd. v. Lewis, 465 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
(holding that a § 120.57 adjudicatory proceeding is not appropriate for a class action).
307. 353 So. 2d at 1232.
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will again be subjected to disciplinary confinement because of
possible future infractions of [the rule he sought to challenge].
Whether this will occur, however, is a matter of speculation and
conjecture and we will not presume that Jerry, having once com-
mitted an assault while in custody, will do so again. To so pre-
sume would result only in illusory speculation which is hardly
supportive of issues of "sufficient immediacy and reality" neces-
sary to confer standing."'
The concluding phrase-" 'sufficient immediacy and reality' neces-
sary to confer standing"-was taken from United States Supreme
Court cases concerned with whether federal constitutional chal-
lenges to government conduct were sufficiently ripe to require ad-
judication of the constitutional issue.309 Because federal courts are
inclined to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication, 310 plain-
tiffs are required to demonstrate the necessity for judicial inter-
vention by showing immediate and real injury or the threat of im-
mediate and real injury to have standing in these circumstances.
What is not apparent and what the Jerry court does not explain,
is why a federal judicial avoidance device should be used by a state
executive agency. Nothing in section 120.56's language, history, or
purpose suggests that the DOAH should decline to exercise its leg-
islatively granted power to determine the validity of adopted rules.
There is no need to worry about unnecessary constitutional adjudi-
cation because the DOAH cannot resolve constitutional challenges
to adopted rules; 1 ' its authority is limited to determining whether
the rule was properly adopted in accordance with the procedural
requirements of section 120.54 and whether the rule is within the
308. Id. at 1236. In Department of Commerce v. Matthews Corp., 358 So. 2d 256 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978), an unsuccessful bidder on a public works contract was permitted to chal-
lenge the validity of wage rate guidelines even though it was not the lowest bidder and had
not been awarded the contract. The court distinguished the bidder's situation from Jerry by
stating but for the wage rate guidelines "Matthews would be in better competitive position
to bid on public works projects." Id. at 257 n.1. Apparently, the court was willing to pre-
sume that Matthews Corporation would bid for public works contracts in the future. The
court did not explain why that presumption did not result in illusory speculation.
309. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1974); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969).
310. See, e.g., Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-09 (1961); Rescue Army
v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
311. Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Leon County, 344 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977);
Department of Admin., Div. of Personnel v. Department of Admin., Div. of Admin. Hear-
ings, 326 So. 2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
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agency's delegated authority. The Jerry "sufficient immediacy and
reality" standard, drawn as it was from federal justiciability con-
cepts and not supported by the language, history, or purpose of
section 120.56, should be abandoned.
Professional Firefighters of Florida, Inc. v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Servicess and to a greater extent Cox
v. South Florida Water Management Districts3 suggest some
movement away from strict adherence to the Jerry "immediacy
and reality" standard. In Professional Firefighters, a hearing of-
ficer dismissed a petition challenging the validity of rules concern-
ing the licensing of paramedics which was filed by an association
and individual members who performed paramedic services in the
course of their employment with a local fire department. The hear-
ing officer concluded that the requisite "'sufficient immediacy and
reality'" to challenge the rules was not satisfied because the indi-
viduals had not applied for and been denied certification under the
challenged rules.1 The reviewing court reversed, observing that
the hearing officer's order "would preclude a challenge by anyone
who had not first complied with a rule and suffered injury, no mat-
ter how clear the rule's applicability to, or substantial its effects
on, the challenger. ' 31 5 The court found that the individuals were
presently affected by the rules because they were currently em-
ployed in the field regulated by the rules and went on to hold:
When an agency sets up a new licensing or certification require-
ment for an occupation or profession not previously subject to
state-wide regulation or licensing, persons engaged in that occu-
pation or profession have standing to challenge the proposed reg-
ulation. This is true regardless of whether submission to certifica-
tion or licensing is termed "voluntary" or not. There is a clear,
direct effect on those concerned individuals being able to con-
tinue to earn their livelihood. The test of "substantially affected"
as to the two individual appellants is met .... 31e
Although the court said Jerry was distinguishable,317 it is clear
312. 396 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
313. 450 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), petition for review denied mem., 459 So. 2d
1041 (Fla. 1984).
314. 396 So. 2d at 1195.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1196.
317. The court said that both Jerry and Alice P. involved challengers who were not
subject to the rule or immediately affected by it when the petitions were filed and they were
unlikely to be affected by the rule in the future. The firefighters, on the other hand, were
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
that the firefighters were not required to satisfy-nor could they
have satisfied-the "immediacy and reality" standard as it was ar-
ticulated in Jerry. At the time they filed their petition, the
firefighters were members of the class subject to the certification
rules, but they could not demonstrate "injury which [was] accom-
panied by any continuing, present adverse effects" resulting from
the rules as required by Jerry.18 They were not then applicants
whose certification had been denied pursuant to the rules. Indeed,
the hearing officer specifically found that they neither "alleged
[nior established that anything in the challenged rules would dis-
qualify them from certification. '"3 19 Nevertheless, by using a more
relaxed standard-one not requiring a demonstration of injury ac-
companied by present adverse effects-the court concluded that
the firefighters were substantially affected by the certification rules
because if they wished to continue to perform paramedic services
they would have to be state certified and that required that they
submit themselves to the process embodied in the rules.
In Cox, the hearing officer dismissed a petition challenging the
validity of certain water use restriction rules adopted by a water
management district for future implementation in times of
drought. The challenger, a landowner who also operated a nursery
and landscape business, claimed he would be adversely affected by
the water use restrictions. The hearing officer ruled that the requi-
site "immediacy and reality" were lacking because at the time the
motion to dismiss was heard, there was no drought. The reviewing
court reversed in a terse opinion that took judicial notice of the
fact that the state's "never ending preoccupation with the delicate
balance of its water supply is more than mere speculation.
Droughts and floods are to Florida what sand is to the Sahara De-
sert-inevitable. 3 20 The court made no effort to distinguish Jerry
and it certainly did not apply Jerry's stringent "immediacy and
reality" standard. The court was satisfied that a person who would
be subject to the rule when the inevitable event occurred was pres-
ently substantially affected by that rule for purposes of challenging
its validity.
In none of the three cases was the impact of the language of
section 120.56(2) considered. That section requires the validity
said to be presently affected by the certification rules because they work in the field regu-
lated by those rules. Id.
318. 353 So. 2d at 1235.
319. 396 So. 2d at 1195.
320. Id.
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challenge petition to recite "facts sufficient to show the person
seeking relief is substantially affected by the rule." Just as that
language inexorably leads to the conclusion that the challenger's
personal interests must be substantially affected, so too, it makes
inescapable the conclusion that the substantial effect must be pres-
ently felt by the challenger. The use of the present verb tense de-
mands that the challenger demonstrate some present effect which
is substantial. Viewed from this perspective, Jerry and Profes-
sional Firefighters reached the correct conclusion; Cox did not.
As an inmate in a state prison when he filed the rule challenge,
Jerry was a member of the class of persons subject to the rule. But
the challenged rule was a procedural one-it defined the discipli-
nary process used when an inmate was accused of violating prison
rules. As a consequence, the mere existence of the rule did not af-
fect Jerry in any way. Only if Jerry conducted himself in such a
way as to be accused of a substantive rule violation would the pro-
cedural rule be invoked and substantially affect him.
The paramedic certification rule, on the other hand, did have a
present effect on the firefighters. The rule required the firefighters
to do something not required of them before. They had to make
application for state certification. The mere requirement that they
submit themselves to the certification process contained in the rule
was adequate to establish that the rule presently affected them in
a substantial manner. Section 120.56's access language does not re-
quire adverse effect or injury. So the fact that none of the chal-
lengers submitted to the process and failed to qualify for certifica-
tion is immaterial.
Cox is closer to Jerry than it is to Professional Firefighters even
though the rule was substantive not procedural. Cox was a member
of the class subject to the water use restriction rule. But the mere
existence of the rule did not have a present effect on Cox. Cox was
not required to change his conduct in any way by the rule. Only if
natural elements combined to cause a drought in the future would
the rule require Cox to alter his behavior. However likely the
chances the rule would be invoked at some time, Cox could not
satisfy the requirement of present effect when he filed his validity
challenge petition.
The suggestion that unless a legally recognized right is interfered
with by a rule, a person is not substantially affected for purposes
of pursuing a validity challenge came in School Board of Orange
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
County v. Blackford.32 1 The school board, responding to a United
States district court's desegregation order, adopted rules which
closed a high school, transferred those students to other schools in
the district, designated a junior high school as an exceptional edu-
cation facility, and established new attendance zones for some of
the remaining junior high schools in the district. The rules were
challenged by the parents of two junior high school students who
were transferred pursuant to the rules. The hearing officer ruled
that the parents' "interest in maintaining for their children an
educational program which is not unnecessarily disrupted by
changing schools, and realigning friendships, is a substantial
one." 322 He held the school board's rules invalid because they were
not adopted in accordance with section 120.54 rulemaking proce-
dures.32 3 The school board appealed and the court reversed. While
it recognized that parents have an interest in their children's edu-
cation, including an interest that its progress not be unnecessarily
disrupted, the court concluded that these parental concerns were
not sufficient to entitle them to challenge the validity of the rules.
With a curious citation to Jerry as support for the proposition, the
court said "[t]o walk a little bit further, or to have the chance to
make new friends does not offer entitlement to complain." 32 " The
holding was announced in these words:
We hold that while these children have a legal right to receive
from the School Board equal opportunities for the obtaining of a
free education, they do not have a right to be seated at a particu-
lar desk in a particular room at a particular school in order to
receive such educational exposure. To uphold the order entered
striking down the orders of the School Board herein referred to
would require first that common sense and logic take a holiday. 25
The court's emphasis on the importance of the interest asserted
was misplaced and is quite troublesome. Section 120.56 requires a
challenger to show that he is substantially affected by a rule. It
does not require that a challenger's substantial interests are af-
fected by the rule. The statutory language focuses the inquiry on
the effect the rule has on a challenger. The question, therefore, is
whether he is affected in some important or significant way by the
321. 369 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
322. Id. at 691.
323. Id. at 690.
324. Id. at 691.
325. Id. (emphasis added).
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rule. The question is not whether some important or significant
interest of a challenger is affected by the rule. And the question
certainly is not whether a challenger has a "legal right" which is
interfered with or denied by the rule. The court asked the wrong
question and predictably it got the wrong answer.
A rule which reassigns junior and senior high school students
certainly does have an effect on those students and their parents
which is more than trivial.2M The court's refusal to recognize the
magnitude of the rule's effect on the challengers appears to have
been influenced by its view that the content of the attendance zone
rule effectively was immune from successful challenge because its
terms were dictated by the federal district court's desegregation or-
der. Even if the school board were now required to start over and
to follow the rule adoption procedures of section 120.54, the sub-
stance of the attendance zone rule would not change. But the fact
that the school board had no discretion with respect to the content
of the attendance zone rule ought to have no bearing on whether
the school board had to comply with the procedural requirements
for rule adoption. In the circumstances of this case, the court
might have concluded that the school board's failure to follow pre-
scribed procedure was harmless error.32 7 Instead, the court trivial-
ized the effect of the rule on the challengers with its talk of walk-
ing a little bit farther and making new friends. It manipulated the
access requirement with its suggestion that interference with a le-
gal right was necessary to challenge the rule administratively. The
court was wrong on both counts.
326. See School Bd. of Leon County v. Ehrlich, 421 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (af-
firming in part and reversing in part a hearing officer's final order concerning proposed
amendments to an attendance zone rule; the challenge was filed under § 120.54(4) by par-
ents of children affected by the proposed rule); see also Cortese v. School Bd. of Palm
Beach County, 425 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), petition for review denied mem.,
436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983); Polk v. School Bd. of Polk County, 373 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979); School Bd. of Broward County v. Constant, 363 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
327. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(8) (1985). Several cases have excused agency failure to comply
with some requirements of the rule making process, notably the failure to provide the eco-
nomic impact statement required by id. § 120.54(2) by finding that the failure did not im-
pair the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action. See Florida-Texas
Freight, Inc. v. Hawkins, 379 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1979); Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Flor-
ida Comm'n on Human Relations, 470 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Department of Pro-
fessional Reg. v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Cortese v. School Bd. of
Palm Beach County, 425 So. 2d 554, 558 n.12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Plantation Residents'
Ass'n, v. School Bd. of Broward County, 424 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), petition
for review denied mem., 436 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1983); School Bd. of Broward County v.
Gramith, 375 So. 2d 340, 340-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Polk v. School Bd. of Polk County,
373 So.2d 960, 962-63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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B. Agency Declaratory Statements
Section 120.565 directs "[e]ach agency . . . [to] provide by rule
the procedure for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for
declaratory statements." Through a declaratory statement, an
agency articulates its opinion concerning the applicability of a stat-
utory provision, agency rule, or agency order to the particular cir-
cumstances presented in the petition. Notice of the receipt of a
petition and its subsequent disposition must be published by the
agency in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A copy of both the
petition and the disposition must be sent to the Joint Administra-
tive Procedures Committee. Agency disposition of a petition for a
declaratory statement is final agency action subject to judicial
review.3s'
The agency declaratory statement provision contains no legisla-
tively dictated standard for determining the interest a person must
have to request a declaratory statement from an agency. On its
face, the provision appears to delegate to each agency the discre-
tion to determine by rule the nature of the interest petitioners
must possess to avail themselves of this process. That broad dis-
cretion, however, is curtailed somewhat by the requirement that
agency rules adopted to comply with section 120.565 must be in
substantial compliance with the model rules of procedure adopted
by the Administration Commission. 29
The model rules state that "[a]ny person may seek a declaratory
statement as to the applicability of a specific statutory provision or
of any rule or order of the Agency as it applies to the Petitioner in
his particular set of circumstances only." 330 Further, the model
rules direct that petitions must be in writing and must contain,
among other things, a "[d]escription of how this rule, order or stat-
ute may or does affect the petitioner in his/her particular set of
circumstances only."331 The purpose of the declaratory statement
is to provide a "means for resolving a controversy or answering
328. FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1985).
329. Id. § 120.54(10) requires the Governor and Cabinet, acting as the Administration
Commission, to promulgate one or more sets of model rules of procedure. The model rules
are the rules of procedure for each agency to the extent that it does not have a specific rule
covering the subject matter of the applicable model rule. This section was amended in 1975
to require substantial compliance with the model rules when agencies adopted rules man-
dated by id. §§ 120.53 and 120.565. Ch. 75-191, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 368, 370 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 120.54(10) (1985)).
330. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-4.01(1) (1983).
331. Id. R. 28-4.01(2)(e).
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questions or doubts concerning the applicability of any statutory
provision, rule or order as it does, or may, apply to petitioner
....- 32 Therefore, "[tihe potential impact upon petitioner's in-
terests must be alleged in order for petitioner to show the exis-
tence of a controversy, question or doubt."333
The guidelines contained in the model rules indicate that agency
rules implementing the declaratory statement provision may re-
quire some showing of effect on the petitioner's interests that is
caused by the statutory provision, agency rule, or order about
whose applicability there is doubt.3 34 The model rules do not sug-
gest that either the effect or the petitioner's interests must be
"substantial. '" 335 It is only required that the interests be personal
to the petitioner and that there is or may be some effect on those
interests.3 6 Agency opinion may only be sought on the applicabil-
ity of a statutory provision, agency rule, or order "as it applies to
the petitioner in his particular set of circumstances only. 33 7
Thus, it is evident that the declaratory statement proceeding is not
available to one who seeks an agency's opinion on a purely hypo-
thetical question unrelated to his personal situation.
1. History of the Declaratory Statement Provision
The declaratory statement provision was not recommended by
the Law Revision Council. It originated in the House bill as intro-
duced 3a and, with slight modification, was contained in the com-
332. Id. R. 28-4.05.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. In Sarasota County v. Department of Admin., 350 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977), the court concluded that FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-4.05 supported its view that a "pre-
liminary test of substantial interest is proper" before an agency issues a requested declara-
tory statement. (Emphasis added).
336. See Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 399 So. 2d 6, 6
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in which the court held that associations were not entitled to the de-
claratory ruling they received from the agency because their petition failed to allege that the
rule had any potential effect on the associations' interests. Individual members of the as-
sociations who may have been affected by the rule were not parties to the petition and the
court ruled that the associations were not proper parties to obtain a declaratory statement
on behalf of their individual members.
337. FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1985) (emphasis added).
338. Fla. HB 2672, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.7). The provision read:
Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition of peti-
tions for declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of
any rule or order of the agency. Rulings disposing of petitions have the same sta-
tus as agency decisions or orders in contested cases.
This language was taken from the 1961 MODEL Acr, supra note 93, § 8, at 402.
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mittee substitute bill that passed the House.339 The Senate bill as
introduced contained the declaratory statement provision as
passed by the House.3 40 The Senate committee substitute bill did
not have any provision for declaratory statements. The conference
committee report contained the House provision with some further
language refinements.3 41 The only available record of legislative
discussion about this provision is the Senate floor debate, during
which it was unfavorably compared with the Senate preferred va-
lidity challenge to adopted rules provision, 42 and the staff expla-
nation to the House Committee on Governmental Operations.3 43
2. Declaratory Statement Provisions in Other States
Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have a declara-
tory statement provision in their administrative procedure stat-
utes. Sixteen of these states, including Florida, have provisions
modeled on the RMA in which the statutory provision itself does
not specify any particular interest necessary to invoke the process.
Each agency is authorized to establish the appropriate interest by
rule.4 Eight states and the District of Columbia confer the right
339. Fla. CS for HB 2672, 2434, and 2583,. sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. 120.56).
340. Fla. SB 892, sec. 7 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.56).
341. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1326, 1329 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. §
120.56(1)); FLA. S. JOUR. 906, 909 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same). As enacted, the provision read:
Each agency shall provide by rule the procedure for the filing and prompt disposi-
tion of petitions for declaratory statements as to the applicability of any statutory
provision or of any rule or order of the agency. Agency disposition of petitions
shall be final agency action.
342. See supra notes 208, 282.
343. The staff explanation was given by Phillip Parsons, a lawyer assigned by the
Speaker to the Committee. He said:
Section 120.56 . . . provides a remedy that is not available to a citizen at this
time. It requires that each agency adopt by rule, a procedure for a declaratory
judgment, so that a party can go before the agency and for a determination of
whether a rule affects his course of conduct, his business, or his interests. In other
words, prior to any agency action that might affect that party, and he's worried
about the applicability of the rule, he can go to the agency and ask for a ruling: Is
my conduct within the meaning of this rule or not? So then his rights are settled
and he's allowed to proceed. There is no similar provision by statute at this time.
It's a remedy that we don't have.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 11, 1974) (available at
Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Legis. Library Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.).
344. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 93, § 8, at 402; ARY_ STAT. ANN. § 5-706 (1976); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-176 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-
13-11 (Michie 1982); IDAHO CODE § 67-5208 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.9 (West 1978); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:962 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-501 (1983); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 233B.120 (1983); N.Y. A.P.A. § 204 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 307 (West
1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-8 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-15 (1980); UTAH CODE
1050 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:965
to request a declaratory statement, on "interested persons," while
also authorizing agencies to provide by rule the procedure for their
submission.3 ' 5 The Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin
statutes also permit "interested persons" to request a declaratory
statement, but they do not provide for agency rules to regulate the
procedure for submission. 46 The South Carolina statute does not
specify any particular interest necessary to request a declaratory
statement, nor does it authorize agency rules to regulate the proce-
dure for submission.4 7 The remaining four state statutes all spec-
ify a different interest necessary to petition for a declaratory state-
ment and authorize agency rules to regulate the procedure for
submission: North Carolina extends the right to "aggrieved per-
sons"; 348 Tennessee to "affected persons";3 49 Alabama to "any per-
son substantially affected by a rule";350 New Mexico to one whose
"interests, rights or privileges are immediately at stake." '351
3. Functional Analysis
Because the Florida declaratory statement provision is modeled
on the RMA, the purposes and goals sought to be achieved by the
drafters of the RMA provision should be considered when develop-
ing an appropriate access standard for the Florida provision. The
original Model State Act, proposed in response to a call for the
procedure made by the 1941 Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ANN. § 63-46-10 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 808 (Supp. 1984).
345. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1508 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-8 (1976); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 9001 (1979); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-304(a) (1984); MIcH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 24.263 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912 (1981); OIL REV. STAT. § 183.410 (1981) (with
provision that the attorney general shall prescribe by rule the procedures for their submis-
sion, consideration and disposition); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.080 (West 1965); W. VA.
CODE § 29A-4-1 (1980).
346. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 8 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-8 (West
1970); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.06(1) (West 1982).
347. S.C. CODE § 1-23-150(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
348. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (1978).
349. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-223 (Supp. 1984) (declaratory order).
350. ALA. CODE § 41-22-11(a) (1982). The provision also requires the petition to "state
with particularity facts sufficient to show the person seeking relief is substantially affected
by the rule." The official commentary on this provision states that both the "any person
substantially affected by a rule" language and the required statement of facts showing the
substantial effect of the rule were taken from FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1), (2) (1977), the validity
challenge to adopted rules provision. The Florida language was adopted to protect agency
and public interest "from the issuance of unwarranted declaratory rulings by the require-
ment that the petition document the substantial interest of the petitioner." Commentary at
398.
351. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-9 (1983).
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352ministrative Procedure, merely authorized agencies to issue de-
claratory rulings. 53 Experience in several states that adopted this
approach showed great reluctance on the part of agencies to issue
formal declaratory rulings.3 5 ' The drafters of the RMA "sought to
devise an amendment which would lead to the fuller utilization of
this beneficial procedure. 355 Accordingly, the drafters decided that
agencies should be required to rule upon each request for a de-
claratory ruling, but that they would be permitted to make their
ruling that of declining to resolve the particular question.
Whatever ruling the agency made, however, (even a ruling declin-
ing to rule upon a particular question), would have the same sta-
tus as any other final order of the agency. This would mean that,
in appropriate cases, the refusal of the agency to make a ruling
could be appealed to the courts. In other cases, the denial of the
request would make it a matter of formal record that (for exam-
ple) the agency was not prepared to say that a particular course
of conduct was prohibited by the rule in question.3 56
To achieve these ends, the RMA declaratory ruling provision was
amended to add: "Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing
and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings as to
the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order
352. F. COOPER, supra note 117, at 240-41. The Attorney General's Committee stated:
In recent years, in the Federal and state courts, the device of the declaratory judg-
ment has been provided to furnish guidance and certainty in many private rela-
tionships where previously parties proceeded at their own risk .... The time is
ripe for introducing into administration itself an instrument similarly devised, to
achieve similar results in the administrative field. The perils of unanticipated
sanctions and liabilities may be as great in the one area as in the other. They
should be denied or eliminated. A major step in that direction would be the estab-
lishment of procedures by which an individual who proposed to pursue a course
which might involve him in dispute with an administrative agency, might obtain
from that agency, in the latter's discretion, a binding declaration concerning the
consequences of his proposed action.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
30-33 (1941), reprinted in F. COOPER, supra note 117, at 240.
353. 1946 MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, § 7, cited in F. COOPER, supra
note 117, at 241. As promulgated, the provision provided:
On petition of any interested person, any agency may issue a declaratory ruling
with respect to the applicablility to any person, property, or state of facts of any
rule or statute enforceable by it. A declaratory ruling, if issued after argument and
stated to be binding, is binding between the agency and the petitioner on the state
of facts alleged, unless it is altered or set aside by a court.
354. F. COOPER, supra note 117, at 242.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 243.
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of the agency. '357
The purposes of the declaratory statement procedure are "to en-
able members of the public to definitively resolve ambiguities of
law arising in the conduct of their daily affairs or in the planning
of their future affairs ' 358 and "to enable the public to secure defin-
itive binding advice as to the applicability of agency-enforced law
to a particular set of facts." 359 While a declaratory judgment action
in a court is one way to resolve ambiguities in the law and to ob-
tain a definitive ruling as to the law's application to a particular
set of facts, it is not the only way and it is not the way selected by
the Florida Legislature. The legislature chose instead to require ex-
ecutive branch agencies to issue definitive rulings to clarify ambig-
uous provisions of law. This approach is characterized by Professor
Bonfield as "a more desirable method of achieving clarity. '360
Agency declaratory statement procedures are considered more de-
sirable than judicial declaratory judgment actions for several rea-
sons. They are less costly, less time consuming, less complicated,
and less uncertain .36 Bonfield has written that much of the uncer-
tainty in declaratory judgment actions results from "the many lim-
itations with which the judicial process has cloaked itself."'36 2
Among the limitations he notes are the following:
a reluctance, even on the state level, to answer suppositive ques-
tions whose resolution is unnecessary to resolve a demonstrably
active contest of rights between parties. That is, there is a natural
reluctance to determine rights in a judicial proceeding on the ba-
sis of facts which may be no more than hypothetical because the
person seeking such a determination may only want to know
them for planning purposes. There is also a general reluctance on
the part of the courts to issue a declaratory decree regarding the
applicability of law enforced by an agency without first giving the
agency an opportunity to utilize its expertness in determining the
appropriate result. Declaratory relief also may be unavailable ab-
sent a showing of substantial need. What is required, therefore, is
a relatively cheap, simple, expeditious and widely available
substitute.3
357. 1961 MODEL AcT, supra note 93, § 8, at 402.
358. Bonfield, supra note 121, at 820.
359. Id. at 822-23.
360. Id. at 805.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 805-06 (footnotes omitted).
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The declaratory statement provision is an executive branch sub-
stitute for the declaratory judgment action. It is intended, how-
ever, that the administrative substitute be more widely available
than the judicial remedy and that its use not be unduly restricted
by artificial access barriers that would frustrate its primary pur-
poses. These purposes are implemented by the access standard,
drawn from the language of the model rules, articulated above.
That is, any person who is in doubt about the applicability of a
statutory provision, agency rule, or order to described conduct that
he is or may be engaged in, is entitled to an agency ruling on the
.question if the unclear provision of law has some effect or impact
'on his conduct. Further, any person who is in doubt about the ap-
plicability of a statutory provision, agency rule, or order to the de-
scribed conduct of others that does or may affect the personal in-
terests of the petitioner, is entitled to an agency ruling on the
question, if the unclear provision of law would protect the peti-
tioner's personal interests from an undesired effect.
This access standard makes agency declaratory statements avail-
able to some persons who would not have standing to institute a
declaratory judgment action. That is as it should be and as was
intended. The procedure was developed to meet the perceived in-
adequacies of declaratory judgment actions. It was developed to
provide a less costly, less lengthy, less complicated, and less techni-
cal nonjudicial mechanism for members of the public to secure
"binding advice where it is necessary or helpful for them to con-
duct their affairs in accordance with law." 364 For this executive
branch alternative to work properly, great care must be exercised
by both agencies and courts to understand it for what it is and not
to treat it as a masquerading declaratory judgment action.
4. Analysis of Cases Concerning Access to Declaratory
Statements
Unfortunately, Florida courts have already begun to view the de-
claratory statement provision as if it were a judicial proceeding.
Judicial principles have been imposed on this executive process in
three cases: one involving a request for a declaratory statement
which was denied by an agency, another involving an agency re-
fusal to dismiss a request for a declaratory statement, and one con-
cerning judicial review of a statement issued by an agency to a pe-
364. Id. at 812.
19861 1053
1054 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:965
titioner who the court decided was not entitled to request the
answer received.
In Couch v. State,365 an action was filed in circuit court concern-
ing parents' rights to visitation with their child who had been adju-
dicated a dependent child and placed in foster care. While this ac-
tion was pending in the circuit court, the parents filed a
declaratory statement petition asking the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services whether the foster care program ad-
ministered by it was governed by certain agency rules and federal
statutes. The Department refused to answer the questions posed,
citing the fact that the issues presented by the petition were pend-
ing before the circuit court. The parents appealed. In upholding
the Department's action, the district court of appeal opined that
the similarity between the declaratory statement proceeding and
the declaratory judgment action justified its reliance on court deci-
sions construing the declaratory judgment statute when it was
called on to determine the "availability and scope of the remedies"
under the declaratory statement provision. The principle borrowed
from declaratory judgment case law and applied to the declaratory
statement process was that "an actual, present and practical need
for a declaratory judgment must be shown. '36 6
The court's decision to make the availability of a declaratory
statement dependent on whether a declaratory judgment action
could be maintained under the same circumstances completely un-
dermines primary goals sought to be achieved by the legislature
through the declaratory statement device. Binding agency advice
was intended to be more widely available than judicial declara-
tions. Clarification of ambiguities present in agency enforced law
was intended to be encouraged and facilitated by the use of the
declaratory statement. By requiring that an "actual, present, and
practical need" must be shown in order to be entitled to a declara-
tory statement, the court has transferred the judicial reluctance to
respond to suppositive questions to an executive proceeding that
was designed to do just that so that persons would have the benefit
of agency thinking for planning purposes. Indeed, the court's re-
quirement that an actual, present, and practical need must be
shown is a deviation from the model rules' statement of the pur-
pose of the declaratory statement, namely, it is a "means for
resolving a controversy or answering questions or doubts concern-
365. 377 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
366. Id. at 33.
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ing the applicability of any statutory provision, rule or order as it
does or may, apply" to the petitioner.3 67
In Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Company v.
Shand, Morahan & Company, Inc.,31 8 litigation between the par-
ties was pending before a United States district court when Shand
filed a petition for a declaratory statement asking the Department
of Insurance to answer questions which were in issue in the law-
suit. Lawyers Professional Liability filed a motion to abate or dis-
miss the petition for declaratory statement. The Department de-
nied the motion and Lawyers Professional Liability appealed. The
district court of appeal ruled that the Department had abused its
discretion by refusing to suspend its proceedings on the declara-
tory statement pending the outcome of the federal court litigation.
Following Couch, the court found case law dealing with concurrent
jurisdiction between state and federal courts instructive. The prin-
ciple borrowed from this case law and applied to the declaratory
statement process was that an "action for declaratory relief, initi-
ated when a suit is already pending which involves the same issues
and which would afford full, adequate and complete relief, will not
be permitted to proceed." '
The results reached in Couch and Lawyers Professional Liabil-
ity are undoubtedly correct, but not for the reasons given by the
courts. In fact, these two cases illustrate a fundamental inadequacy
in the model rules controlling declaratory statements. Section
120.565 directs agencies to provide rules "for the filing and prompt
disposition" of petitions for declaratory statements. The model
rules, with which all agency rules must be in substantial compli-
ance, make adequate provision for the filing of the petitions; but
apart from authorizing agencies, in their discretion, to hold hear-
ings on an expedited basis to dispose of a petition, no provision is
made for prompt disposition.37 0 Significantly, the model rules are
silent on the circumstances in which an agency may decline to is-
sue a requested declaratory statement. The statutory phraseology
"[e]ach agency shall provide by rule the procedure for the filing
and prompt disposition" of petitions is similar to the RMA provi-
sion 3 7 1 The drafters of that language intended it to require agen-
367. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-4.05 (1983) (emphasis added).
368. 394 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
369. Id. at 240.
370. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-4.07 (1983).
371. Compare FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1985) with 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 93, § 8, at
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cies to rule on all petitions submitted but to permit a ruling that
declined to answer the question asked.
The circumstances in which an agency will decline to resolve a
question presented to it by a petition for a declaratory statement
need to be specifically set forth in the model rules and in the rules
of the agencies. There are numerous legitimate reasons why agen-
cies would be justified in declining to issue a requested declaratory
statement.372 Certainly one of those circumstances is when the pe-
titioner is involved in litigation in either state or federal court and
the question raised by the petition is pending before the court. It
would be entirely appropriate and consistent with statutory au-
thority for the model rules and the agencies' rules to specify that
agencies will decline to respond to petitions filed to achieve some
advantage in pending litigation. It is incumbent on agencies to ad-
dress this matter and it is imperative that they do so. Their failure
to fill the existing vacuum with rules of their own which meet their
own peculiar executive needs only encourages the courts to fill the
vacuum with common law rules which satisfy needs peculiar to the
372. Professor Bonfield has suggested several grounds that would support an agency de-
cision to decline to issue a declaratory statement. He has written:
Action of this sort would certainly be justified where it is necessary to assure an
adequate allocation of the agency resources available for the issuance of rulings to
petitions raising questions of wider public impact or of greater urgency. An agency
refusal to rule would also be supportable where regulated parties seek to obtain
permission to engage in activities that are so borderline as to be of very questiona-
ble legality, though margiqally proper. Agency abstention would also be justifiable
in order to postpone decisions on difficult questions where the agency has had
insufficient time or resources to develop a "fully matured opinion." Other valid
reasons to abstain from ruling on the merits of a particular petition include the
fact that the issue raised has been definitively settled by a change in circum-
stances or other means so that the need for a ruling has terminated, or the fact
that the questions posed or facts presented are insufficiently specific, or over-
broad, or otherwise inappropriate as a basis upon which to decide. In addition, an
agency may properly wish to decline to rule where the party seeking the ruling has
no interest beyond mere curiousity in obtaining it, where the issue involved turns
on peculiar facts which cannot be predicted or adequately described in advance, or
where an answer to the question requires an analysis of so many complex factors
that it becomes practically unmanageable outside of an actual full scale formal
adjudication. An agency may also reasonably refuse to rule where the same or a
similar course of action is under investigation for purposes of formal full scale
adjudication, or where the petition filed is improper because it does not meet the
procedural requirements imposed by the agency for such petitions. Similarly, a
refusal to rule would be justified where the ruling, though technically binding only
on the agency and petitioner, would necessarily determine the legal rights of other
parties who have not filed such a petition, and who are opposed to the resolution
of the issue by declaratory ruling procedures . . ..
Bonfield, supra note 121, at 818-19 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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judiciary.
A third case involves a judicial imposition not excusable by any
failure on the part of the executive branch. In Florida Optometric
Association v. Department of Professional Regulation,"'s two as-
sociations, the Society of Ophthalmic Dispensers and Optical Dis-
pensers of North Florida, requested and received a declaratory
statement from the Board of Opticianry. 7 4 Judicial review of the
Board's statement was sought by the Florida Optometric Associa-
tion, an intervenor in the proceedings before the Board, and by the
Department of Professional Regulation, an observer of but not an
intervenor in the Board's proceedings. The district court of appeal
reversed the Board's action on the ground that the two petitioning
associations were not proper parties to request the declaratory
statement in the first place. The court found that the requested
declaratory statement related to the applicability of an agency rule
to a hypothetical set of facts which were alleged to exist as to some
association members but not as to the associations themselves. Re-
lying on cases decided prior to Florida Home Builders that denied
associations access to proceedings to challenge the validity of
adopted rules when individual association members were not
373. 399 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
374. Doubt as to the meaning of the Board of Opticianry's rule concerning the fitting of
contact lenses was the basis for the declaratory statement. The rule provided that:
The fitting of contact lenses is embraced in the field of optical dispensing. An
optician may properly fill a prescription for contact lenses only if it contains both
the optical specifications and complete lens specfication desired by the optome-
trist or physician prescribing the lenses. Having prepared the lenses in precise
conformity with the prescription, the optician can proceed to fit and adapt the
lenses under the supervision, control, and direction of the optometrist or physi-
cian so desires [sic].
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 21P-10.09 (1979). The associations' petition for a declaratory statement
addressed the following questions to the Board concerning the meaning of the fitting of
contact lenses rule:
(1) May an optician fill a prescription for contact lenses which contains all the
necessary refractive information and omits only the keratometer readings, when
the prescribing doctor has specifically instructed the optician to take the ker-
atometer readings?
(2) When an optician has properly filled a written prescription for contact lenses
in precise conformity with the prescription, may the optician then proceed to fit
and adapt the lenses to the wearer when the prescribing doctor has specifically
instructed the optician to take keratometer readings and fit the patient with con-
tact lenses?
The Board answered both questions in the affirmative. The contact lens fitting rule was
amended in 1981 to provide that "[Tihe technical fitting of contact lenses is embraced in
the field of optical dispensing. All fitting shall be done only under the supervision of either a
licensed physician or licensed optometrist." FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 21P-10.09 (Annual Supp.
1982).
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joined as parties, the court held that the associations were not
proper parties as contemplated by section 120.565 and the model
rules to obtain a declaratory statement on behalf of their
members.75
Both the reasoning and the result reached in Florida Optometric
Association are incorrect. The only connection between the au-
thority relied on by the court and the question before it was that
associations were seeking relief for their members. The administra-
tive proceedings to which access was in question were quite dissim-
ilar. Furthermore, the access requirements to initiate a validity
challenge to adopted rules are not even remotely similar to the re-
quirements based on the model rules for determining access to the
declaratory statement process.7 6 The model rules' guidelines con-
cerning those persons who are entitled to obtain a declaratory
statement are not jurisdictional. That is, an agency may in its dis-
cretion give a declaratory statement to anyone who petitions. The
model rules' guidelines set minimum standards. Anyone who satis-
fies those guidelines is entitled to a declaratory statement. But the
model rules' guidelines do not establish boundaries beyond which
an agency may not go. An agency may give a declaratory statement
375. Florida Optometric Ass'n, v. Department of Professional Reg., 399 So. 2d at 6. Curi-
ously, the court observed in a footnote that if the associations had the requisite interest for
§ 120.565 purposes, the case would then present an issue as to these unincorporated associa-
tions' legal capacity to institute such proceedings. See Phillips & Co. v. Hall, 128 So. 635
(1930); cf. Walton-Okaloosa-Santa Rosa Medical Society v. Spires, 153 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1963)." 399 So. 2d at 6 n.1. The cited authorities both concerned the common law
incapacity of unincorporated associations to sue or be sued in their common name. This
common law incapacity has no relevance in the context of statutorily defined administrative
proceedings.
376. See also Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Fla. v. Department of Business
Reg., 10 Fla. L.W., 2697 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 13, 1985), in which the court reversed the
agency's dismissal of a petition for declaratory statement filed by an association so that it
could advise its members how the agency interpreted certain undefined statutory terms. The
agency dismissed the petition on the ground that the association "'failed to demonstrate
that [it] is affected.'" Id. In reversing the agency, the court specifically refused to follow
Florida Optometric Ass'n because in the court's view that decision had been undermined by
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Florida Home Builders. The court held that the
Florida Home Builders associational standing rule applied to requests for declaratory state-
ments. Id. at 2698. The court recognized that Florida Home Builders involved access to
challenge rules under § 120.56. Id. at 2697. Nevertheless, the court found "no reason to
believe that there is any determinative difference between the . . . purpose of the rule chal-
lenge proceeding ...and the purpose of this proceeding by an association under section
120.565, both proceedings having been initiated under the Administrative Procedure Act."
Id. at 2698. Consequently, the court committed the same error made by the Florida Opto-
metric Ass'n court. See also Farmworker Rights Org. v. Department of Health & Rehab.
Servs., 417 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (extending the Florida Home Builders
associational standing rule to proceedings under § 120.57).
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to anyone in its discretion; an agency must give a declaratory
statement to anyone who satisfies the model rules' requirements.377
The real question before the court was not whether the agency
erred in giving the declaratory statement but whether either the
Florida Optometric Association or the Department of Professional
Regulation had standing to seek judicial review of the declaratory
statement. Judicial review is available to a party who is adversely
affected by final agency action.3 78 The Florida Optometric Associa-
tion was allowed to intervene in the Board's declaratory statement
proceedings. It was, therefore, a party within the meaning of sec-
tion 120.52(11)(c). 37 9 However, there is no indication that the Asso-
377. Florida S&L Servs., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 8 Fla. L.W. 2093 (Fla. 1st DCA
Aug. 26, 1983), opinion withdrawn and new opinion issued, 443 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983) was another example of judicial overreaching in the declaratory statement area. Flor-
ida S&L Services provides computer information, which is transmitted over private tele-
phone lines supplied by Southern Bell, to financial institutions around the state. Southern
Bell asked the Department of Revenue whether the private line service it provided was
subject to the state sales tax. The Department responded that it was and Southern Bell
began adding the sales tax to its customers' bills. Florida S&L Services then sought a declar-
atory statement from the Department, questioning the imposition of the sales tax on the
private line service. The Department issued a declaratory statement which expressed its
view that the private line services were subject to the sales tax. Florida S&L Services ap-
pealed the declaratory statement.
The district court of appeal initially declined to reach the merits because it found that
Florida S&L Services lacked "standing" to request the declaratory statement the Depart-
ment had given it. The court's conclusion rested on its interpretaton of the Department's
declaratory statement rule which says: "Any person substantially affected by a Department
rule or order or the applicability of a statutory provision may petition the Department for a
declaratory statement; provided however, only those persons whose rights, privileges and
immunities are directly affected may be considered 'substantially affected."' FLA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 12-2.10 (1980) (emphasis added). In the court's view, Florida S&L Services was not
directly affected, as required by the rule, because even though it was required to pay the
tax, the legal liability for the sales tax rested with the service provider-Southern Bell-not
with the consumer-Florida S&L Services.
The court's decision was completely indefensible. The Department, presumably capable of
understanding its declaratory statement rule, was quite willing to give Florida S&L Services
its official position on the applicability of the statutory provision in question. Indeed, the
Department did not resist Florida S&L Services' right to request the declaratory statement
from it or its standing to seek judicial review. The court raised the question sua sponte
without benefit of argument from counsel. Clearly, the Department's position on the appli-
cability of the sales tax to the private line service caused Florida S&L Services a real and
immediate pocketbook injury that would satisfy the federal judicial standing requirements.
The interest was more than adequate to meet the minimum standards established by the
model rules. Fortunately, the court granted the motion for rehearing, withdrew the original
opinion, and without mentioning "standing," resolved the merits of the dispute in Florida
S&L Services' favor. Florida S&L Servs. v. Department of Revenue, 443 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983).
378. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1985).
379. Record on Appeal at 57, Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional
Reg., 399 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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ciation qua association was adversely affected by the Board's ac-
tion. The Board's opinion with respect to opticians' responsibilities
in the fitting of contact lenses had no adverse affect at all on the
Florida Optometric Association. Thus, the Association's appeal
should have been denied for lack of standing.
380
The Department of Professional Regulation was not a party to
or an intervenor in the Board's declaratory statement proceedings.
Without party status, the Department failed to satisfy the first re-
quirement for seeking judicial review under section 120.68(1), and
its appeal should have been denied for lack of standing.18 1 Rather
than reversing the Board's merely advisory opinion, the court
should have refused to hear the appeal because neither party seek-
ing review was adversely affected by the Board's action.
This was the approach taken by the reviewing court in Sarasota
County v. Department of Administration.382 Sarasota County re-
quested a declaratory statement from the Department questioning
whether the construction of a crude oil splitter refining facility in
neighboring Manatee County was a development of regional im-
pact (DRI) subject to the DRI process incorporated in chapter 380,
the Environmental Land and Water Management Act. The De-
partment responded that in its view the project was not a DRI.
Sarasota County then sought judicial review of the declaratory
statement claiming that the negative response to the question it
posed was " 'adverse effect' sufficient to clothe [the] court with ju-
380. As an unincorporated association itself, the Florida Optometric Association was vul-
nerable to the same challenge it advanced against the Society of Ophthalmic Dispensers and
the Optical Dispensers of North Florida. It did not establish that the Board's declaratory
statement had any adverse impact on the association's own interests as an association. But
none of the briefs filed in the case challenged Florida Optometric Association's standing to
seek judicial review of the Board's declaratory statement.
381. In its brief, the Department asserted its right to seek judicial review of the Board's
action based on FLA. STAT. § 455.211 (1979). Appellant's Main Brief at 18, Florida Optomet-
ric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Reg., 399 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). This claim
went unchallenged but it appears to be unsupported. The statutory provision declares that
"[t]he secretary of the department shall have standing to challenge any rule or proposed
rule of a board pursuant to ss. 120.54 and 120.56." FLA. STAT. § 455.211(1) (1979). Clearly
this language confers on the Department the right to initiate a validity challenge proceeding
under ss. 120.54(4) or 120.56; it does not confer standing to seek judicial review under s.
120.68(1). The only reference to standing for purposes of judicial review is in § 455.211(2)
(1979), which provides that "either the secretary or the board shall be a substantially inter-
ested party for purposes of § 120.54(5). The board may, as an adversely affected party,
initiate and maintain an action pursuant to § 120.68 challenging the final agency action."
Neither § 455.211(1) nor (2) confers standing on the Department to seek judicial review of a
board's declaratory statement.
382. 350 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied mem., 362 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1978).
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risdiction. ' 's83 The Department defended on the ground that the
county had no right to receive the declaratory statement the De-
partment had given it. The court rejected both contentions. On the
latter point, while the court seemed to agree with the Depart-
ment's position, it considered the question moot because the De-
partment had not made the determination when it had the power
to do So. 384 Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Department had
given an official opinion which the county probably was not enti-
tled to receive did not compel the court either to reverse the purely
advisory opinion or to review its merits. The court correctly ex-
amined the DRI process and determined that the legislative
scheme contemplated a limited cast of players-the developer, the
local governments with zoning authority over the project, the re-
gional planning agency, and the state planning agency. 38 5 Sarasota
County was none of these. As a stranger to the DRI process, Sara-
sota County had no statutory interests that could be adversely af-
fected by the Department's position on the project, and, therefore,
had no standing to involve the court in a purely hypothetical ques-
tion. The court properly declined to review the merits of the de-
claratory statement.
The declaratory statement proceeding is an executive process
that was designed to enable persons to secure binding agency ad-
vice about ambiguous provisions of agency enforced law. Agencies
are required to give declaratory statements to persons who meet
the minimum access standard required by the model rules, but
agencies may in their discretion issue declaratory statements to
persons who do not satisfy those access requirements. In either
383. Id. at 805.
384. Id. at 805 n.4.
385. See Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmental Land and Water Man-
agement Act of 1972, 1973 URBAN. L. ANN. 103. This case represents only one of several
attempts to use the various chapter 120 proceedings to broaden the opportunity for partici-
pation in the DRI process beyond those entities identified specifically in FLA. STAT. §
380.07(2). All of these efforts have failed. See infra notes 567-73 and accompanying text; see
also Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Monroe County, 456 So.
2d 904, 910-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), petition for review denied mem., 462 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.
1985); Windley Key, Ltd. v. Department of Community Affairs, 456 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1984); Londono v. City of Alachua, 438 So. 2d 91, 92-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Caloosa
Property Owners Ass'n v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 429 So. 2d 1260 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983), petition review denied mem., 438 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1983); Suwanee River
Area Council Boy Scouts of Am. v. Department of Community Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1373
(Fla. 1st DCA 1980); South Fla. Regional Planning Council v. Land and Water Adjudicatory
Comm'n, 372 So. 2d 159, 165-67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Sarasota County v. General Dev. Corp.,
325 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Sarasota County v. Beker Phosphate Corp., 322 So. 2d
655, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
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event, it is not proper for a reviewing court to reverse an agency's
statement on nonsubstantive, technical grounds. The technical
niceties that constrain courts do not apply to executive agencies.
The model rules and the rules of the agencies need to be revised to
articulate the specific circumstances under which agencies may de-
cline to rule on a particular question. The statutory language and
the purposes of this process require the agencies to provide by rule
for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory
statements. Their failure to act will only heighten the temptation
to further judicialize this process. In the end, the reformists' goals
will have been sabotaged through the combined forces of a passive
executive branch and an active judiciary.
C. Decisions Determining Substantial Interests
Chapter 120 provides for both a formal and an informal adjudi-
catory process. The procedures governing the formal adjudicatory
proceeding apply when there are disputed issues of material fact. 8
The procedures governing the informal adjudicatory proceeding
apply in all other cases. 8 In either event, section 120.57 proce-
dures-formal or informal-"apply in all proceedings in which the
substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency. '388
Determining the appropriate access standard for these administra-
tive proceedings requires a separate examination of the provision's
three essential elements: "substantial interests," "party," and "are
determined by an agency."
The phrase "substantial interests" appears as part of the statu-
tory access standard in two provisions: the section 120.54(17)
drawout and here in the section 120.57 adjudicatory proceedings.
Because the phrase is only one element of the access standard in
each of these provisions, however, the same standard does not re-
sult for both proceedings. As in the drawout provision, the adjec-
tive "substantial" suggests important or significant and the noun
"interests" signifies something less than legally recognized and
protected rights, privileges, or immunities. But unlike in the
drawout provision, the phrase "substantial interests" in the adjudi-
catory provision is not limited by a personal pronoun. So while ac-
cess to the drawout proceeding is accorded when one demonstrates
that the procedural protections available in the information gath-
386. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1985).
387. Id. § 120.57(2).
388. Id. § 120.57 (emphasis added).
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ering proceeding are not adequate to protect his important or sig-
nificant personal concerns, access to an adjudicatory proceeding
does not necessarily require demonstration of impact on one's per-
sonal interests. A person may trigger the adjudicatory process
whether or not his own personal interests are at stake. It is the
determination of the "substantial interests of a party," not the de-
termination of the petitioner's own substantial interests, that
makes the process available.38 9 In most instances, the important or
significant concerns determined by an agency will be those of the
person who requests the adjudicatory proceeding. However, in
some licensing and permitting situations, particularly when the
agency intends to grant the requested license or permit, a third
person may be sufficiently interested to request an adjudicatory
proceeding.
The ability of a third person to initiate an adjudicatory proceed-
ing depends on the definition of "party." As defined in section
120.52(11), the word "party" includes four different general catego-
ries of persons. Specific provision is also made for county consumer
interest agencies and for prisoners and parolees.3 e0 Only the four
389. Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 343, 346-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (emphasis
in original).
390. FLA STAT. § 120.52(11) (1985) defines "party" to mean:
(a) Specifically named persons whose substantial interests are being determined
in the proceeding.
(b) Any other person who, as a matter of constitutional right, provision of stat-
ute, or provision of agency regulation, is entitled to participate in whole or in part
in the proceeding, or whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed
agency action, and who makes an appearance as a party.
(c) Any other person, including an agency staff member, allowed by the agency
to intervene or participate in the proceeding as a party. An agency may by rule
authorize limited forms of participation in agency proceedings for persons who are
not eligible to become parties.
(d) Any county representative, agency, department, or unit funded and author-
ized by state statute or county ordinance to represent the interests of the consum-
ers of a county, when the proceeding involves the substantial interests of a signifi-
cant number of residents of the county and the board of county commissioners
has, by resolution, authorized the representative, agency, department or unit to
represent the class of interested persons. The authorizing resolution shall apply to
a specific proceeding and to appeals and ancillary proceedings thereto, and it shall
not be required to state the names of the persons whose interests are to be
represented.
According to a 1983 amendment to this definition, prisoners
may obtain or participate in proceedings under s. 120.54(3), (4), (5) or (9), or a.
120.56 and may be parties under s. 120.68 to seek judicial review of those proceed-
ings. Prisoners shall not be considered parties in any other proceedings and may
not seek judicial review under s. 120.68 of any other agency action. Parolees shall
not be considered parties for purposes of agency action or judicial review when the
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general categories require examination.
The first category includes those specifically named persons
whose substantial interests are being determined in the proceed-
ing. Included in this group are specifically identified persons whose
own significant or important personal concerns will be determined
by the agency action. For example, any person who applies for any
type of license, any person subject to discipline by any regulatory
agency, or any person on whom an agency seeks to impose some
burden or restraint, would be a party within the meaning of this
first provision.
In the second category are those who by right derived from the
constitution, a statute, or an agency rule are entitled to participate
as parties. Any person with a legally recognized and protected
right, privilege, or immunity is entitled to party status under this
provision.
The third category includes those persons whose substantial in-
terests will be affected by the agency action and who make an ap-
pearance as a party. This category overlaps and includes the first
two but goes beyond them. Any person whose important or signifi-
cant personal concerns will be affected, but not necessarily deter-
mined, by the agency action in question is entitled to party status
under this provision, if he makes an appearance as a party.
Finally, in the fourth category are those persons allowed by the
agency to intervene or to participate in the proceeding as parties.
This category is the broadest of all. No specific interest is statuto-
rily mandated. An agency may, in its discretion, permit interven-
tion or participation as a party by anyone.
The phrase "are determined by an agency" suggests that the im-
portant or significant concerns of a party must be decided, settled,
or resolved conclusively or finally by the agency. The substantial
interests of a party will not be determined by an agency, therefore,
unless the agency action will finally decide, settle, or resolve those
interests. Preliminary agency action or agency action that results
in a recommendation rather than in a decision will not cause the
substantial interests of a party to be determined by an agency.
proceedings relate to the rescission or revocation of parole.
Ch. 83-78, § 1, 1983 Fla. Laws 257, 258 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11) (1985)).
The effect of the 1983 amendment was to overrule a judicial decision that prisoners were
parties for purposes of seeking judicial review of their presumptive parole release dates as
set by the Parole and Probation Commission. See Daniels v. Florida Parole & Probation
Comm'n, 401 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), approved in Roberson v. Florida Parole
& Probation Comm'n, 444 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1984).
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This examination of the essential elements of the statutory lan-
guage yields several different standards governing access to the ad-
judicatory proceedings, largely because of the flexibility in the defi-
nition of "party." Each of the following persons, therefore, should
be able to compel the commencement of the adjudicatory process:
(1) any specifically named person whose important or significant
concerns will be decided, settled, or resolved finally by an agency;
(2) any person with a legally recognized or protected right, derived
from the constitution, a statute, or an agency rule, to participate in
a proceeding in which the substantial interests of a party are de-
cided, settled, or resolved finally by an agency; (3) any person
whose important or significant personal concerns will be acted on
or changed in some way in a proceeding in which he makes an ap-
pearance and in which the substantial interests of a party are de-
cided, settled, or resolved finally by an agency; and (4) any person
allowed by an agency, in its discretion, to intervene or to partici-
pate in a proceeding in which the substantial interests of a party
are determined by an agency. Because the meaning of the word
"party" is such an important part of the statutory access language
in the adjudicatory proceedings provision, the history of the defini-
tion of "party" as well as the history of the adjudicatory proceed-
ings provision itself must be consulted for evidence of legislative
intent about the appropriate access standards that should be used
in this context.
1. History of the Definition of "Party"
The Law Revision Council began with the definition of "party"
contained in the Massachusetts administrative procedure statute,
but immediately expanded it. The first part of the Massachusetts
definition includes "specifically named persons whose legal rights,
duties or privileges are being determined in the proceeding."3 91
The "legal rights, duties or privileges" phrase was replaced in Flor-
ida with the phrase "substantial interests. s3 2 This formulation of
391. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(3)(a) (West 1979) (emphasis added).
392. Reporter's Draft no. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.2(6), at 4. The decision to replace the
phrase "legal rights, duties or privileges" with the phrase "substantial interests" appears to
have been made as early as the September 28-30, 1973 meeting in Washington, D.C. of an
ad hoc task force of prominent administrative law scholars and practicioners assembled by
the American Bar Association's Center for Administrative Justice. 2 PRELIMINARY MATERI-
ALs DEALING WITH THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 39 (1973) (initial commen-
tary). The working papers from this meeting show the striking of the typed phrase "legal
rights, duties or privileges" and the handwritten insertion of the phrase "substantial inter-
ests" in its place. Id. at 91.
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the first category of persons who are parties-"specifically named
persons whose substantial interests are being determined in the
proceeding"-remained constant through all five Law Revision
Council drafts.39 3
The second part of the Massachusetts definition includes "any
other person who as a matter of constitutional right or by any pro-
vision of the General Laws is entitled to participate fully in the
proceeding, and who upon notice . . . makes an appearance
. . ,.3' This provision also was expanded by the Law Revision
Council to encompass "any other person who as a matter of consti-
tutional right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regula-
tion is entitled to participate in whole or part in the proceedings
and who upon notice makes an appearance." 39 5 That formulation
remained essentially unchanged through the five Council drafts. 396
The third category of persons who are parties-those whose sub-
stantial interests will be affected-was not drawn from the Massa-
chusetts provision. It first appeared in the Council's second draft
in this form: "any other person who as a matter of constitutional
right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation is enti-
tled to participate in whole or in part in the proceeding or whose
substantial rights will be affected by proposed agency action, and
who makes an appearance . . . . 397 "Substantial rights" was
changed to "substantial interests" in the third draft.398 As thus
modified, the provision remained unchanged through the remain-
ing drafts. 399
The fourth category of persons who are parties-those allowed
by the agency to intervene or participate-was taken from the
Massachusetts statute, which permits intervention only by "any
other person allowed by the agency to intervene as a party. Agen-
cies may by regulation not inconsistent with this section further
393. Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.2(6)(a), at 4.; Reporter's Draft No. 2,
supra note 107 § 0120.2(9)(a), at 6; Reporter's Draft No. 3, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(a), at
6; Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 0120.2(9)(a), at 6; Reporter's Final Draft, supra
note 107, § 0120.2(9)(a), at 6.
394. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(3)(b) (West 1979).
395. Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.2(6)(b), at 4 (emphasis added).
396. Id.; Reporter's Draft No. 2, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 6; Reporter's Draft
No. 3, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 6; Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, §
0120.2(9)(b), at 6; Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 3.
397. Reporter's Draft No. 2, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 6 (emphasis added).
398. Reporter's Draft No. 3, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 6 (emphasis added).
399. Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 6; Reporter's Final Draft,
supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(b), at 3.
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define the classes of persons who may become parties." 00 In the
first three Council drafts, the provision read the same as the first
sentence in the Massachusetts statute. An agency was allowed to
permit anyone to intervene. 0 1 In the fourth draft, the provision
was expanded expressly to permit inclusion of agency staff and to
allow an agency to permit anyone to participate as well as to inter-
vene in the proceeding as a party.40 2 That formulation remained
essentially unchanged in the final draft. 0 3
The House bill as introduced contained the RMA definition of
party: "each person or agency named or admitted as a party, or
properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a
party."'40 4 During the House Administrative Procedure Subcommit-
tee's review of this definition and the more encompassing defini-
tion in the Law Revision Council's third draft, the policy question
of broad or narrow access was faced squarely and resolved in favor
of the more limited access contemplated by the RMA definition."0 5
400. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(3)(c) (West 1977).
401. Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.2(6)(c), at 4; Reporter's Draft No. 2,
supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(c), at 6; Reporter's Draft No. 3, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(c),
at 6.
402. Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 0120.2(9)(c), at 6. A second sentence was
added to this provision permitting agencies to authorize by rule limited forms of participa-
tion for persons not eligible to become parties under the terms of the act.
403. Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 107, § 0120.2(9)(c), at 3.
404. Compare Fla. HB 2672, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.2(8)) with 1961
MODEL ACT, supra note 93, § 1(5), at 372.
405. The tape recording of the subcommittee meeting is flawed in two respects: There
are several inaudible passages and a large gap in the middle of the staff explanation. Never-
theless, as much of the discussion as can be understood is set forth here in full because this
is one of the few available records of any legislative debate on the access question.
CHAIRMAN HECTOR Eight is "party." This differs some from Council's draft num-
ber three. This language actually narrows [inaudible].
REP. KISER: It expands the present definition in the law, doesn't it?
CHAIRMAN HECTOR: If you look at "party" in the yellow [HB 2672] and you look at
it there [Law Revision Council's third draft], you see different language.
STAFF: 2672 is more restrictive. That's broader.
CHAIRMAN HECTOR: That's much broader. They let. . . people, anybody. And this
limits it to those persons or agencies admitted as a party or properly seeking and
entitled as of right to being admitted as a party.
REP. KISER: This is draft number three, and this represents only draft number
two?
CHAIRMAN HECTOR. That's correct. [inaudible] What we attempted to do was to
eliminate the frivilous challenges. I think it's better language. I think we do want
to limit it to those people [inaudible].
REP. KISER: Well, the only thing I was thinking of, you know as a policy decision
you may want to do that, but, of course, it would knock out anyone who really was
not an affected party but who wanted to be heard on [inaudible].
CHAIRMAN HECTOR: I think the language of the bill does include the [inaudible].
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This decision was reconsidered and reversed by the Subcommittee
at some point before the House committee substitute bill was re-
ported to the floor. The House committee substitute contained the
same definition of party as was recommended by the Law Revision
Council's final draft.40 6 There is, however, no available record of
the legislative discussion which led to this change in approach.0 7
The definition of party, as developed by the Law Revision Council,
was approved by the House.
The Senate bill as introduced contained the same definition of
party as was in the committee substitute bill approved by the
House.4 08 The Senate committee substitute as approved by the
Senate did not contain a definition of party.409 The conference
committee report approved by both chambers contained the House
definition of party.410
REP. KISER: You're talking about which one now, here or here?
CHAIRMAN HECTOR: I'm suggesting that we use the language here [HB 2672] rather
than-
REP. KISER: Okay, all I was saying is that the policy decision has to be made how
broad you want to make it because, as it's written here [HB 2672], no question
about it, it's much more limited than here [Law Revision Council's third draft]. In
this draft, virtually anyone could become a party, whereas in the yellow draft
there would be instances of people who might want to be heard on something and
couldn't be like a public group. For example, some of these environmental groups
that have come in on [inaudible].
STAFF: They could be heard. See, what we've done is, the agency has discretion
here, they can [lengthy gap in the recording] or admitted as a party the hearing
examiner could admit somebody as a party if they wanted to. The agency could
admit somebody as a party if they want to give standing to an environmental
group if they wanted to, or, if you're entitled to it as a matter of
right-constitutional, statute, or rule, you're admitted as a party. But still, any-
body can get in, but not everybody has a right to get in. You're entitled to get in if
• . . we're not leaving anybody out, you know, there's nobody that can't get in.
CHAIRMAN HECTOR: Okay, then we'll go with the language in 2672.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Admin. Procedure, tape recording of pro-
ceedings (Jan. 17, 1974) (available at Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Legis. Li-
brary Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.).
406. Compare Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 107, § 120.2(9), at 3 with Fla. CS for
HB 2672, 2434 and 2583, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)).
407. Subcommittee meetings were scheduled for January 29, 1974, February 26, 1974,
and April 4, 1974. Tape recordings are not available for the January and February meetings.
The definition of party was not discussed at the April meeting. The committee substitute
was heard by the House Committee on Governmental Operations on April 11, 1974. The
staff summary of the definition of party clearly indicates that the language being explained
was the Law Revision Council's recommended language. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Govtl. Ops.
tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 11, 1974) (available at Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt.
Comm., Div. of Legis. Library Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.).
408. Fla. SB 892, see. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.52(13)).
409. Fla. CS for SB 892 (1974).
410. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1327 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. §
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2. History of the Adjudicatory Proceedings Provision
The adjudicatory proceedings provision in the first four Law Re-
vision Council drafts did not contain any access requirement lan-
guage. The second and third drafts called for adjudicatory proce-
dures to apply "[wihenever proposed agency action involves a
disputed issue of material fact, of policy, or of the interpretation of
a provision having the effect of law, or whenever a statute other
than this act requires a hearing."41 In the fourth draft, adjudica-
tory procedures were to apply "in all contested cases" which in-
volved disputed material facts, policy, or interpretation of provi-
sions having the effect of law.412 Beginning with the second draft, a
definition of "contested case" was added. It was in that definition
that an access standard appeared. "Contested case" was defined to
mean "a proceeding, including ratemaking and licensing, in which
the substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency
after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing. ' 41 3 A definition of
"contested case" was not included in the Council's final draft, but
the access language in the definition was salvaged and was added
to the adjudicatory proceeding provision. The final draft provided
that "[t]he provisions of this section shall apply in all proceedings
including ratemaking and licensing, in which the substantial inter-
ests of a party are determined by an agency. '41 4
The House bill as introduced contained a definition of "con-
tested case" that was the same as that in the preliminary Law Re-
vision Council drafts. 415 Like those drafts, this bill did not include
any access language in the adjudicatory proceedings provision.4 16
The House committee substitute bill followed the approach taken
by the Council's final draft; no definition for "contested case" was
included and the access language developed by the Council was
added to the adjudicatory proceedings provision.1 7
The Senate bill as introduced contained the same language as
the bill that passed the House.418 The Senate approved committee
120.52(9)); FLA. S. JouR. 907 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same).
411. Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra note 107, § 0120.6, at 14; Reporter's Draft No. 3,
supra note 107, § 0120.6, at 16.
412. Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 0120.6, at 16.
413. Reporter's Draft No. 2, supra note 107, § 0120.2(3), at 3; Reporter's Draft No. 3,
supra note 107, § 0120.2(3), at 3; Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 0120.2(3), at 3.
414. Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 107, § 120.6, at 9-12.
415. Fla. HB 2672, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 0120.2(3)).
416. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 0120.8).
417. Fla. CS for HB 2672, 2434 and 2583, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57).
418. Fla. SB 892, sec. 1 (1974) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57). The provision was
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substitute bill did not address adjudicatory proceedings at all. The
conference committee report removed the language specifically in-
cluding ratemaking and licensing but otherwise retained the access
language developed by the Law Revision Council. 19
Several conclusions can be drawn from this history. First, the
term "contested case" was abandoned because it tended to rein-
force the view that agency action was either adjudicatory or
rulemaking and consequently that the procedural protections to
which a person was entitled depended on the form the agency ac-
tion took rather than the effect the action had on a person.420 One
of the major accomplishments of the 1974 Act was to focus "atten-
tion on the rights affected rather than the labels given a particular
process.'421 This end was to be achieved in part by rejecting the
inflexible view of agency action inherent in the term "contested
case."
422
Second, use of the phrase "substantial interests" in both the def-
inition of "party" and in the adjudicatory proceedings provision
was a deliberate and considered decision intended to broaden the
availability of adjudicatory proceedings.423 All the sources used by
the Law Revision Council as starting points for these provi-
sions-the RMA definitions of "party" and "contested case," the
Massachusetts definition of "party," and the 1961 Act's definition
of "party"-limited party status and hence the availability of adju-
dicatory proceedings to persons whose legal rights, duties, or privi-
leges were at stake. Dissatisfaction with such a restrictive view of
the availability of adjudicatory proceedings was reflected in the
comments to the preliminary Law Revision Council drafts424 and in
amended on the House floor to exclude "state university student conduct and disciplinary
hearings wherein students vote upon or have a vote in the final decision, but such decision
does not constitute final agency action." FLA. H.R. JOUR. 915 (Reg. Sess. 1974). This lan-
guage was subsequently deleted by the conference committee. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1330 (Reg.
Sess. 1974); FLA. S. JOUR. 909 (Reg. Sess. 1974).
419. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1330 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (referring to proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57);
FLA. S. JOUR. 909 (Reg. Sess. 1974) (same).
420. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 17-18.
421. Id. at 6.
422. Levinson, supra note 97, at 627-28.
423. Id.; Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 12.
424. The comment to the definition of "contested case in the second, third, and fourth
drafts cited this statement by Professor Fred Davis, who was a member of the ABA ad hoc
task force that consulted on the 1974 revision: "'[s]ubstantial' is hardly a precise term, but
its imprecision more accurately and honestly focuses attention on the true policy issue in-
volved than do the artificial RMA terms." Reporter's Draft No. 2, supra note 107, §
120.2(3), at 3 (Reporter's comment); Reporter's Draft No. 3, supra note 107, § 120.2(3), at 3;
Reporter's Draft No. 4, supra note 131, § 120.2(3), at 3.
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the Council's decision to specifically target for reform judicial deci-
sions limiting the availability of adjudicatory proceedings under
the 1961 Act.425 By developing the new phrase "substantial inter-
ests" to replace the old "legal rights, duties, or privileges," the
drafters intended a more expansive availability of adjudicatory
proceedings to result under the 1974 Act than had been the case
under the 1961 Act and the other laws used as models for the new
Florida Act.4" 6
Third, while use of the phrase "substantial interests" in substi-
tution for the phrase "legal rights, duties, or privileges" in the defi-
nition of "party" was itself a major break with prior law, the full
significance of the intended new direction becomes evident only
from the contexts in which the phrase "substantial interests" is
but a part. In the first provision, the drafters merely expanded the
Massachusetts formulation by extending party status to "specifi-
cally named persons whose substantial interests are being deter-
mined in the proceeding." The result was to accord party status to
a person whose important or significant interests, whether or not
those interests were technically recognized as legal rights, were be-
ing finally settled by an agency. In the second provision, however,
the drafters expanded the concept further by extending party sta-
tus to any person "whose substantial interests will be affected by
the proposed action." They recognized that the determination of a
party's substantial interests may have a ripple effect. Therefore, to
protect those interests that will be affected, although not deter-
mined by an agency, party status was extended to those persons
whose substantial interests will be affected by the action the
agency proposes to take in determining the substantial interests of
another.
Fourth, even though it is clear that "substantial interests" need
not be legally protected rights, it seems equally clear that legally
425.
[T]he discretionary determinations of many governmental agencies and officers
which have been characterized as "quasi-judicial," "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-
executive," or have otherwise been exempted from the operation of administrative
procedure laws, are now brought under the minimum fairness provisions of the
proposed act. To this extent the act is intended to overrule cases making the dis-
tinction, such as Bay National Bank [& Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302
(Fla. 1st DCA 1969)] and Dickinson v. Judges of the District Court of Appeal, 282
So. 2d 168 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973).
Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 18.
426. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 5, 17-18; Levinson, supra note 92, at 628,
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protected rights are subsumed under the phrase "substantial inter-
ests." Nevertheless, the definition of "party" specifically includes
those persons "who as a matter of constitutional right, provision of
statute, or provision of agency regulation" are entitled to partici-
pate in the proceedings. It is significant that with respect to this
aspect of the definition, the Massachusetts model once again was
expanded. The Massachusetts provision includes persons who have
a constitutional or statutory right to participate and permits agen-
cies by rule not inconsistent with the statutory definition of
"party" to "further define the classes of persons who may become
parties." The Florida provision, on the other hand, does not re-
strict agency discretion to confer party status on persons by rule.
Thus, by specifically authorizing agencies to adopt rules conferring
the right to participate in adjudicatory proceedings, without limi-
tation, the Florida provision expands the opportunity of persons to
establish a right of participation.
Fifth, in addition to providing for party status by rule, the provi-
sion also authorizes agencies to permit persons to intervene and to
participate in a proceeding as parties. The Massachusetts model
was expanded in this regard as well. The Massachusetts provision
allows agencies to permit intervention as a party; the Florida pro-
vision goes further by authorizing agencies to permit both inter-
vention and participation in a proceeding as parties.
Finally, the available record of the House subcommittee debate
on the definition of "party" establishes that there was division be-
tween two committee members over whether, as a matter of policy,
broad or limited access to adjudicatory proceedings ought to be al-
lowed. Concerns about the restrictiveness of the RMA definition
apparently were assuaged by the staff explanation that stressed the
discretion they perceived would be placed in agencies and DOAH
hearing officers to admit persons as parties under the RMA lan-
guage. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee reversed its position ap-
proving the RMA definition of "party" and ultimately accepted
the facially more inclusive Law Revision Council definition. It is
unfortunate that there is no available record of the discussion lead-
ing up to that decision. However, in light of the record that is
available, it is reasonable to infer that the legislative committee
preferred to complement broad agency discretion to admit persons
as parties with broadly stated statutory rights to participate in ad-
judicatory proceedings as parties.
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3. Definition of "Party" in Other States
The MSAPA separately defines "party" for purposes of agency
proceedings and for purposes of judicial review and civil enforce-
ment proceedings. The MSAPA defines a "[p]arty to agency pro-
ceedings" to mean: "(i) a person to whom the agency action is spe-
cifically directed; or (ii) a person named as a party to an agency
proceeding or allowed to intervene or participate as a party in the
proceeding.'12 7 A majority of states and the District of Columbia
follow the RMA approach of defining "party" for all purposes to
mean "each person or agency named or admitted as a party, or
properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a
party. ' 42'8 The Alabama and Wisconsin administrative procedure
statutes use the RMA language but expand it to make additional
provision for party participation. " 9 The Alaska and California
427. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 112, § 1-102(6), at 79. For purposes of judicial review
or civil enforcement proceedings, MSAPA defines party as "(i) a person who files a petition
for judicial review or civil enforcement or (ii) a person named as a party in a proceeding for
judicial review or civil enforcement or allowed to participate as a party in the proceeding."
Id. § 1-102(7), at 79. Standing to seek judicial review is addressed separately. Id. § 5-106, at
156.
428. 1961 MODEL AT, supra note 93, § 1(5), at 372; Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(5)
(1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-701(b) (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-102(11) (Supp. 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166(5) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10102(6)
(Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(10) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(4) (Supp. 1985);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-1(3) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(5) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127, § 1003.06 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IowA CODE ANN. § 17A.2(5) (West 1978); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 49:951(4) (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.205(4) (Supp. 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(7) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-A:1(X) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-2(E) (1978); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW §
102(7) (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(5) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(4)
(Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 301(8) (West Supp. 1984); RI. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-
1(e) (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(4) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 1-26-1(5) (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(8) (Supp. 1984); TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 3(5) (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-3(2) (1978); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 801(b)(5) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-101(b)(vi) (1982).
429. ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(6) (1982) defines "party" to mean:
Each person or agency named or admitted as a party or properly seeking and
entitled as a matter of right (whether established by constitution, statute or
agency regulation or otherwise) to be admitted as a party.. . . An agency may by
rule authorize limited forms of participation in agency proceedings for persons
who are not eligible to become parties.
The official commentary on this provision states that the parenthetical language was taken
from FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b) (1977) and that the final sentence is a verbatim adoption of
the second sentence of id. § 120.52(10)(c). The official commentary concludes that this defi-
nition "is intended to permit persons or agencies able to demonstrate a substantial interest
in the outcome access to agency proceedings, either as parties or as limited participants."
ALA. CODE § 91-22-3, commentary (1982).
WIs. STAT ANN. § 227.01(6) (West 1982) defines "party" to include "each person or agency
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statutes define "party" to include the agency, the respondent, and
a person, other than an officer or an employee of the agency in his
official capacity, who has been allowed to appear in the proceed-
ing.430 The Ohio statute defines "party" to mean "the person
whose interests are the subject of an adjudication by an agency;" 431
the Pennsylvania statute defines "party" as "[a]ny person who ap-
pears in a proceeding before an agency who has a direct interest in
the subject matter of such proceeding."43  The Maine,4 33 Massa-
chusetts,434 and Oregon3 5 statutes define "party" in greater detail
than those of other states, but none approaches the breadth of the
Florida definition.
4. Adjudicatory Proceedings in Other States
A majority of the states, the District of Columbia, the RMA, and
the MSAPA make adjudicatory proceedings available only when an
agency determines legal rights, duties or privileges. 436 Arkansas,
named or admitted as a party. Any person whose substantial interests may be adversely
affected by any proposed agency action in a contested case shall be admitted as a party."
430. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.640(b)(4) (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11500(b) (West 1980).
431. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01(G) (Page Supp. 1984).
432. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
433. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8002(7) (1979) defines "party" to mean:
A. The specific person whose legal rights, duties or privileges are being deter-
mined in the proceeding;
B. Any person participating in the adjudicatory proceeding pursuant to section
9054, subsection 1 or 2; and
C. Any agency bringing a complaint to Administrative Court under section
10051.
Id. tit. 5, § 9054(1) (1979) permits the agency conducting the proceeding to allow "any per-
son showing that he is [or] may be, or is a member of a class which is or may be, substa-n-
tially and directly affected by the proceeding, . . . to intervene as a party to the proceed-
ing." Pursuant to id. tit. 5, § 9054(2) (1979), an "agency may, by order, allow any other
interested person to intervene and participate as a full or limited party to the proceeding."
434. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(3) (West 1979). See supra text accompanying
notes 391, 394, 400.
435. OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310(6) (1983) defines "party" to mean:
(a) Each person or agency entitled as of right to a hearing before the agency;
(b) Each person or agency named by the agency to be a party; or
(c) Any person requesting to participate before the agency as a party or in a lim-
ited party status which the agency determines either has an interest in the out-
come of the agency's proceeding or represents a public interest in such result.
436. ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(2) (1985); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166(2) (West Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(8) (1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-13-2(2) (Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-1(5) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(2)
(Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 1003.02 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-1-
3 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.2(2) (West 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §
8002(1) (1979); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-201(c) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
30A, § 1(1) (West 1979); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 24.203(3) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
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Louisiana, and Virginia provide for adjudication when an agency is
required by law to decide any matter after notice and hearing.
4 3 7
The Colorado provision is similar but with an additional directive
that "[a] person who may be affected or aggrieved by agency action
shall be admitted as a party. '438 The California statute defines ad-
judicatory hearing to mean one which "involves the personal or
property rights of an individual, the granting or revocation of an
individual's license, or the resolution of an issue pertaining to an
individual." 4 9 The New Mexico statute defines an adjudicatory
proceeding as one in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a
party are determined by an agency, but it also includes "the impo-
sition or withholding of any sanction and the granting or withhold-
ing of any relief."'440 The words "sanction" and "relief" are defined
broadly by the statute, suggesting a wide availability of adjudica-
tory proceedings.4 1
Wisconsin's treatment of adjudicatory proceedings is perhaps
the closest analogue to Florida's and, therefore, requires more care-
ful scrutiny. There are two provisions to consider. One is the Wis-
consin definition of "contested case"; the other is a provision for a
hearing if specified access requirements are met.
§ 14.02(3) (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-43-3(b) (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
536.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(4) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
901(3) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.032 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:l(III) (Supp.
1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-2(b) (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. A.P.A. § 102(3) (McKinney
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(3) (Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01(D) (Page Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310(2)(a) (1981); 2 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-1(b) (1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-23-310(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-1(2) (Supp.
1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(3) (Supp. 1984); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13(a),
§ 3(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-11 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
801(b)(2) (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.010(3) (Supp. 1985); W. VA CODE §
29A-1-2(b) (Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) (1982); 1961 MODEL AcT, supra note
93, § 1(2), at 371; 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 112, §§ 4-102, 1-102(5) at 1220-23, 79.
437. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-701(d) (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(3) (West Supp.
1985); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:12(A) (1978).
438. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-105(2) (1982).
439. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11500(f) (West 1980).
440. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-2(B) (1978).
441. Id. § 12-8-2(J)(1), for example, defines "sanction" as including the "whole or part of
any agency prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of
any person or his property. Id. § 12-8-2(K) defines "relief" to mean:
the whole or part of any agency: (1) grant of money, assistance, license, authority,
exemption, exception, privilege or remedy;
(2) recognition of any claim, right, interest, immunity, privilege, exemption or ex-
ception; or
(3) taking of any other action upon the application or petition of, and beneficial
to, any person.
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Although the Wisconsin statute uses the term "contested case,"
it does not limit its use to the determination of legal rights, duties
or privileges like the RMA and the majority of states do. Rather,
the Wisconsin definition of a "contested case" is:
a proceeding before an agency in which, after hearing required by
law, substantial interests of any party to such proceeding are de-
termined or adversely affected by a decision or order in such pro-
ceeding and in which the assertion by one party of any such sub-
stantial interest is denied or controverted by another party to
such proceeding.44 2
This definition contains the same three essential elements found in
section 120.57's access language: "substantial interests," "party,"
and "are determined." The importance of these striking similari-
ties between the Wisconsin and Florida provisions, however, is
overshadowed by one significant difference. The Wisconsin statute,
like the RMA and the administrative procedure statutes of almost
all other states, makes the right to an adjudicatory hearing depen-
dent on other law. That is, some law other than the administrative
procedure statute itself-the federal or state constitution, substan-
tive statutes, common law or agency rule-must require a hearing
to be held before anyone can claim entitlement to the procedural
protections offered by the administrative procedure statute.4 43 The
442. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(2 (West 1982) (emphasis added).
443. Most states that incorporate the required hearing by reference do so by using the
RMA phrase "by law." ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(3) (1982); ARIz. RED. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(2)
(1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-701(d) (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(2) (Supp. 1985); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 91-1(5) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(2) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §
1003.02 (Smith-Hurd 1981); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-201(c) (1984); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 24.203(3) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.02(3) (West Supp. 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 25-43-3(b) (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(4) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.032 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-A:1 (III) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-2(B) (1978); N.Y. A.P.A. § 102(3)
(McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(3) (Supp.
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-1(b) (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-1(2) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-11
(1978); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:12(A) (1978) ("the basic laws provide expressly for decisions upon
or after hearing"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(2) (West 1982); Wvo. STAT. § 16-3-101(b)(ii)
(1982). Some states use "by law or constitutional right." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(3) (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.010(3) (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 29A-1-2(b) (Supp. 1985);
see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(8) (1981). Two states use "by statute." CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 4-166(2) (West Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-1-3 (Burns Supp. 1984). Several
states use "by constitution or statute." COLO. RE. STAT. § 24-4-105(2) (1982) ("hearing is
required under the state constitution or by this or any other statute"); IOWA CODE ANN. §
17A.2(2) (West 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(3) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 8002(1) (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(1) (West 1979); N.J. STAT.
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Florida statute does not require reference to other law. A person is
entitled to an adjudicatory proceeding, either formal or informal,
"in all proceedings in which the substantial interests of a party are
determined by an agency.'444 Under the Wisconsin scheme,
whether one is entitled to a hearing because substantial interests
of a party are determined by an agency is, in the first instance, a
legislative decision. Under the Florida approach, the legislature
may require a hearing under section 120.57 to be conducted before
an agency action is taken. The legislature may also exclude a class
of interests from the section 120.57 hearing requirements.4 " In
general, however, whether an adjudicatory proceeding is necessary
is first an executive decision and second a judicial decision. Conse-
quently, because Florida, unlike Wisconsin and unlike the majority
of states, does not require other law to require a hearing before the
protections of section 120.57 can be sought, there is little to be
gained from the actual experiences of these other states in dealing
with requests for adjudicatory hearings.4 4 6
The second provision in the Wisconsin statute relating to adjudi-
catory proceedings grants a right to a hearing, which is to be
treated as a contested case, to any person filing a written request
if:
(a) A substantial interest of the person is injured in fact or
threatened with injury by agency action or inaction;
(b) There is no evidence of legislative intent that the interest is
not to be protected;
(c) The injury to the person requesting a hearing is different in
kind or degree from injury to the general public caused by the
agency action or inaction; and
ANN. § 52:14B-2(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985) ("by constitutional right or by statute"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 183.310(2)(a) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(3) (Supp. 1984); see also Bon-
field, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 63 IOWA L. REV. 285, 302-08 (1977) for an examination of the justifications for
reference to law external to the APA for hearing requirements.
444. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1985).
445. See id. § 120.57(5) (making § 120.57 inapplicable when the "substantial interests of
a student are determined by the State University System" and providing an alternative
procedure); id. § 120.52(11)(d) (excluding prisoners and parolees from § 120.57 proceedings).
446. The 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 112, § 4-101(a), (b), by its own terms and without
reference to external law requires adjudicatory proceedings. However, the MSAPA links the
requirement for adjudicatory proceedings to the definition of "order," which is an agency
determination of the "legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of
one or more specific persons." Id. § 1-102(5).
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(d) There is a dispute of material fact. 47
The effect of this provision is to modify the requirement that a
hearing be required by law external to the administrative proce-
dure act itself. As a result, even if there is no other law requiring a
hearing, one must be granted if the access criteria are satisfied. Be-
cause this provision in the Wisconsin administrative procedure act
confers a right to a hearing without reference to other law, it oper-
ates in the same fashion as section 120.57. On another level, how-
ever, the differences between the two states' approaches are palpa-
ble. First, Wisconsin requires that the substantial interest of the
person requesting the hearing be injured in fact or threatened with
injury; Florida requires only that the substantial interests of a
party be determined by agency action. Second, Wisconsin requires
that there be no evidence of legislative intent that the substantial
interest asserted not be protected; Florida has no similar require-
ment. Third, Wisconsin specifies that the person must be injured
in a way that is different in kind or degree from the injury to the
general public; Florida has no such requirement. Finally, Wiscon-
sin requires the presence of disputed issues of material fact; Flor-
ida requires disputed issues of material fact for a formal proceed-
ing but not for an informal proceeding. The most significant
similarity between the Wisconsin provision and Florida's section
120.57 is that neither requires determination of legal rights, duties
or privileges. But the importance of that single similarity is out-
weighed by the comparatively more detailed access language in the
Wisconsin provision. In the final analysis, neither Wisconsin provi-
sion is close enough to Florida's section 120.57 on the critical
points relating to access to those proceedings to warrant further
study. Access to adjudicatory proceedings in Florida, like access to
most of the administrative proceedings already considered, is not
comparable to access to adjudicatory proceedings in any other
jurisdiction.
5. Functional Analysis
The opportunity for an adjudicatory proceeding under section
120.57 is a recognition of the modern day understanding "that a
hearing independently serves the public interest by providing a fo-
rum to expose, inform and challenge agency policy and discre-
447. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.064(1) (West 1982).
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tion."44 8 The adjudicatory proceeding provision, like the provisions
for administratively challenging proposed and adopted rules, is an
intrabranch dispute resolution mechanism. Before an agency takes
action that will determine the substantial interests of a party, it
must provide an executive branch forum in which questions about
the factual bases and policy reasons for its actions can be exposed,
challenged and explained on the record. When there are no dis-
puted issues of material fact, the agency has broad discretion, sub-
ject only to minimal statutory fairness guidelines, to fashion the
executive branch proceeding that must be made available on re-
quest.449 When there are disputed issues of material fact, the con-
tours of the formal proceeding that must be made available are
carefully prescribed by the statute. 50
Although most agencies have the option of having the agency
head conduct the formal proceeding, in practice requests for these
proceedings are routinely forwarded to the DOAH for hearing.451
In reality then, most disputes with contested material facts are
tried before an independent hearing officer. The parties must sup-
port their factual positions with competent and substantial evi-
dence on the record made before the hearing officer. The hearing
officer's findings of fact may not be disturbed by the agency head
unless a review of the entire record discloses no competent and
substantial evidence to support those findings.452 The scheme em-
bodied in section 120.57(1) puts the agency and the private party
or parties on equal footing as adversaries before an independent
hearing officer. 453 Although the process resembles a judicial pro-
ceeding, it is not one; it is an adjudicatory proceeding conducted
according to legislative directive by the executive branch DOAH.
Indeed, any resemblance to a judicial proceeding breaks down
after the hearing is completed. In most instances, the hearing of-
ficer's order is not a final order; the hearing officer submits a rec-
ommended order to the agency. 45 The agency may accept the rec-
448. State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
449. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (1985).
450. Id. § 120.57(1)(b).
451. Id. § 120.57(1)(a), (1)(b)(13).
452. Id. § 120.57(1)(b)(9).
453. Id. § 120.57(1)(b)(3) provides in part that "[tihe referring agency shall take no fur-
ther action with respect to the formal proceeding, except as a party litigant, as long as the
division has jurisdiction over the formal proceedings."
454. Id. § 120.57(1)(b)(8). In some instances the legislature has provided by statutes ex-
ternal to chapter 120 that hearing officers' orders issued after a § 120.57 proceeding be final
orders. Id. § 163.3213(5)(a) (administrative review of land development regulations to deter-
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ommended order and enter it as the agency's final order, or the
agency may reject or modify the hearing officer's conclusions of law
or his interpretation of agency rules. A penalty recommended by a
hearing officer may be accepted, reduced or increased by an
agency. Only a hearing officer's findings of fact may not be rejected
or modified so long as there is competent substantial evidence in
the record to support those findings.455 This design reflects the in-
stitutional strengths of each executive branch agency involved. The
DOAH was created to "improve the fairness of administrative
practice before Florida agencies, by replacing agency employees
and representatives with independent hearing officers."4 56 Recog-
nizing that the facts will in most instances control the applicable
law, the legislature put an independent hearing officer in the piv-
otal position between the agency and the other parties to perform
the important function of finding facts in a fair and impartial man-
ner based exclusively on evidence of record.457
The DOAH was intended to operate as a central pool of inde-
pendent professional fact finders. Because of the importance the
legislature attributed to the fairness and impartiality of the fact
finding function, it insulated the hearing officers' findings of fact
from agency overreaching. On the other hand, the legislature cre-
ated the various agencies and delegated to them responsibility for
developing informed policy, consistent with legislative guidelines,
in specialized areas. It is presumed, for example, that the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation has more expertise and special-
ized knowledge about wetlands than does the Department of
Transportation or, for that matter, the DOAH. Having delegated
responsibility for policy development and enforcement to the vari-
ous agencies, the legislature insured their continuing accountability
by giving them authority to reject or modify recommended conclu-
sions of law or interpretations of agency rules. Thus, the accommo-
dation, which gives DOAH hearing officers control of the facts and
mine consistency with the local government plan); id. § 394.457(7)(b) (involuntary commit-
ment proceedings); id. § 230.23(4)(m)(4) (determining eligibility of exceptional students for
special instruction services); id. § 337.165(2)(d) (denial or revocation of state contract bid
certification of contractors); id. § 57.111(4)(d) (awarding attorneys fees and court costs to a
prevailing small business party).
455. Id. § 120.57(1)(b)(9). By virtue of a 1984 amendment to this subsection, an agency
may not reduce or increase a hearing officer's recommended penalty unless it reviews the
complete record and states with particularity the reasons for the change and justifies its
action by citation to the record. Ch. 84-173, § 2, 1984 Fla. Laws 519, 520.
456. Reporter's Comments, supra note 120, at 22.
457. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(7) (1985).
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the agencies control of the interpretation of their statutes and
rules, is uniquely suited to provide fairness and accountability in
the executive branch adjudicatory forum provided for in section
120.57(1).
The opportunity for an adjudicatory proceeding, either formal or
informal, before an agency determines the substantial interests of
a party was intended to be broadly available. Three legislative de-
cisions were critical to achieving the goal of broad availability.
First was the decision to make the right to adjudicatory proceed-
ings depend solely on the terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act itself. The legislature could have followed the example set by
the overwhelming majority of states and made the right to a hear-
ing less readily available by requiring some law external to chapter
120 to require a hearing to be held before one would be available
under section 120.57. It chose not to do so. Second was the decision
to make adjudicatory proceedings available when substantial inter-
ests were determined by an agency. Again the legislature could
have followed the majority of states and stayed with the choice it
made when it enacted the 1961 Act and made the opportunity for
hearing available only when an agency would determine the legal
rights, duties, privileges or immunities of a party. It chose not to
be so restrictive. Third was the decision to make adjudicatory pro-
ceedings available to a person whose substantial interests will be
affected though not determined by agency action which will deter-
mine the substantial interests of another party. The legislature
could have restricted the right to adjudicatory proceedings to those
persons whose substantial interests were being determined by
agency action. It chose instead to permit greater access. Taken to-
gether, these three decisions effectively make access to adjudica-
tory proceedings in Florida the most generous in the country.
In summary, the access criteria for invoking section 120.57 adju-
dicatory proceedings must be consistent with these legislative pol-
icy choices. No law external to chapter 120 need require a hearing.
Substantial interests, not necessarily legal rights, must be at stake
in the proceeding. A person whose substantial interests will be af-
fected in a proceeding which will determine the substantial inter-
ests of another is entitled to a hearing. The access criteria drawn
from the plain meaning of the statutory language satisfy these pol-
icy choices.
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6. Analysis of Cases Concerning Access to Adjudicatory
Proceedings
Generally, the cases concerning access to adjudicatory proceed-
ings have involved one of two questions. First, what is the meaning
of "substantial interests" as used in the definition of "party" and
in the access language of section 120.57? Second, what is the rela-
tionship between section 120.57's access language and other statu-
tory provisions that confer a right upon specifically identified per-
sons to initiate or to participate in proceedings? For purposes of
analysis, the cases involving the first question are divided into
three categories: (a) competitive economic injury; (b) other sub-
stantial interests; and (c) certificates of need and comparative
hearings. The cases involving the second question are considered
under two headings: (d) DRI and binding letter processes; (e) pub-
lic contract bid disputes.
(a) Competitive Economic Injury
Section 120.57 requires an adjudicatory proceeding when "the
substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency."
Thus, even if the party whose substantial interests are being deter-
mined does not request an adjudicatory proceeding, any other per-
son who is a party has a right to initiate a proceeding under sec-
tion 120.57. This situation is likely to occur when, after free form
proceedings have concluded, an agency informs an applicant that it
intends to grant a requested license. 458 The license applicant is a
party whose substantial interests are determined by the agency's
decision to grant the license. As the applicant succeeded in getting
what he wanted from the agency through free form proceedings, he
will not request a hearing. But third persons may have interests
that will be affected by the agency decision to grant the license to
the applicant. If these third persons can establish party status,
they can force an adjudicatory proceeding to determine the cor-
rectness of the agency's decision to issue the license. Thus, in these
circumstances, the definition of "party" plays a critically impor-
458. The phrase "free form proceeding" was coined by Professor Levinson to describe
the practices which agencies use to transact most of their business and which are "not sub-
ject to any legally binding procedural requirements at all." Levinson, Elements of the Ad-
ministrative Process: Formal, Semi-Formal, and Free-Form Models, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 872,
874 (1977). Indeed, free form proceedings have been characterized as those "necessary or
convenient procedures, unknown to the APA by which an agency transacts its day to day
business." Capeletti Bros. v. Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978), cert. denied mem., 368 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1979).
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tant role.
In Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis,459 the court ruled that Gads-
den, a competitor bank, could initiate an adjudicatory proceeding
under section 120.57 to test the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance's decision to grant a branch banking application to Quincy
State Bank. The Department's position that a competitor bank
was not a party to another bank's branch application was rejected
by the court because the Department had by rule identified parties
to proceedings before it as including persons who oppose the grant-
ing of an application. Gadsden did oppose the granting of Quincy's
application for a branch bank and thus was a person who by "pro-
vision of agency regulation, [was] entitled to participate" in the
proceeding.460 Gadsden had acquired party status through the De-
partment's rule; therefore, it had "the right to a hearing even if the
agency and the party whose substantial interests are to be deter-
mined agree to omit compliance with Section 120.57. ' '461
Because the Department's rule makes protesting banks parties
to proceedings on other banks' applications, the court had no occa-
sion to consider whether in the absence of such a rule an economic
competitor nevertheless could gain party status as a person whose
substantial interests would be affected by an agency decision to
license a competing bank. There is a suggestion in the opinion that
potential competitive injury could support party status only if it
were made a legally recognized concern by statute or rule. That
suggestion no doubt was precipitated by the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in ASI, Inc. v. Florida Public Service
Commission.62
In ASI, the supreme court ruled that ASI could not compel the
Public Service Commission to conduct a section 120.57 adjudica-
tory proceeding on an application by Airco Air Freight Delivery,
Inc. for a for-hire permit "to transport 'delayed, misplaced and/or
misrouted baggage . . . from the Jacksonville International Air-
port' to specified points in northeast Florida.' '4 3 The court noted
that the statute under which the Commission acted required for-
459. 348 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
460. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b) (Supp. 1976).
461. 348 So. 2d at 346 (footnote omitted).
462. 334 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1976).
463. Id. at 595. The term "for-hire" was defined by statute to mean "any motor carrier
engaged in the transportation of persons or property over the public highways of this state
for compensation, which is not a common carrier or contract carrier but transports such
persons or property in single, casual and nonrecurring trips." FLA. STAT. § 323.01(9) (1975).
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hire permits to issue "as a matter of right and of course"464 and
then stated:
We are unable to conclude that the Commission's grant of a per-
mit to Airco constitutes 'substantial interests of [ASI being] ...
determined by an agency,' within the intendment of Section
120.57, . . . even assuming that ASI will experience competition
from Airco, operating under its new for-hire permit. The fact is
that ASI has no legally recognized interest in being free from
competition. On the contrary, the statutory scheme is one of free
and unfettered competition among for-hire motor vehicles on
public highways .... The procedural requirements established
by the administrative procedure act evince no purpose either to
alter this substantive policy or to require hearings to find facts
which can have no bearing on agency action.465
The court's analysis is flawed in several respects. First, it fails to
appreciate that any party has a right to an adjudicatory proceeding
when the substantial interests of a party are determined by an
agency. By substituting ASI by name for the statutory phrase "a
party" in its quotation of the section 120.57 access language, the
court implies that the right to an adjudicatory proceeding belongs
only to the party whose substantial interests are determined in the
proceeding. The language of the statute does not support such a
restrictive view. On this point, the Gadsden State Bank court's
more careful analysis yielded a result more in keeping with the
meaning of the statutory language.
Second, the court seems to equate "substantial interests" with
"legally recognized interest." This is especially troublesome in light
of the legislative history and the multifaceted definition of "party."
The phrase "substantial interests" was chosen deliberately to make
adjudicatory proceedings available to persons whose important or
significant interests were affected or determined by agency action
whether or not those interests were recognized technically as pro-
tected legal rights. Indeed, to equate "substantial interests" with
"legally protected interest" as the ASI court did renders the defi-
nition of "party" inexplicably redundant. As defined, "party" in-
cludes specifically any "person, who as a matter of constitutional
right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation, is en-
titled to participate . . . in the proceeding, or whose substantial
464. FLA. STAT. § 323.05(1) (1975).
465. 334 So. 2d at 596 (emphasis added) (brackets in original).
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interests will be affected by proposed agency action, and who
makes an appearance as a party." '466 A person whose interests are
legally recognized by the constitution, by statute or by rule is a
party under the first part of the provision; a person whose interests
are not so recognized but nevertheless are important or significant
and will be affected by the proposed agency action is entitled to
party status under the second part of the provision. ASI may not
have had a legally recognized interest in being free from competi-
tion. But that should have been only the beginning, not the end, of
the court's inquiry. The next step was to decide whether the pro-
posed agency action-the issuance of a permit to Airco to engage
in certain ground transportation activities for compensa-
tion-would affect any important or significant interests of ASI.
Professor Levinson's response to the question is consistent with
the legislative history and the statutory language:
[A] competitor should be regarded as having a substantial inter-
est in any proceeding which would have a substantial impact
upon him, such as a proceeding to issue a permit to another party
in the same business if favorable action on the application would
have a significant impact upon others in the business.46 7
Third, the court fails to appreciate that the right to initiate an
adjudicatory proceeding is controlled by the access language of sec-
tion 120.57 but that the scope of the proceeding is governed by the
for-hire permit statute. If the court analyzed the access language of
section 120.57 and concluded that ASI was entitled to party status
in the Airco proceeding because its substantial interests would be
affected if the permit issued, it would then have to turn to the for-
hire permit statute to determine the scope of ASI's participation in
the proceeding. Granting a competitor access to the proceeding be-
cause his substantial interests will be affected by the proposed
agency action does not mean that evidence and argument about
potential competitive economic injury must be entertained by the
agency. The questions that may be put in issue in the proceeding
as well as the evidence and argument that must be received are
governed solely by the substantive statute which authorizes the
agency action. Again Professor Levinson's analysis is persuasive:
466. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11)(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
467. England & Levinson, Administrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 749, 757 n.44 (1977).
Professor Levinson's comments on the ASI decision were not joined in or commented upon
by his coauthor, Justice England.
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The extent of [the competitor's] participation would depend on
the law applicable to the granting of permits for the specific type
of business activity involved. In a situation such as that in ASI,
where the statute does not require an applicant to demonstrate
public convenience and necessity, the agency might strike as irrel-
evant any matters asserted by the competitor relating to public
convenience and necessity. The competitor might find himself
without any remaining arguments for submission to the
agency-but this result would follow from defining the scope of
the competitor's participation, not from excluding him for lack of
substantial interest. 68
The court's failure to distinguish between the right to an adjudica-
tory proceeding and the scope of one's participation in that pro-
ceeding, and its failure to recognize the relationship between the
procedural requirements of chapter 120 and the substantive re-
quirements of other law, caused it to undermine one of the distinc-
tive features of section 120.57, that is, that the right to invoke the
section's procedural protections is conferred by its own terms with-
out reference to other law. As a consequence, persons entitled to
request adjudicatory proceedings by the terms of section 120.57,
principally economic competitors, are being denied the right when
competitive economic impact is not a concern in the issuance of a
license by statute or rule. This manipulation of the section's access
criteria is unfortunate and unnecessary. The Florida Supreme
Court's error in ASI has been repeated by the district courts of
appeal.
Since the early 1960's, sulphur, a necessary ingredient in fertil-
izer, has been brought into Florida in liquid or molten form. Agrico
Chemical Company, a manufacturer of fertilizer, purchased molten
sulphur from the Freeport Sulphur Company. Freeport trans-
ported the molten sulphur in a specially designed ship and brought
it into the state through the Port of Tampa where it was handled
by Sulphur Terminals Company until its transfer to Agrico. When
a method of transporting sulphur in solid form, referred to as pril-
led sulphur, became available through a Canadian supplier, Agrico
filed an application with the Department of Environmental Regu-
lation (DER) for construction permits to build a facility to handle
prilled sulphur. Agrico applied for an air pollution source permit
and a waste water facility permit. DER issued the waste water per-
mit and a letter of intent to issue the air permit. Freeport and
468. Id.
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Sulphur Terminals filed petitions for section 120.57 proceedings to
contest the issuance of the air and waste water permits. Both peti-
tions were referred by DER to the DOAH and assigned to the
same hearing officer."69
The hearing officer recommended to DER that the petition chal-
lenging the waste water permit be dismissed because that permit
had already been issued. In its final order, DER dismissed the peti-
tion for lack of "standing." It concluded that Freeport and Sulphur
Terminals failed to establish that the proposed waste water treat-
ment facility would harm their environmental interests and that
the real nature of their substantial interest was future adverse eco-
nomic impact, a concern not within the "zone of interest" pro-
tected by the environmental permitting statute.7 0
Freeport and Sulphur Terminals then amended their petition for
a hearing on the air permit application to allege that environmen-
tal injury would result from the proposed prilled sulphur facility.
The hearing officer found that both Freeport and Sulphur Termi-
nals had the right to a section 120.57 proceeding on the proposed
air permit for three reasons: (1) their substantial inter-
ests-adverse economic impact-were affected; (2) DER allowed
them to intervene by forwarding their petition to the DOAH; and
(3) a DER rule entitled them to party status. At the conclusion of
the hearing on the permit application, the hearing officer recom-
mended that DER deny the air pollution source permit. DER's fi-
nal order, approved by the Environmental Regulation Commission,
rejected the first two grounds proffered by the hearing officer for
permitting Freeport and Sulphur Terminals to initiate the pro-
ceeding, but agreed with the hearing officer that a DER rule gave
them party status. The final order accepted the hearing officer's
recommendation on the substantive question and denied Agrico's
air pollution source permit. 47 1
On review, the court held that it was error to permit either Free-
port or Sulphur Terminals, as economic competitors of Agrico, to
participate in Agrico's permit proceedings and directed DER to
proceed with the issuance of the air pollution source construction
permit. The court's discussion of the economic competitor's right
to initiate an adjudicatory proceeding on another's permit applica-
tion was in two parts. First, whether potential economic injury
469. Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 406 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. 2d DCA
1981), petition for review denied mem., 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1982).
470. Id. at 479-80.
471. Id. at 480-81.
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qualifies as a "substantial interest" which will be affected in an
environmental permitting proceeding; and second, whether DER
could and did by rule extend party status to these competitors.
With regard to the meaning of "substantial interests," the court
accepted DER's view that the interest must be within the "zone of
interest" protected by the permitting statute. The court articu-
lated its standard in these terms:
We believe that before one can be considered to have a substan-
tial interest in the outcome of the proceeding he must show 1)
that he will suffer injury in fact which is of sufficient immediacy
to entitle him to a section 120.57 hearing, and 2) that his substan-
tial injury is of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed
to protect. The first aspect of the test deals with the degree of
injury. The second deals with the nature of the injury. While peti-
tioners in the instant case were able to show a high degree of po-
tential economic injury, they were wholly unable to show that the
nature of the injury was one under the protection of [the environ-
mental permitting statute]. 7 '
While it is true that the court did not call its access test by the
name "zone of interest" and it did not cite the United States Su-
preme Court decision that first announced the test, the federal
"zone of interest" test is precisely what the court grafted onto sec-
tion 120.57.473
The federal "zone of interest" test is not an all-purpose rule
even in federal law. It was the result of the Supreme Court's effort
to give meaning to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act's
provision extending a right to judicial review to a person "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute.'' 4 When the statute to be construed re-
quires adverse affect "within the meaning of a relevant statute," it
may make sense to say that the interest injured must be one argua-
bly within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute
under which the agency action is taken. But the statute construed
by the Agrico court does not say a person is a party if his substan-
tial interests are adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute. It simply says a party is a
person whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed
472. Id. at 482.
473. The "zone of interest" test was announced in Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
474. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (emphasis added).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
agency action. There is no justification for using the "zone of inter-
est" test to construe that language.
The Agrico court fell into the same error the ASI court did. It
failed to recognize that the right to initiate section 120.57 proceed-
ings is controlled by that section's own terms, but that the scope of
the proceeding is governed by the substantive statute which autho-
rizes the agency's action. The hearing officer did appreciate the
point. He conducted what the parties referred to as a "mini-trial"
on "standing '47 5 during which he allowed Freeport and Sulphur
Terminals to introduce evidence of the potential economic injury
they would suffer if the permit issued. This evidence was allowed
and used to establish that Freeport's and Sulphur Terminals' sub-
stantial interests would be affected by the proposed agency
action.471
During the substantive portion of the hearing, the evidence prof-
fered and admitted went not to the economic effects but to the
environmental effects of handling prilled sulphur.4 7 Freeport and
Sulphur Terminals did not try to persuade either the hearing of-
ficer or DER to protect their "profit and loss statement" under a
statute designed to protect the environment.47 What the threat of
economic injury gave them was a strong incentive to help DER
protect the environment. With the financial resources to match
Agrico lawyer for lawyer and expert witness for expert witness,
Freeport and Sulphur Terminals were able to convince the hearing
officer, DER, and the Environmental Regulation Commission that
DER's initial decision to issue the air pollution source construction
permit was unsound because of the potential damage that con-
struction of a prilled sulphur facility would cause to the
environment. 47 9
The hearing officer recognized that the plain meaning of section
120.57's access language entitles persons to party status if they can
475. 406 So. 2d at 481 n.2.
476. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 11 Fla. Admin. Rep. 44, 46-47
(1979).
477. Id. at 46-50.
478. 406 So. 2d at 482.
479. The hearing officer recommended denial of Agrico's permit because he found as a
matter of law Agrico failed to provide DER with "reasonable assurance based on plans, test
results and other information, that the construction . . .[or] operation . . . of the installa-
tion will not. . . cause pollution in contravention of Department standards, rules or regula-
tions." 11 Fla. Admin. Rep. at 50-52 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 17-4.07(1)(19)). DER's
final order accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact and his conclusions of law on all
matters except those pertaining to Freeport's and Sulphur Terminal's rights to initiate the
proceeding. 11 Fla. Admin. Rep. at 52-61.
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show that their important or significant interests will be affected
by the proposed agency action, without regard to whether their in-
terests are protected by the statute which authorizes the agency
action. He also recognized that the environmental permitting stat-
ute set the boundaries within which all parties had to try the case.
If that statute had permitted DER to consider the competitive eco-
nomic impact of its permitting decisions, then evidence of eco-
nomic consequences would have been admissible. As that statute
permitted DER to consider only environmental impact, only evi-
dence of environmental consequences would be received and used
as a basis for decision. This approach to the problem of economic
competitors' participation in environmental permitting proceed-
ings maintains the integrity of section 120.57 and the environmen-
tal permitting statute. The Agrico court and others that have
adopted its "zone of interest" test to control access to section
120.57 proceedings have sacrificed the section's central integrity by
forcing it to serve ends better served by the scope of participation
concept.480
The second part of the court's discussion of competitors' rights
to participate in another's permitting proceeding concerned
whether DER had by rule allowed economic competitors to partici-
pate. DER's position was that it could make "potential competitive
economic injury cognizable in its licensing proceedings, "481 and
that it had done that here through its Latest Reasonably Available
Control Technology rule (LRACT).82 In making its decision on
Agrico's permit, DER was required to determine and apply
LRACT. The rule said, in part, "[i]n making the determination the
Department shall give due consideration to" among other things
"the social and economic impact of the application of technol-
480. See Shared Servs. Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 426 So. 2d 56 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983) (applying the Agrico test to deny a competitor the right to an adjudicatory
proceeding on the applicant's request for licensure to operate an air ambulance service and
for certification as an advanced life support provider); see also North Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc.
v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 478 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (applying the Agrico test to
deny a competitor the right to contest an application for a certificate of need to provide an
open heart surgery program and to establish a cardiac catherization lab).
481. 406 So. 2d at 482.
482. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 17-2.03 (1981), quoted in Agrico, 406 So. 2d at 480-81 n.1.
LRACT was repealed before the final hearing was held on the Agrico permit. It was replaced
with the Best Available Control Technology rule (BACT). FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 17-2.03(3)(b)
(1981), quoted in Agrico, 406 So. 2d at 480-81 n.1. BACT provided that any proceeding
involving a determination of LRACT in process on the effective date of the rule change was
to be governed by LRACT.
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ogy. ''4 83 DER's interpretation of this rule was that "'[elconomic
impact' is broad enough to reasonably include consideration of the
potential economic impacts application of LRACT would have on
competitors of the applicant."484
The court rejected DER's interpretation of its own rule, saying
that it was not persuaded that the rule's reference "to 'social and
economic impact' can be reasonably read to include the economic
impact on a business entity when a competitor is first on the mar-
ket with a less expensive product. '4 ' Rather, in the court's view,
LRACT when "read in the context of DER's statutory frame-
work"48 is better interpreted as a cost-benefit directive to DER
that it consider the costs to business of complying with the new
technology requirements and weigh those costs against the benefits
the technology is expected to bring to environmental interests.4 87
Thus, the court concluded, LRACT
does not require DER to balance the cost of new technology to
the affected business against possible economic losses to a busi-
ness competitor. Thus, the LRACT Rule is not a 'provision of
agency regulation' which allows a competitor to object, solely on
the basis of potential competitive economic injury, to the issu-
ance of the permit.488
By rejecting DER's conclusion that LRACT was an agency regu-
lation which conferred party status on the two competitors in
Agrico's permitting proceeding, the court also rejected DER's
claimed "right to grant standing to economic competitors if it
chooses to do so, even though its final decision to issue or deny a
permit may not be based on the economic effect on an applicant's
competitor."4 89 DER's position is supported by two aspects of the
definition of "party" in chapter 120. A party is (1) any "person
who,. . . [by] provision of agency regulation, is entitled to partici-
pate . . . in the proceeding . .,49 and (2) "[a]ny other person,
. . . allowed by the agency to intervene or participate in the pro-
483. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 17-2.03(1)(A)(1)(d) (1981).




488. Id. at 482-83 (emphasis supplied by the court).
489. Id. at 481.
490. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11)(b) (1985).
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ceeding. '491 The court's inability to divorce the substance of the
proceeding from the access question prevented it from seeing that
on this point DER was correct. The court did not explain why
DER could not allow economic competitors to participate in per-
mitting proceedings if it chose to do so. The opinion did suggest,
however, that DER's authority to grant party status by rule or oth-
erwise was limited by the statute which authorized its action on
the merits in the same way that affected substantial interests were
limited to those within the "zone of interests" protected by that
statute. Recall that the court read LRACT "in the context of
DER's statutory framework." If the court meant to suggest that
the agency discretion to give party status to any other person, con-
ferred on the agency in chapter 120's definition of "party," is lim-
ited to persons asserting injury to an interest protected by the
agency's substantive statute, it is clearly wrong. Neither the plain
meaning of the language used nor the legislative history supports
the court's suggestion.
Competitive economic injury is a substantial interest, and if per-
sons claiming economic injury will be affected by proposed agency
action, they are entitled to party status. That does not mean that
the substantive policy which an agency is responsible for imple-
menting will be misappropriated "to redress or prevent injuries to
a competitor's profit and loss statement. 4 92 It does not mean that
hearings will be required "to find facts which can have no bearing
on agency action."4 93 Rather, it means that persons with a financial
incentive will help the agency serve the public interest, not their
own private interest, by marshaling competent and substantial evi-
dence to support facts upon which the agency is required to act to
make an informed decision. Only facts material and relevant to the
agency's decision may be put in issue in the proceeding. What is
material and relevant to the agency's decision depends on the
terms of the substantive statute which authorizes the agency
action.
(b) Other Substantial Interests
The question of a third person's right to initiate section 120.57
proceedings on another's license application has come up when in-
terests other than competitive economic interests have been as-
491. Id. § 120.52(11)(c).
492. 406 So. 2d at 482.
493. ASI, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 334 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1976).
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serted as the substantial interests that will be affected by proposed
agency action. For example, in Hillsboro-Windsor Condominium
Association v. Department of Natural Resources,"9 the associa-
tion, which owned the common areas of the condominium and the
land around it, alleged that its property would be eroded and de-
stroyed if the Department issued a coastal construction control
line permit to an adjacent property owner. The allegations of ero-
sion and destruction of its property established that the associa-
tion's substantial interests would be affected if the permit issued.
Consequently, the association had a right to initiate an adjudica-
tory proceeding on the adjacent property owner's requested
permit.
But a homeowners' association and individuals residing across
Biscayne Bay from a condominium, who alleged they would be ad-
versely affected by the damage to the bay if the condominium de-
veloper constructed a proposed marina, did not establish that their
substantial interests would be affected by an agency determination
that no lease of sovereignty lands was required for the marina."95
The court did not say that the residents' interests in the quality of
the Bay were not substantial interests; the court said the residents
failed to allege how their interests would be affected by the agency
decision not to collect rent from the developer in the event permit-
ting authority to construct the marina was secured from DER."96
Several cases have concerned whether a particular agency action
determined the substantial interests of an individual so as to enti-
tle that person to test the agency decision in a section 120.57 pro-
ceeding. In Greene v. Department of Natural Resources,'497 Greene
sought a section 120.57 proceeding on the Governor and Cabinet's
494. 418 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
495. Grove Isle, Ltd. v. Bayshore Homeowners' Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982), petition for review denied mem., 430 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1983).
496. After DER issued a letter of intent to grant Grove Isle a water quality control per-
mit for the construction of the marina, Bayshore Homeowners' Ass'n, other associations,
and individuals petitioned for a § 120.57 proceeding. The hearing officer's recommended
order contained the following finding of fact:
Both Mr. Win. Cleare Filer and David A. Doheny live close to Grove Isle. Mr.
Doheny's residence is on the mainland facing the proposed marina site and Mr.
Filer's house is on Pelican Canal. They use the waters of Biscayne Bay around
Grove Isle for recreation. If the quality of the water in the proposed marina site
were lessened their substantial interests would be affected.
2 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 639-A (1980). The associations were dismissed as parties because no
evidence was presented on which a conclusion that their substantial interests would be af-
fected could be based. Id. at 640-A.
497. 414 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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decision to approve acquisition of a tract of land in Broward
County under the state's environmentally endangered land (EEL)
purchase program. The acquisition of the tract was recommended
by the Conservation and Recreation Land Committee (CARL).
Greene claimed that the tract did not meet the legal criteria for an
EEL purchase and petitioned for a formal proceeding under sec-
tion 120.57(1). The Department denied the petition in part be-
cause the pleadings "state[d] no substantial interest whatsoever
which would be affected by the action taken by the Governor and
Cabinet in accepting and approving the C.A.R.L. Selection Final
Report."498
On review, the court affirmed the Department's denial of the
hearing. The court agreed with the Department that the petition
for the section 120.57(1) proceeding failed to explain how Greene's
substantial interests would be determined or affected by the deci-
sion to acquire the tract. Greene was "neither the owner, nor adja-
cent owner, of any land in the . . . parcel nor the owner of any
land on the CARL Committee's acquisition list with lower priority
than [the questioned parcel], or the owner of land not on the list
but which allegedly should be on the list."499
Greene tried to avoid the access requirements of section 120.57
by relying on section 403.412(5)'s citizen standing provision to ini-
tiate the section 120.57 proceeding. Section 403.412(5) provides:
In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized
by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural re-
sources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction,
the Department of Legal Affairs, a political subdivision or munic-
ipality of the state, or a citizen of the state shall have standing to
intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting
that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted
has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise
injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state.00
The court ruled that Greene's reliance on section 403.412(5) was
misplaced for four reasons. First, the provision only applies to suits
for injunctive relief in circuit court. Second, the provision only al-
lows a citizen to intervene in a proceeding; it does not permit a
citizen to initiate a proceeding. Third, the provision is limited to
498. Id. at 253.
499. Id.
500. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(5) (1981).
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environmental permitting and licensing, neither of which described
the conduct sought to be challenged. Fourth, Greene's verified
pleading did not allege that approving the acquisition of the tract
as an EEL would impair, pollute, or otherwise injure the air, water,
or other natural resources of the state.
The court's third and fourth reasons for denying Greene the use
of section 403.412(5) to compel a section 120.57 proceeding on the
acquisition approval decision were compelling. However, the first
two reasons given by the court were not persuasive. The court's
statement that the provision only applied to suits in circuit court
for injunctive relief was inaccurate. By its express terms the provi-
sion applies "[i]n any administrative, licensing, or other proceed-
ings." The court apparently confused sections 403.412(5) and
403.412(2). It is the latter section which authorizes citizens to
maintain suits for injunctive relief in the circuit courts °.5 1 The
court's second point, that the provision only authorizes interven-
tion in an ongoing proceeding not the initiation of a proceeding, is
debatable. The language of the provision supports the court's con-
clusion. But at least one other court in dictum said that a citizen
may use section 403.412(5) in an appropriate case to initiate a sec-
tion 120.57 proceeding after free form proceedings have ended and
the agency has given notice of its intent to issue a license.502
Before the legislature removed proceedings in which the sub-
stantial interests of a student were determined by the state univer-
sity system from section 120.57,03 two cases alleging university ac-
tion against students constituted a determination of the students'
substantial interests were decided. In the first, Sterman v. Florida
State University,501 a candidate for a Ph.D. in science education
was offered instead an Ed.D. degree after unsuccessfully defending
his Ph.D. dissertation. The degree transfer was offered by
Sterman's doctoral committee and approved by his major profes-
sor. Subsequently, the department chairman refused to allow him
to receive the Ed.D. degree. Sterman requested a section 120.57
adjudicatory proceeding; the university denied the requested hear-
ing, in part, because it claimed Sterman failed to allege a determi-
nation of his substantial interests which would entitle him to a
hearing. On appeal, the court reversed the university.
501. Id. § 403.412(2)(a).
502. Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 441 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983).
503. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(5) (1985).
504. 414 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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The university supported its position on two grounds. First, it
claimed that degree transfers were prohibited by university rules.
Therefore, Sterman could not assert a substantial interest had
been determined. The court noted that because no hearing had
been held, the facts alleged by Sterman in his petition for the
hearing were presumed true. Sterman alleged that degree transfers
were not prohibited and that they were common at the university.
By deciding against him on this point, without giving him an op-
portunity to support his position with evidence, the court ruled
that the university improperly decided an issue that went to the
merits of Sterman's claim. Second, the university claimed that
Sterman's substantial interest-the proffered Ed.D. degree-was
based on a subjective academic assessment of his performance and
"a substantial interest in a decision based upon the assessment of
a student's academic performance would not be a substantial inter-
est within the scope of that term as used in 120.57. ' '50' The court
rejected the university's argument. The real interest asserted by
Sterman's petition "was in a degree which had been offered and
approved by authorized university officials and subsequently re-
voked without explanation. ' 06 Determining the propriety of the
revocation would not concern the subjective assessment of
Sterman's academic performance.
In the second case, a student who was a candidate for a Ph.D. in
economics sought a section 120.57 proceeding on the Department's
refusal to readmit him to the doctoral degree program after he had
been dismissed for academic reasons. The university denied the
student's request for a hearing and the student appealed.0 7 After
recounting the unhappy details of the student's academic life since
beginning the doctoral program, the court concluded the "evi-
dence" supported the university's position that the readmission
decision was based solely on academic considerations. The court
then wandered far from the question before it and speculated that
if a hearing were ordered in this case it "would open this Court
and the Department of Administrative Hearings [sic] to a flood of
claims which could be filed anytime a university or college student
was dissatisfied with his grade in a particular course." 508 In sum-
mary fashion, the court concluded that the denial of readmission
to the doctoral program was "not a decision in which 'the substan-
505. Id. at 1104.
506. Id.
507. Beheshtitabar v. Florida State Univ., 432 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
508. Id. at 167.
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tial interests of a party are determined by an agency' within the
meaning of Section 120.57. "5019
There are several problems with the court's analysis. Even
though no hearing had been held, the court did not, as it did in
Sterman, presume that the facts alleged in the petition requesting
the hearing were true. The university alleged the decision was an
academic one. The student, an Iranian citizen, claimed the decision
was motivated in part by a desire to punish him for the seizure of
the American embassy in Iran and the taking of American hos-
tages.5 10 The court permitted the university to decide against the
student without giving him an opportunity to support his claim
with evidence. The court accepted the university's version of a dis-
puted material fact as "evidence" which not surprisingly supported
the university's conclusion that the nonreadmission decision was
based solely on academic grounds. In effect, the student was de-
nied access to a section 120.57 proceeding because the court con-
cluded, without benefit of a record compiled during an adversary
proceeding, that he would lose on the merits. The strength of a
party's position on the merits of a claim is not a proper considera-
tion when deciding whether a petition alleges that agency action
determined the substantial interests of a party. The right to a
hearing and the ability to prevail on the merits after the hearing
are totally different and separate questions.
The court muddied the access question even further with its
speculation about the flood of student complaints over grades in
particular courses. The question before the court was not whether
a section 120.57 proceeding was required when a student disagreed
with the bona fide academic evaluation of a professor who awarded
a grade of "C" when a student believed he deserved an "A". The
question presented to the court was whether a section 120.57 pro-
ceeding was required when a student was denied readmission to a
graduate degree program allegedly because the academic evalua-
tion was tainted by improper and unprofessional considerations.
The Sterman case, decided a year earlier but not cited by the ma-
jority, was a well reasoned precedent for holding that the univer-
sity determined the student's substantial interests when it denied
him readmission to the doctoral program under the circumstances
alleged. 11
509. Id.
510. Id. at 168 (Ervin, J., specially concurring).
511. Judge Ervin in his concurring opinion did rely on Sterman v. Florida State Univ.,
414 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) to support his view that the university's action did
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The final two cases under this heading concern whether school
board personnel decisions determine substantial interests entitling
the affected individual to a section 120.57 hearing. In Johnson v.
School Board of Palm Beach County,12 a tenured classroom
teacher was suspended without pay by the superintendent after
the teacher assaulted a student. The superintendent notified the
teacher by letter that the suspension without pay was effective im-
mediately, that the superintendent would recommend to the school
board at its next meeting that it ratify his suspension decision, and
that it terminate the teacher's employment. The school board ret-
roactively ratified the superintendent's decision to suspend the
teacher without pay. Subsequently, a hearing was held on a formal
petition to terminate the teacher's contract; the school board's fi-
nal order dismissing the teacher from employment was upheld by
the State Board of Education. The teacher then sought judicial re-
view of that portion of the final order which sustained the legality
of his suspension without pay and the board's retroactive ratifica-
tion of it.
The teacher challenged his suspension without pay as a denial of
state and federal constitutional due process guarantees. The court
avoided one constitutional question by holding that the superin-
tendent had statutory authority to suspend a teacher in an emer-
gency, but no authority to suspend without pay. The court found
that while the school board did have statutory authority to sus-
pend without pay, its authority was prospective only. Therefore,
the teacher was entitled to full pay during the period of suspension
before the board's meeting. The court then had to decide whether
the board constitutionally could suspend the teacher without pay
pending the hearing on his termination from employment, or
whether due process required a presuspension hearing. After bal-
ancing the school board's and the teacher's competing interests,
the court held that a postsuspension hearing conducted with rea-
sonable diligence and dispatch satisfied constitutional due process
requirements.513
determine the student's substantial interests. He concurred in the judgment denying the
student a hearing on the limited ground that the student waived his right to a § 120.57
proceeding. Id.
512. 403 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
513. Id. at 525. As authority for this holding, the court relied on Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In Arnett, the Court used a balance
of competing interests approach in upholding statutory procedures for the dismissal of fed-
eral civil service employees. Of the six Justices who reviewed these procedures in light of the
requirements of the due process clause, only Justices Powell and Blackmun found the hear-
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It was from this federal constitutional perspective that the court
considered whether section 120.57 required a hearing before sus-
pension without pay. The court's treatment of the question was
conclusory and obviously was influenced by its resolution of the
constitutional issue: "While the termination of an employee would
be a proceeding affecting the substantial interest of a party, requir-
ing the agency action to be in accordance with Section 120.57,...
we conclude that suspension without pay pending a full eviden-
tiary termination hearing is not such a proceeding." 514 Balancing
competing interests may be an appropriate test for determining
whether the Constitution requires a hearing before government in-
vades protected liberty or property interests. 15 But balancing com-
peting agency and private interests is not an appropriate method
for determining whether a person's substantial interests have been
determined by agency action. The court's resolution of the consti-
tutional claim against the teacher meant only that the teacher was
not a "person who, as a matter of constitutional right" was entitled
to a section 120.57 proceeding as a party.516 The court never asked
whether the teacher's interest in the continuation of his pay was a
"substantial interest . . . being determined in the proceeding" by
the school board's action. 517 Had the question been put this way,
surely the response would have entitled the teacher to a section
120.57 proceeding before the school board suspended him without
pay.
In Martin v. School Board of Gadsden County,518 a teacher re-
quested a section 120.57 adjudicatory proceeding on the school
board's decision to transfer her from one elementary school to an-
other in the district. The petition requesting the hearing asserted
the transfer was a disciplinary measure initiated by the superin-
tendent after he received a letter from the principal at Martin's
ing after dismissal sufficient. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall thought a
prior hearing was required.
514. 403 So. 2d at 527 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In a later case, Strange
v. School Bd. of Citrus County, 471 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), the court read a
provision in FLA. STAT. § 231.36(4)(c) (1983) that "the school board shall determine upon the
evidence submitted whether the charges have been sustained" to contemplate that the
school board would hold a hearing before suspending a teacher without pay. In Strange, the
teacher was offered an opportunity for a formal hearing but she never requested one. The
court concluded she had waived her right to a formal hearing on her suspension.
515. For a discussion critical of interest balancing in this area, see L. TRIE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 539-43 (1978).
516. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11)(b) (1985).
517. Id. § 120.52(11)(a).
518. 432 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
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school complaining that Martin's "'actions and attitudes have det-
rimentally affected the morale of the faculty and staff.' ,,519 Martin
claimed the charge was not supported by facts and that without a
hearing she would "be denied the opportunity to challenge the ac-
curacy of such statements. ' 520 The school board's denial of the re-
quested hearing was affirmed on review.
The court held no error was committed by the school board
when it denied Martin a hearing because the petition requesting
the hearing "wholly fail[ed] to identify what substantial interest
[was] affected. There [was] no allegation of harm done to the
teacher by the transfer. No pecuniary harm was alleged. No dam-
age to reputation was alleged .... ,,521 That holding was not re-
markable. The model rules require a petition for formal proceed-
ings to contain "an explanation of how [the petitioner's]
substantial interests will be affected by the Agency determina-
tion '522 and provide for the denial of a petition "if the petitioner
does not state adequately a material factual allegation, such as a
substantial interest in the Agency determination. '521
519. Id. at 590.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 588.
522. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-5.201(2)(b) (1983).
523. Id. R. 28-5.201(3)(a). This rule also requires an agency to give written notice to all
parties of the action taken on [a] petition [requesting a hearing] and to "state with particu-
larity its reasons therefor." Id. R. 28-5.201(3)(b). In Sims v. Board of Trustees of North Fla.
Junior College, 444 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), Sims, the President of the North Flor-
ida Junior College, requested a § 120.57(1) proceeding after the college's board of trustees
voted not to renew his employment contract. Sims claimed the termination of his employ-
ment affected his substantial interests, that his employment was "'subject to written and
oral agreements which have been entered into or amended within the past year and which
provide for notice of non-renewal and specifications of good and sufficient cause for non-
renewal; [and that] the Board has neither provided notice nor specified good and sufficient
cause.'" 444 So. 2d at 1116. The Board denied the petition because it appeared untimely
and because "the official records of the College negated the material assertions of [his] peti-
tion." 444 So. 2d at 1116. The court held the petition requesting the hearing was timely and
that the second reason given by the Board did not state the reasons for denying the petition
with sufficient particularity to satisfy FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-5.201(3)(b) (1983).
On remand, the Board again voted to deny Sims' request for a § 120.57(1) proceeding. In
a four page letter to Sims from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, several reasons were
offered to support the decision to deny the hearing. The principal reasons were that the
employment contract between Sims and the Board expressly stated that "[n]o legal cause
shall be required of the Board in the event that the [President] is not reemployed by the
Board in the position held by the [President] under the terms of this agreement after June
30, 1980 .... ," that "[a]ll official action of the Board of Trustees is recorded in the official
minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees," and that "[a]ll agreements to which the
Board of Trustees is a party are included in the official records of the Board of Trustees."
Neither the minutes nor the records reflected any agreements between the Board and Sims
regarding his employment as President. Record on Appeal at 42, Sims v. Board of Trustees
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The dissent charged the majority had accepted the school
board's argument that Martin had "no legally recognized interest
to teach at a particular school; accordingly, her substantial inter-
ests [were] not affected by the transfer,""" and thus the majority
had immunized school board personnel decisions from chapter 120.
While the majority insisted that was untrue, that it required only
some showing that substantial interests would be affected and that
the petition failed to satisfy that requirement, the meaning of this
passage from the majority's opinion is otherwise hard to
understand:
We are, in effect, asked to find that Administrative Procedures
Act formal hearings are, as a matter of law, a part of a school
system's personnel procedures. We will not do this.
Personnel decisions are necessarily judgment calls involving a
multitude of factors. If a superintendent in his or her discretion,
supported by the School Board, decides that harmony between
administration and faculty is best served by an intrasystem trans-
fer, it is not this Court's job to second-guess them . 25
Nothing in chapter 120 or in any other case suggests that person-
nel decisions of school boards or any other agency are beyond the
procedural discipline of section 120.57. Any decision by an agency
is subject to the hearing requirements of section 120.57, if the deci-
sion determines or affects the substantial interests of a party. To
suggest, as the majority does, that personnel decisions rest solely in
the unbridled and unchallenged discretion of the superintendent
and the school board is unprecedented. The availability of a hear-
ing does not depend on any characterization of the agency's deci-
sion. Rather, section 120.57 proceedings are available to any person
"whose substantial interests are threatened . . . by agency action
which is proceeding arbitrarily, imperiously, or obliviously. ' '526
Nothwithstanding the majority's novel suggestion to the contrary,
section 120.57 is, as a matter of law, a part of any agency's person-
nel procedures to the extent that substantial interests are deter-
of North Fla. Junior College, 473 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Sims again appealed the denial of his petition for hearing. The court ruled that this time
the Board stated with sufficient particularity why no hearing was required and affirmed the
Board's denial of Sims' petition. 473 So. 2d at 1.
524. 432 So. 2d at 590 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
525. 432 So. 2d at 588-89.
526. State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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mined or affected by an agency decision.2 7
(c) Certificates of Need and Comparative Hearings
Federal law requires states to designate a planning agency to ap-
prove proposed capital expenditures for health care facilities if fed-
eral criteria for need are satisfied. Unless the state planning agency
approves the capital expenditure, federal reimbursement for health
care costs to providers, principally under the Medicare and Medi-
caid programs, is reduced by the amount necessary to assure fed-
eral money is not used to support unnecessary capital expenses in-
curred by health care providers. 28 Federal law also requires states
to establish a certificate of need (CON) program in order for them
to qualify for grants under federal health programs.529 Responding
to this federal encouragement, the Florida Legislature enacted the
Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act which contains
Florida's CON program and names the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services (HRS) as this state's health care planning
agency.5 30 The Act specifically provides that "[a]n applicant or a
substantially affected person who is aggrieved by the issuance, rev-
ocation, or denial of a certificate of need shall have the right...
to seek relief according to the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act." 53 1
Initially, HRS' position was that each application for a CON was
granted or denied on its individual merits alone on a first come
first served basis and not in comparison with other applications for
the same kind of facility in the same service area. As a conse-
quence, each applicant was entitled to an adjudicatory proceeding
on the denial of his own application for a CON, but a competing
applicant was not entitled to a hearing on the issuance of another's
application. Applicants had no right to consolidate the proceedings
and force a comparative evaluation of competing applications. Two
cases decided in 1979 rejected HRS' position. In one case, the
court relied on section 120.57's access language to conclude that a
competitor did have a right to a hearing on the issuance of an-
527. Wahlquist v. School Bd. of Liberty County, 423 So. 2d 471, 472-75 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982); Foreman v. Columbia County School Bd., 408 So. 2d 653, 653-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981);
Webster v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 367 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979);
Witgenstein v, School Bd. of Leon County, 347 So. 2d 1069, 1071-72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
528. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1982).
529. Id. § 300k-300n.
530. FLA. STAT. §§ 381.493-.499 (1985).
531. Id. § 381.494(8)(e).
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other's CON. In the other case, the court applied the federal
Ashbacker doctrine to Florida CON proceedings and concluded
that a comparative hearing in which all competing applications
were considered together was required to satisfy fundamental no-
tions of fairness.
In Bio-Medical Applications of Ocala, Inc. v. Office of Commu-
nity Medical Facilities,532 Bio-Medical and Shands Teaching Hos-
pital each submitted applications for a CON to provide a ten-sta-
tion kidney dialysis center in Ocala. HRS denied Bio-Medical's
application and granted Shands', finding it to be a "less costly and
more appropriate alternative. ' 533 HRS refused to permit Bio-Med-
ical to contest Shands' CON in an adjudicatory proceeding; it con-
ceded that Bio-Medical was entitled to a hearing on the denial of
its own CON. Bio-Medical appealed HRS' final order denying it
the right to a section 120.57 proceeding on Shands' application for
a CON. Bio-Medical claimed that the Health Facilities and Health
Services Planning Act entitled it to a hearing on the Shands appli-
cation because it was an "applicant. . .aggrieved by the issuance
• ..of a certificate of need. '534
The court found it unnecessary to decide "whether 'any' simul-
taneous applicant"5 35 for a CON was entitled to an adjudicatory
proceeding when a competitor's application was granted after free
form proceedings. The court limited its holding to applicants
whose applications were simultaneous and mutually exclusive. In
that circumstance, the court said "each competitor is potentially a
party to the proceedings on the other's application. Each is one
'whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed agency ac-
tion' on the other's application. '536 Therefore, as a party Bio-Med-
ical was entitled to initiate a section 120.57 hearing in proceedings
which would determine Shands' substantial interests.
The court's conclusion undoubtedly was correct, but its analysis
of Bio-Medical's party status was a bit curious. Bio-Medical, after
all, was claiming that it was entitled to a hearing on the Shands
application because of the provision in the Health Facilities and
Health Services Planning Act which at the time gave "any appli-
cant . . . aggrieved by the issuance or denial" of a CON the right
"to seek relief according to the provisions of the Administrative
532. 374 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
533. Id.
534. FLA. STAT. § 381.494(6)(e) (1977).
535. 374 So. 2d at 89.
536. Id.
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Procedure Act." Bio-Medical was claiming party status by "provi-
sion of statute," not as one "whose substantial interests will be af-
fected by proposed agency action." But by relying on that part of
the definition which makes a person a party if his substantial in-
terests will be affected by the agency action, the court narrowed
access to section 120.57 proceedings in CON cases to applicants
whose applications were both simultaneous and mutually exclusive.
Had it focused on the "provision of statute" part of the definition,
the court would have seen that the legislature granted party status
to any applicant aggrieved. That grant of party status by statute
arguably was broader than the court's with its additional require-
ments of simultaneity and mutual exclusivity.53 7
The only question in Bio-Medical Applications of Ocala was the
right of a competing applicant to initiate a section 120.57 proceed-
ing on another's application which the agency intended to grant.
The court did not have to address the question whether the right
to participate in another's CON application proceeding adequately
protected all applicants' rights to a fair consideration of their pro-
posals. That question was considered in Bio-Medical Applications
of Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services.58
In Bio-Medical Applications of Clearwater, Kidneycare of Flor-
ida, Inc. submitted an application for a CON to construct a ten-
station kidney dialysis center in Clearwater. HRS denied the CON
based on its determination that there was no need for additional
dialysis stations in that area. Kidneycare's request for a hearing
was referred to the DOAH. At about the same time, Bio-Medical
Applications of Clearwater submitted an application for a CON to
install a twenty-station kidney dialysis facility in Clearwater. HRS
denied Bio-Medical's application for a CON. Bio-Medical's request
for a hearing was also referred to the DOAH. Bio-Medical was per-
mitted by the hearing officer to intervene in Kidneycare's proceed-
ing, but its attempt to convince the hearing officer that the later
scheduled proceeding on its own application should be consoli-
dated with the Kidneycare proceeding was not successful. At the
537. The legislature amended the Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act in
1980 to give a right to a hearing to "[a]n applicant, a substantially affected person or health
systems agency." Ch. 80-87, § 4, 1980 Fla. Laws 594, 598 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
381.494(7)(e) (Supp. 1980)). This provision was amended deleting reference to "health sys-
tems agency." Ch. 82-182, § 3, 1982 Fla. Laws 628, 632 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
381.494(8)(e) (1985)).
538. 370 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended to HRS
that Kidneycare's application for a CON to construct a ten-station
dialysis center be approved. HRS' final order, accepting the hear-
ing officer's recommendation, was rendered before the hearing was
conducted on Bio-Medical's application. After that hearing was
concluded, the hearing officer recommended that HRS approve a
CON authorizing Bio-Medical to operate a seven-station dialysis
facility rather than the twenty-stations requested.
Bio-Medical sought judicial review of HRS' final order issuing a
CON to Kidneycare alleging that the failure to consolidate its ap-
plication with Kidneycare's for hearing was a material error in pro-
cedure that affected the fairness of the proceeding and the correct-
ness of HRS' action.5 39 The court agreed with Bio-Medical that in
these circumstances the principle announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC540 applied:
"[Wihere two bona fide applications for administrative approval
are mutually exclusive, the grant of one without a hearing to both
deprives the loser of the hearing to which he is entitled." 54' When
opposing applicants are competitors for a fixed pool of needed ser-
vices as in this case, the court said:
fairness requires that the agency conduct a comparative hearing
at which the competing applications are considered simultane-
ously. Only in that way can each party be given a fair opportunity
to persuade the agency that its proposal would serve the public
interest better than that of its competitor. Such an opportunity is
not afforded by merely allowing an applicant to intervene in the
proceedings pertaining to a competing application since the mer-
its of the intervenor's proposal are not thereby presented for com-
parative consideration . 2
As the court noted, no federal or state statute, including chapter
120, recognized the need for or established procedures for accom-
modating comparative hearings in CON cases. Just as in
Ashbacker itself, the need for comparative hearings was recognized
by the judiciary and was based on common law concepts of fair
539. As an intervenor in the Kidneycare proceeding, Bio-Medical was a party and thus
was able to seek judicial review. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-5.104 (1983). A court must remand
a case for further proceedings if a material error in procedure affected the fairness of the
proceeding or the correctness of the agency decision. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(8) (1985).
540. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
541. 370 So. 2d at 23.
542. Id.
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play and fundamental fairness. After Bio-Medical Applications of
Clearwater, the legislature directed HRS to provide by rule for
"applications to be submitted on a timetable or cycle basis ...
and provide for all completed applications pertaining to similar
types of services, facilities, or equipment affecting the same service
district to be considered in relation to each other no less often
than two times a year."' 3 By rule, applications in the same batch-
ing cycle for similar needs in the same service district are pre-
sumed to be simultaneous and mutually exclusive applications on
which a comparative hearing must be held if requested. 544
Although the batching cycle mechanism takes some of the guess
work out of determining whether applications are simultaneous
and therefore subject to a comparative hearing, it does not operate
perfectly. For example, continuances may delay hearings on earlier
batched applications until after later batched applications have
been considered. In these circumstances, applicants from the ear-
lier batch cycle are entitled to intervene in the proceedings on the
later batch cycle applications. 5" No reported case has ruled on the
availability of a comparative hearing in these circumstances.
Whether applicants in a later batch cycle may intervene in or con-
solidate their proceedings with proceedings to dispose of earlier
batch cycle applications is not clear. 4 e
In Community Psychiatric Centers, Inc. v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services,5 47 the court ruled that an ap-
plicant whose CON application was four batch cycles later than
the application on which it sought to compel a comparative hear-
ing was not entitled to a comparative hearing under the principles
of Bio-Medical Applications of Clearwater because the applica-
tions were not simultaneous. But the court went on to suggest that
an applicant in a later batch cycle could be entitled to a compara-
tive hearing with earlier batch cycle applications, if the later batch
cycle applicant was an "affected person" as defined by an HRS
rule.54' The court concluded that the applicant was not an "af-
543. Ch. 80-187, § 4, 1980 Fla. Laws 594, 598 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 381.494(5)
(1985)).
544. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.08(1) (1984).
545. Federal Property Management Corp. v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am.,
462 So. 2d 493, 495-96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
546. 462 So. 2d at 495.
547. 474 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
548. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.02(20) (1984) defines "affected person" to mean:
the person whose application/proposal is being reviewed, members of the public
who are to be served by the person proposing the project, health care facilities and
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fected person" within the meaning of the HRS rule, and thus was
not entitled to a comparative hearing. It is troublesome, however,
that the court relied on an HRS rule that identifies persons who
may request that HRS hold a public hearing on a CON applica-
tion. 4" The rule which the court should have looked to identifies
the persons who may invoke section 120.57 proceedings, as "per-
sons whose interests are substantially affected."550
In Gulf Court Nursing Center v. Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services,5 5' the court held that an applicant, whose
CON application was filed nine months and at least one batching
cycle later than the application on which it sought to compel com-
parative review, was entitled to a comparative hearing under Bi-
omedical principles. Provincial House of Florida and Beverly En-
terprises filed applications for CONs to construct 120-bed nursing
home facilities in Lee County in January 1981 and March 1981,
respectively. Both applications were designed to meet the pro-
jected bed need for 1983 contained in the 1981 health systems plan
for Lee County. HRS comparatively reviewed Provincial's and
Beverly's applications with one filed by Health Care Management
and awarded a CON for seventy-eight nursing home beds to
Health Care Management. The CON applications of Provincial
and Beverly were denied and they requested a hearing. Late in De-
cember 1981, and before the hearing was held, HRS entered into a
stipulation with Provincial and Beverly granting each of them a
CON for seventy-two nursing home beds. The CONS were granted
because the 1982 health systems plan for Lee County identified a
need for 143 additional nursing home beds in 1985.
In the meantime, Gulf Court filed an application for a CON to
health maintenance organizations located in the health service area in which the
service is proposed to be offered or developed which provide services similar to the
proposed services under review, and health care facilities and health maintenance
organizations which, prior to receipt by the agency of the proposal being reviewed,
have formally indicated an intention to provide such similar services in the future.
See also NME Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 10 Fla. L.W. 1976 (Fla.
1st DCA Aug. 23, 1985) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.02(20) (1984)) as authority for
finding that existing hospitals in the same service district where a new facility was proposed,
were substantially affected by HRS' decision to grant the CON for the new facility). But see
North Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. NME Hosps., Inc., 478 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
where the court buttressed its conclusion that a competitor hospital's future adverse eco-
nomic effect was not within the zone of interest the Health Facilities and Health Services
Planning Act was designed to protect by noting that the competitor hospital was not an
"affected person" under FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.02(20) (1984).
549. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.10(1)(a) (1984).
550. Id. R. 10-5.10(8).
551. 10 Fla. L.W. 1983, 1985-86 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug 23, 1985).
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construct a 120 bed nursing home facility in Lee County in early
December 1981. Gulf Court's application was based on the 143 bed
need projected in the 1982 health systems plan. Gulf Court's appli-
cation was comparatively reviewed with other applications in the
same batching cycle but not with Provincial's and Beverly's appli-
cations. Gulf Court's application was denied because the projected
need for 143 additional beds was met when the Provincial and
Beverly CONs were granted. Gulf Court sought a hearing on the
denial of its application and on the grant of CONs to Provincial
and Beverly. The hearing officer recommended that Gulf Court
have its application comparatively reviewed with Provincial's and
Beverly's applications. HRS' final order rejected the hearing of-
ficer's recommendation and concluded that Gulf Court was not en-
titled to a comparative review with Provincial and Beverly. Gulf
Court appealed.
The court reversed HRS' final order and ruled in these circum-
stances the later batched Gulf Court application was entitled to
comparative review with the earlier batched Provincial and Bev-
erly applications. The court rejected HRS' position that Biomedi-
cal only required comparative consideration of applications filed
simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in time. The court said
that "[mlutual exclusivity of the competing applications must be
judged by whether each seeks to meet the same 'fixed pool of
needed investments.' "552 The original applications filed by Provin-
cial and Beverly were based on 1983 projected bed needs. Gulf
Court's application was based on 1985 projected bed needs. There-
fore, considering the applications as they were submitted by the
parties, there was no mutual exclusivity because the applications
addressed different fixed pools of needed investments. The situa-
tion changed, however, when HRS stipulated, in apparent violation
of statute and its own rules, that the Provincial and Beverly appli-
cations would be granted to meet a need the applications did not
address-the 1985 projected need.5 53 By its action, HRS effectively
552. Id. at 1985.
553. The court noted that federal and state statutes and HRS rules require applications
for CONs to be consistent with the applicable health systems plan. Id. at 1985-86; see 42
U.S.C. §§ 300m-6(a)(5)(B)(ii), 300m-6(g) (1982); FLA. STAT. §§ 381.494(4)(a), .494(6)(c)(1),
.494(8)(a) (1983); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.09(1) (1984). Furthermore, by statute, only com-
pleted applications must be comparatively reviewed. FLA. STAT. § 381.494(5) (1983). By rule,
HRS has prescribed procedures for supplementing or amending a completed application,
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.08(7) (1984), and for resubmitting an updated application for re-
consideration after an application is denied. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 10-5.14 (1984). None of
the procedures under these rules were followed to amend Provincial's and Beverly's applica-
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put Provincial and Beverly in competition with Gulf Court for the
same fixed pool of needed nursing home beds. Consequently, even
though the applications were filed in different batching cycles and,
therefore, were not simultaneous in time, they were mutually ex-
clusive and comparative review was required.5 54
In addition to competing applicants, others have been given ac-
cess to section 120.57 proceedings on CON applications. In Collier
Medical Center, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,555 existing hospitals were given access to a proceeding on
a CON for a proposed new hospital. The applicant tried to deny
their intervention by claiming their only interest was potential eco-
nomic injury; an interest the applicant claimed was not within the
"zone of interests" protected by statute or chapter 120's definition
of "party." The court rejected the argument saying "the effect of
the proposed .. .facility on the continued financial feasibility of
the intervenors is a recognized interest under Florida certificate of
need law. '5 56
More problematic is Farmworker Rights Organization, Inc. v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which ex-
tends the Florida Home Builders558 associational standing rule to
proceedings conducted under section 120.57.111 HRS approved a
CON application for the construction of a one-hundred bed acute
care hospital in Lehigh Acres. The Farmworker Rights Organiza-
tion objected and requested a section 120.57 proceeding on the
CON application; HRS denied the requested hearing because no
member of the organization was made a party to the request. On
appeal, the court reversed. Although it recognized that Florida
Home Builders involved the right of an association to challenge the
validity of an adopted rule under section 120.56, the court saw no
tions. 10 Fla. L.W. at 1986.
554. See also University Medical Center, Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
478 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (affirming a hearing officer's nonfinal order denying a
motion to consolidate CON applications for comparative hearing because the applications
were not made part of the record on appeal and, therefore, the court could not determine
which fixed pool of need or which health systems plan was the basis of each application).
555. 462 So. 2d 83, 86 (Fla.lst DCA 1985).
556. Id. at 86. Contra North Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. NME Hosps., Inc., 10 Fla. L.W.
2548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). But cf. Humana, Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
469 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Shared Servs., Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab.
Servs. 426 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
557. 417 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
558. Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Employment Sec., 412 So.
2d 351 (Fla. 1982).
559. See supra notes 299-306 and accompanying text.
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reason why the same access standard should not apply to section
120.57 proceedings. The court explained its conclusion:
For the purpose of standing, there is no significant difference be-
tween a section 120.56(1) and a section 120.57(1) proceeding. In
order to establish standing in the former case a person must show
that he has been 'substantially affected' by the challenged rule,
while in the latter case a party must show that his 'substantial
interests' are being determined. Based on the similarities between
the standing requirements of these two sections, we now hold that
the standing requirements for associations as set forth in Florida
Home Builders shall apply equally in both section 120.56(1) and
section 120.57(1) proceedings.5 60
In other sections of this Article, the differences between the ac-
cess language of section 120.56 and the access language of section
120.57 were explored. " 1 The most important difference ignored by
the court in Farmworker Rights Organization is that adjudicatory
proceedings can only be initiated by a person who is a party. An
association seeking to represent its members' interests in an adju-
dicatory proceeding would have to rely on a statutory provision, an
agency rule, or agency acquiescence to acquire party status. Acting
as a representative of its members' interests, an association cannot
be a person "whose substantial interests will be affected by pro-
posed agency action. ' 562 The substantial interests that will be af-
fected must be personal to the person seeking party status. No
statutory provision confers party status on an association to permit
its participation in adjudicatory proceedings on a CON. No HRS
rule gives party status to an association for purposes of participat-
ing in CON proceedings. Although it had the discretion to permit
the association's participation, HRS did not allow the association
to intervene or participate in the CON proceeding. The associa-
tion's interests as an association were not affected by HRS' deci-
sion to approve the CON for an acute care hospital. The
Farmworker Rights Organization could not establish party status
and should have been denied the right to initiate adjudicatory pro-
ceedings on the CON application.
560. 417 So. 2d at 754-55.
561. See supra notes 264-70, 388-426 and accompanying text.
562. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(11)(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
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(d) DRI and Binding Letter Processes
While it is clear that no law external to chapter 120 must require
a hearing to be held before a person can claim a right to section
120.57 proceedings, it is equally clear that external law may limit
access to those proceedings. Two provisions in the Environmental
Land and Water Management Act specifically identify the persons
and entities who may participate in administrative proceedings
concerning developments of regional impact (DRIs). The courts
consistently and, in my opinion, correctly have rebuffed attempts
to use the broader access language of section 120.57 to entitle
others not specifically identified to participate.
The first provision specifies that a local government order relat-
ing to a DRI may be appealed to the Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission (the Governor and Cabinet) by "the owner, the devel-
oper, an appropriate regional planning agency, ... or the state
land planning agency. ' '5 3 This provision is important because the
first and only opportunity for a section 120.57 proceeding in the
DRI process is when an appeal is taken to the Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission.56' At the earlier stages of the process,
either substantial interests are not determined"6 or the determina-
tion of substantial interests is not made by an agency subject to
chapter 120.66 Nevertheless, in Caloosa Property Owners Associa-
tion, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commission-
ers,5 7 the court recognized that while the legislature required the
Commission to conduct appeals in accordance with chapter 120, it
also limited the persons who could invoke section 120.57 proceed-
ings to those specifically authorized to take an appeal. To permit
any person who alleged that his substantial interests were either
563. Id. § 380.07(2).
564. Proceedings before the Commission are conducted pursuant to chapter 120. Id. §
380.07(3).
565. An application for development approval (ADA) is filed with the local government
having zoning authority over the proposed development. Id. § 380.06(6)(a). Because by defi-
nition a DRI affects more than one county, the statutory scheme requires review of an ADA
by the appropriate regional planning council. Regional planning councils are agencies sub-
ject to chapter 120, id. § 120.52(1)(b), but because they only have power to recommend
approval or rejection of the ADA to local governments, their action does not determine the
substantial interests of a party. Id. § 380.06(12)(a).
566. The local government determines substantial interests by either approving or re-
jecting the DRI. But counties and municipalities are not agencies for chapter 120 purposes
unless they are expressly made subject to the chapter by general or special law. Id. §
120.52(1)(c).
567. 429 So. 2d 1260, 1263-64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), petition for review denied mem., 438
So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1983).
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affected or determined by the development order to request a sec-
tion 120.57 proceeding from the Commission would contravene the
specific legislative designation and destroy the legislature's purpose
in setting up the DRI review process which was to establish "pri-
marily a comprehensive land use review technique for large scale
development involving primarily two groups-developers on one
hand, and on the other, governmental planners and permitting
authorities." 568
The second provision permits a developer who is in doubt
whether his proposed development is a DRI to seek a determina-
tion from the state land planning agency (the Bureau of Land and
Water Management in the Department of Community Affairs).
Within thirty-five days of acknowledgement of a sufficient applica-
tion, the Bureau must issue a binding letter of its interpretation of
the proposed development. The Bureau's decision binds all agen-
cies-state, regional, and local-and the developer. 69
By rule, the Bureau must solicit and accept information relevant
to the application for a binding letter from the appropriate re-
gional planning council and the appropriate local government; the
Bureau may solicit and accept information from other persons who
may have factual information relevant to the application. 57 0 As ex-
pressed in its rules, the Bureau's interpretation of the statutory
binding letter provision precludes anyone but the developer from
requesting either a formal or informal proceeding under section
120.57.571 The courts have endorsed the Bureau's interpretation of
the provision. The binding letter process involves only the devel-
oper and the Bureau. Neither regional planning councils nor adja-
cent or adjoining property owners have the right to participate in
the process or to initiate a section 120.57 proceeding on an applica-
tion for a binding letter. 2
When considering whether third persons had any claim of right
568. Id. at 1264.
569. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(a), (d) (1985).
570. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 27F-1.16(3) (1979).
571. Id. R. 27F-1.16(8), (9), (12). Contra Peterson v. Florida Dep't of Community Affairs,
386 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), where adjacent property owners were offered an infor-
mal proceeding after a binding letter was issued.
572. Peterson, 386 So. 2d 879; Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of Am. v. Flor-
ida Department of Community Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1373-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); South
Fla. Regional Planning Council v. Land and Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 372 So. 2d 159,
165-67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); South Fla. Regional Planning Council v. Florida Div. of State
Planning, 370 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied mer., 381 So. 2d 770 (Fla.
1980).
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to participate formally in the binding letter process, the courts
consider the purpose and effect of a binding letter.
A binding letter only determines whether a proposed develop-
ment is a DRI; it is not a permit to begin any development activ-
ity and does not protect the developer from any state, federal, or
local restrictions applicable to its development. It does not sup-
plant any local requirements. It does not insulate the developer
from the jurisdiction or permitting requirements of other federal,
state, or local agencies.73
The binding letter device is one which a developer may voluntarily
pursue. If the opinion rendered in the binding letter is that the
proposed development is a DRI, then the developer knows that, in
addition to other permitting requirements, he must submit his pro-
posed development for review and approval by the appropriate lo-
cal government. If the opinion given in the binding letter is that
the proposed development is not a DRI, DRI review and approval
by local government is not necessary.
The DRI appeal and the binding letter provisions are examples
of the legislature's determining in a statute external to chapter 120
who may initiate a section 120.57 proceeding. The executive
branch agencies and the courts have given effect to these legisla-
tive decisions and in doing so have followed the cardinal rule of
statutory construction that the specific controls the general. The
specific provisions of the Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act control over the general provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
(e) Public Contract Bid Disputes
In 1981, the legislature amended chapter 120 to make special
provision for invoking section 120.57 proceedings when the agency
action concerns a bid solicitation or a contract award. In addition
to providing how notice of the agency decision is to be given, the
provision requires that the notice contain a statement that failure
to comply with the time requirements for filing a protest shall con-
stitute a waiver of chapter 120 proceedings. 5 74 A written protest
must be filed with the agency within seventy-two hours of receipt
of the notice of the agency decision. A formal written protest must
573. Peterson v. Florida Dep't of Community Affairs, 386 So. 2d at 880-81.
574. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(5)(a)(1), (2) (1985).
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be filed with the agency within ten days of the filing of the notice
of protest.575 Receipt of the notice of protest stops the bid solicita-
tion process or the contract award process until the protest is re-
solved unless the agency head determines in writing and states
with particularity that the process must continue to avoid immedi-
ate and serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare. 576
Provision is made for resolution of the protest by mutual agree-
ment. If resolution is not possible within seven days from the re-
ceipt of the formal written protest and there are no disputed issues
of material fact, then an informal proceeding under section
120.57(2) is to be conducted. If there are disputed issues of mate-
rial fact, the agency must refer the protest to the DOAH for a for-
mal proceeding under section 120.57(1). 577
Instead of relying on section 120.57's access language and the
definition of "party," the provision identifies the persons who may
file notices of protest, formal written protests, and hence request
proceedings under section 120.57 if settlement by mutual agree-
ment is not possible. For purposes of resolving contract bid dis-
putes, "[a]ny person who is affected adversely by the agency deci-
sion" may request a section 120.57 proceeding so long as the
specified prehearing requirements were satisfied in a timely man-
ner. 578 The cases ignore the "affected adversely" requirement and
continue to determine whether substantial interests are involved.
Before the legislature made special provision for handling con-
tract bid disputes, one court accepted as a correct statement of the
law the conclusion of a hearing officer regarding the right of a sec-
ond lowest bidder to challenge the qualifications of the apparent
lowest bidder: " '[T]he right of a bidder for a public contract to a
fair consideration of his bid and his right to an award of the con-
tract if his is the lowest, responsible bid are matters of "substantial
interest" to him, thus entitling him to a hearing pursuant to
120.57.'""' Another court accepted the notion that a second low-
est bidder established that it had a substantial interest to be deter-
mined by the agency action in awarding the contract to another,
but held that a third lowest bidder could not.580
575. Id. § 120.53(5)(b).
576. Id. § 120.53(5)(c).
577. Id. § 120.53(5)(d)(1), (2).
578. Id. § 120.53(5)(b) (emphasis added).
579. Couch Constr. Co. v. Department of Transp., 361 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978).
580. Preston Carroll Co. v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth., 400 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d
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In two cases decided since the legislative change, in which the
right to challenge the agency's decision in a section 120.57 proceed-
ing was discussed, the courts' treatment of the question was sum-
mary and made no mention of the changed access standard. In In-
ternational Medical Centers, H.M.O. v. Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services,581 the court held that bidders in the
first and second lowest positions "were parties whose substantial
interests were determined by the agency's decision to reject all
bids and to withdraw the [request for proposals] '582 for providing
prepaid health care services to refugees in Dade County. Had the
access question been analyzed under the "affected adversely" stan-
dard, the same conclusion undoubtedly would have been reached.
The Department's decision to reject all bids and to withdraw the
request for proposal was made after it had announced its intention
to use a health maintenance organization (HMO) to provide for
the health care needs of refugees rather than the more costly fee-
for-service method. The Department said only one contract would
be awarded; it did not reserve the right to reject all bids. Of the
four bids submitted, three were considered possible winners ac-
cording to the criteria set forth by the Department for selecting
the winning bid. 583 In these circumstances, the lowest and second
lowest HMO bidders certainly were affected adversely by the De-
partment's decision to reject all bids and to continue the fee-for-
service approach. Although not at issue in the case, the third low-
est HMO bidder also was affected adversely by the agency deci-
sion, and would have had the right to a section 120.57 proceeding
if it had requested one.
Capeletti Brothers, Inc. v. Department of General Services,584
involved an attempt by a fourth lowest bidder to challenge the
award of a contract to the lowest bidder, to force the agency to
reject all bids, and to readvertise because of a material misrepre-
sentation in the site drawings. The contract was for the rough site
preparation for a correctional facility in Dade County. The site
drawings showed a road running parallel to the northern boundary
of the project as a public road. In fact, the road was privately
owned. Capeletti had an agreement with the owner to use the pri-
vate road. Before the bids were submitted, Capeletti notified the
DCA 1981).
581. 417 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
582. Id. at 736.
583. Id. at 735.
584. 432 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
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project architect of the mistake in the drawings and asked whether
another access road would be provided to the successful bidder. No
answer was received. After the bids were opened, the Department
announced its intent to award the contract to the lowest bidder.
Capeletti timely filed a notice of protest and a petition for a sec-
tion 120.57(1) proceeding. The Department notified the lowest bid-
der that it was rejecting all bids because the site drawing was mis-
leading. The lowest bidder then filed a notice of protest and a
request for a section 120.57(1) proceeding. The two petitions were
consolidated for hearing; the hearing officer found that neither the
parties nor the other bidders had been misled by the site drawings
and recommended the award of the contract to the original lowest
bidder. The Department rendered its final order accepting the
hearing officer's recommendation and Capeletti appealed. The
court's discussion of the access question was limited to this foot-
note observation: "[n]o issue has been raised on appeal regarding
the standing of Capeletti, the fourth lowest bidder, to challenge
DGS' agency actions. In any event, Capeletti's interest would ap-
pear to be substantial enough to support such standing." '585
If the court had tested Capeletti's right to challenge the Depart-
ment's initial decision to award the contract to the lowest bidder
under the "affected adversely" standard, it probably would have
concluded that he was entitled to a section 120.57(1) proceeding.
Capeletti's position was that the bid specification materials were
materially misleading and that the three bids lower than its bid,
therefore, did not reflect the real cost of performing the contract.
The Department's decision to award the contract to the apparent
lowest bidder in these circumstances adversely affected Capeletti
and it should have been permitted to challenge the agency decision
for that reason.
Resolution of public contract bid disputes has been singled out
by the legislature for special treatment. The notice requirements
imposed on agencies and the prehearing requirements imposed on
protesters are different from the requirements imposed by section
120.57. Although bid disputes ultimately may be resolved in a sec-
tion 120.57 adjudicatory proceeding, the legislature has specified
that only persons "affected adversely" by an agency decision may
request such a proceeding. Persons "affected adversely" by the
agency decision are also likely to be parties whose substantial in-
terests are determined by the agency as International Medical
585. Id. at 1360 n.1 (citation omitted).
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Centers and Capeletti Brothers indicate. Nevertheless, the two
standards are not necessarily synonymous and attempts to make
them so should be discouraged by analyzing access questions in
this context against the "affected adversely" standard the legisla-
ture provided specifically for bid disputes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article challenges several well entrenched propositions in
Florida administrative law relating to the right to initiate various
administrative proceedings. It is critical of reliance on federal law
in general and federal judicial standing law in particular to resolve
questions of access to these executive forum proceedings. It pro-
poses language without judicial connotations to be used when
thinking and talking about the right to initiate administrative pro-
ceedings. It suggests a new analytical approach which emphasizes
the access language provided by the legislature for each of the
seven proceedings available and which stresses the importance of
understanding the function or purpose of each proceeding and the
relationship between each proceeding's function and the right to
initiate or participate in it. The access standards which result from
this analysis are not as familiar to judges and lawyers as are the
judicial standing rules, but they do reflect the institutional differ-
ences between the executive and the judicial branches of govern-
ment and they do better serve the interests intended by the legis-
lature to be served.
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